THE  WAR  OF  POSITIONS 


BY 
LT.  COLONEL  PAUL  AZAN,  Litt.D. 

OF  THE  FRENCH  ARMT 
WITH  A  PREFACE  BY 

BRIGADIER  GENERAL  JOSEPH  E.  KUHN,  U.S.A. 

TRANSLATED  AT  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


THIRD   IMPRESSION 


CAMBRIDGE 

1  ARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1917 


COPYRIGHT,  1917 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


(LCD-  Z; 

PREFACE 

IT  is  unfortunate  that  authors  of  books  are  so  rarely 
known  to  their  readers.  This  is  especially  true  of 
books  dealing  with  professional  matters.  In  such  cases 
one  would  like  to  be  assured  that  the  author  really 
knows  his  subject,  and  is  not  merely  a  tyro  feeding  his 
readers  with  self-derived  knowledge. 

In  Lieutenant  Colonel  Paul  Azan  we  have  a  fine  type 

^of  the  French  officer,  a  representative  of  that  noble, 

■r:  glorious,  and  chivalrous  Army  which  has  for  three  years 

93  challenged  the  admiration  of  the  world,  friend  and  foe 

a;  alike.    He  has  learned  his  subject,  not  only  theoreti- 

.=c  cally,  but  also  practically,  through  long  service  in  the 

=3  trenches  and  at  the  expense  of  honorable  wounds.    It 

"^  is  to  be  regretted  that  all  who  read  his  book  cannot 

know  the  author  personally. 

A  War  of  Positions,  such  as  is  being  waged  to-day,  has 
never  been  known  before  —  at  least  not  on  anything 
approaching  the  present  scale.  It  has  been  made  pos- 
sible by  the  mutual  action  and  reaction  of  firearms  and 
of  field  works,  aided  on  both  sides  by  the  recent  progress 
of  all  sorts  of  technical  inventions. 

In  the  exposition  of  his  subject  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Azan  has  presented  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
war  of  positions  in  an  exceptionally  clear  and  able 


^GG 


PREFACE 

manner.  While  written  primarily  for  the  soldier,  the 
book  is  full  of  interest  for  the  layman,  and  will  enlighten 
the  latter  as  to  why  it  is  so  difficult  to  attain  a  military 
decision  between  antagonists  fairly  equal  as  to  num- 
bers,  resourcefulness,  and  industrial  development. 

JOSEPH  E.  KUHN, 

Brigadier  General,  General  Staff, 
President  Army  War  College. 

Army  Wab  College, 

July  £4,  1917. 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  present  war,  with  its  multitude  of  new  forms, 
has  come  as  a  surprise  to  that  school  of  writers  who 
believed  that  they  could  find  the  secret  of  victory  in 
certain  immutable  precepts. 

They  might  have  avoided  this  misconception  by  a 
study  of  history.  There  they  would  have  learned  that 
although  the  same  great  principles  of  strategy  brought 
victory  to  Hannibal,  to  Caesar,  and  to  Napoleon,  yet 
tactics  have  undergone  countless  fluctuations  in  the 
course  of  centuries,  on  account  of  the  development  of 
armament. 

The  curve  of  tactics  is  ever  varying,  yet  always  con- 
tinuous. Among  those  forces  whose  resultant  deter- 
mines its  direction,  two  in  particular  have  greatly 
increased  in  recent  years,  the  destructive  power  of 
cannon,  the  resisting  capacity  of  field  works.  A  careful 
evaluation  of  the  importance  of  these  forces  in  the 
recent  wars  of  the  Transvaal,  of  Manchuria,  and  of 
the  Balkans  has  made  it  possible  to  sketch  this  curve 
day  by  day,  to  note  its  sinuosities,  and  to  follow  its 
development  in  a  new  direction. 

Yet  all  this  time  certain  arm-chair  theorists,  closing 
their  eyes  to  actual  facts,  have  still  remained  in  the 
domain  of  speculation.  As  a  basis  for  their  doctrines, 
they  have  taken  the  victories  of  Napoleon,  or  the  battles 


INTRODUCTION 

of  1870.  In  their  wake  a  number  of  men  of  intelligence 
have  been  drawn  by  their  imagination  or  by  their 
enthusiasm  into  the  realm  of  hypothesis  and  fancy,  to 
the  entire  neglect  of  those  qualities  of  reflection  and 
judgment,  which  constitute  the  true  value  of  a  leader. 

In  the  present  war  a  similar  state  of  affairs  has  been 
seen.  Bow  many  military  critics  have  proclaimed  the 
impossibility  of  laying  down  general  rules,  on  the  ground 
thai  the  conditions  of  battle  were  constantly  changing! 
From  time  to  time  they  have  announced  the  passing 
of  a  new  milestone  in  the  evolution  of  tactics;  it  was 
merely  the  milestone  which  their  intelligence  had  passed 
on  its  road  towards  reality. 

Since  October  1914  the  tactical  curve  has  under- 
gone but  slight  modifications.  The  two  opposing  forces 
of  artillery  and  field  works  have,  perhaps,  gained  still 
further  in  importance,  each  one  developing  in  order  to 
overthrow  the  other.  But  the  essential  principles  of 
strategy  and  of  tactics  which  govern  the  course  of  the 
present  war  have  really  changed  but  little  since  that 
date,  nor  can  they  ever  vary  but  by  slow  degrees. 

This  work,  in  which  an  attempt  is  made  to  state 
these  principles,  is  written  for  those  who  have  not,  as 
yet,  taken  part  in  this  war,  in  order  to  spare  them  a 
difficult  and  dangerous  apprenticeship.  Perchance  it 
will  also  give  food  for  study  and  reflection  to  those  of 
my  young  comrades  who  are  seeking  day  by  day,  at 
the  price  of  untold  efforts,  suffering,  and  bloodshed,  to 
hasten  the  hour  of  victory. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface iii 

Introduction v 

PART  I 
THE  PRESENT  WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

Character  and  Forms  of  Warfare 

General  Characteristics 5 

Different  Forms  of  Warfare 7 

CHAPTER  II 

Combat  on  a  Front 

Fronts  in  General 12 

Normal  and  Intensive  Attrition 13 

Principles  of  the  Offensive  on  a  Front 15 

Role  of  the  High  Command  in  an  Offensive 18 

The  Defensive 21 

CHAPTER  III 

Roles  and  Functions  of  the  Different  Arms 
of  the  Service 

Infantry 23 

Artillery 26 

Engineers 27 

Cavalry 29 

Aviation 31 


CONTENTS 

PART   II 

POSITIONS 

CHAPTER  I 

Organization  of  Positions 

Definition  of  Positions  and  their  Elements 37 

Trenches 38"* 

Plan  of  Organization 40 

Outline  of  the  First  line  Trench 41 

Interior  Shape  of  the  Trench 43 

Doubling  Trenches 46 

Transversal  Trenches 48 

Support  Trenches 48 

Covering  Line  for  Artillery 50 

Boyaux 51 

Shelters,  Observing  Stations,  etc 53 

CHAPTER  II 

Trench  Duties 

Liaison 55 

The  Stay  in  the  Trenches 61 

R61e  of  the  Commanders 62 

Activities  of  the  Troops 63 

Supply  of  the  Trench 65 

CHAPTER  III 

Relief 

General  Principles  of  Relief 68 

March  of  a  Unit  from  its  Cantonment  to  the  Trenches  .       69 

Replacing  of  the  Unit  in  Line 70 

Return  of  the  Unit  Relieved      75 


CONTENTS 

PART  III 
ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

CHAPTER  I 

General  Remarks  on  Offensive  Combat 

Parts  Played  by  the  Different  Arms  in  the  Engagement       84 
R61e  of  the  Command 87 

CHAPTER  II 

Preparation  of  the  Attack 

Detailed  Study  of  the  Two  Opposing  Positions  ....  90 

Material  Am6nagement  of  the  Departure  Position    .    .  93 

Smashing  the  Enemy's  Position 97 

Physical,  Professional,  and  Moral  Training  of  the  Troops  103 

CHAPTER  III 

Attack 

Formations  Adopted  for  the  Attacking  Units     ....  106 

Mechanism  of  March  and  of  Combat 107 

Struggle  Inside  the  Position 113 

Night  Fighting 119 

Orders  and  Reports 121 

Liaisons  during  the  Attack 124 

Liaison  of  the  Attacking  Troops  with  the  Artillery   .    .  126 

Forwarding  of  Reserves,  Munitions,  and  Food   ....  128 

Organization  of  the  Conquered  Position      129 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV 
Pursuit 

Maintenance  of  Contact  with  the  Enemy 132 

Continuity  of  Movement  beyond  the  Position    ....     133 
l(  r  and  Demoralization  of  Troops  in  Retreat  and 

of  Reserves 136 

Taking  the  Enemy's  lines  in  the  Rear 139 

[Idle  of  the  Command     I40 

CHAPTER  V 
March  of  Approach 

Preparation  of  the  Approach 144 

Execution  of  the  Approach 145 

Role  of  the  High  Command 148 

PART  IV 
DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

CHAPTER  I 

General  Observations  on  Defensive  Fighting 

Preliminary  Remarks 153 

CHAPTER  II 

Organization  of  the  Defense 

Detailed  Study  of  the  two  Opposing  Positions    ....  156 

Material  Am6nagement  of  the  Position 157 

Physical  and  Moral  Preparation  of  the  Troops  ....  159 

Role  of  the  Command 160 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  III 

Defense 

Maintenance  of  the  Troops  under  Bombardment  ...     162 

Defense  of  the  First  Line 164 

Fighting  in  the  Interior  of  the  Position    . 166 

CHAPTER  IV 

Retreat 

Re-alignment  of  the  Front 168 

Retreat  under  Hostile  Pressure 170 

CHAPTER  V 

Retour  Offensif 

Objects  and  Methods 173 

Conclusion 174 

Glossary 183 


PART  I 
THE  PRESENT  WAR 


War,  as  it  is  waged  to-day,  presents  a  new  aspect.  This  is  not 
exactly  the  same  in  all  countries;  since  the  length  and  geo- 
graphical nature  of  the  fronts,  as  well  as  the  strength  and 
quality  of  the  armies  in  Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Serbia,  and 
Russia  are  not  comparable.  Everywhere,  however,  the  gen- 
eral characteristics  of  the  war  remain  the  same,  since  they  are 
the  result  of  two  essential  factors:  the  destructive  power  of 
heavy  artillery  and  the  defensive  efficiency  of  field  works. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  say  that  there  are  different  principles  of 
war  for  different  fronts,  or  different  countries.  War  between 
two  adversaries,  who  possess  sufficient  forces,  similar  arms,  and 
equivalent  moral  courage,  is  always  dominated  by  the  same 
principles,  and  produces  the  same  effects.  If  it  takes  a  different 
form,  it  is  because  one  of  the  adversaries  is  notably  inferior 
to  the  other.  Such,  for  instance,  is  the  case  when  an  army 
without  artillery  and  without  munitions  is  opposed  to  one  pro- 
vided with  all  the  modern  engines  of  destruction.  Under  such 
circumstances,  war  assumes  the  aspect  of  the  chase,  and 
involves  similar  momentary  risks;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt 
as  to  the  outcome;  victory  is  certain,  and  cannot  be  long 
delayed. 


CHAPTER  I 

CHARACTER  AND  FORMS  OF  WARFARE 

General  Characteristics 

The  development  of  armaments  has  profoundly  affected  the 
conditions  of  combat  between  two  armies. 

The  infantry  of  each  side  suffers  enormous  losses  when  it  is 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  machine  guns,  of  field  or  of  heavy  artil- 
lery; moreover,  in  order  to  hold  its  ground,  it  is  obliged  to  dig 
itself  in.  Furthermore,  it  must  surround  itself  with  accessory 
defenses,  in  order  to  avoid  surprise  by  the  enemy's  infantry. 

Consequently  the  assailant  is  held  in  one  position.  When 
he  tries  to  envelop  the  flanks  of  the  enemy,  troops  are  rushed 
to  the  menaced  point,  stop  him,  and  hold  him  in  the  same 
way  in  a  position  beside  the  first  one. 

And  so  the  line  of  each  army  extends  farther  and  farther 
until  both  ends  rest  simultaneously  on  impassable  barriers, 
the  sea  or  neutral  countries,  which  are  the  lateral  limits  of 
the  fronts. 

Thus  it  is  that,  after  the  first  encounters,  a  long  ribbon 
called  a  trench  is  unrolled  automatically  along  the  front  of 
each  army.  Between  the  two  trenches  is  a  neutral  zone  of 
variable  width,  at  the  most  of  some  hundreds  of  yards. 

If,  in  the  present  war,  the  adversaries  could  have  foreseen 
from  the  beginning  the  part  which  "  the  trench  "  was  destined 
to  play,  they  would  have  made  other  preparations.  Each 
would  have  built  a  veritable  "  Chinese  wall,"  destined  to 

[5] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

guarantee  the  integrity  of  his  national  territory.  From  the 
v.Tv  first  day,  the  struggle  would  have  assumed  the  aspect 
th.it  it  has  since  acquired.  This  is  exactly  what  happened  on 
the  Austro-Italian  front. 

The  trench  dug  along  the  front  of  each  of  the  armies  does 
not  remain  in  the  form  of  a  single  line.  The  points  which  are 
most  important  by  reason  of  their  eventual  strategic  or 
tactical  value  are  strongly  organized;  they  become  centres  of 
resistance,  made  up  of  a  redoubt,  in  front  of  which  extend  sys- 
tems of  trenches. 

One  or  many  centres  of  resistance,  along  with  the  trenches 
which  surround  or  unite  them,  constitute  a  position. 

Each  position  occupies  a  zone  of  very  variable  extent. 
This  zone  corresponds  ordinarily  to  the  task,  offensive  or 
defensive,  which  a  large  unit,  army,  army  corps,  or  division, 
is  expected  to  perform. 

A  position  has  both  an  offensive  and  a  defensive  function. 
It  is  in  the  shelter  of  its  intrenchments  that  the  attack  to  be 
carried  out  by  a  large  unit  is  prepared:  it  is  also  by  means  of 
this  organized  position  that  an  advance  of  the  enemy  can  be 
repelled. 

The  front  of  an  army  is  made  up  of  all  the  positions  placed 
side  by  side  in  an  unbroken  line,  and  resting  throughout  its 
depth  on  well  chosen  successive  lines. 

Behind  the  front,  other  positions  are  prepared  and  main- 
tained, especially  at  points  of  strategic  or  tactical  importance, 
in  order  to  arrest  a  possible  retreat  of  the  troops  from  the 
front  line. 

Combat  between  two  opposing  armies  consists  in  attacking 
and  defending  positions.    The  offensive  as  well  as  the  defen- 
ce] 


CHARACTER  AND  FORMS  OF  WARFARE 

sive  may  be  local,  multiple,  or  general,  according  to  whether 
it  occurs  in  a  limited  zone,  in  several  different  zones,  or  along 
the  entire  front. 

A  general  offensive,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  is 
impossible  on  a  very  widely  extended  front;  to  execute  and 
maintain  it  would  demand  immense  resources  both  in  men  and 
matenel.  Therefore  a  combat  characterized  by  a  multiple 
offensive  in  a  certain  number  of  zones  and  by  a  multiple  defen- 
sive in  the  complementary  zones,  along  a  widely  extended 
front,  is  termed  a  general  offensive. 

Different  Forms  of  Warfare 

The  present  war  may  be  called  a  war  of  positions. 

It  seems  to  resemble  a  war  of  sieges,  but  really  differs  from 
it  in  many  respects;  in  certain  special  contingencies,  however, 
it  permits  a  real  war  of  sieges  to  take  place. 

Lastly,  it  stamps  its  special  characteristics  upon  war  of 
movement,  in  those  exceptional  cases  in  which  the  latter  be- 
comes possible. 

Whenever  two  adversaries  are  approximately  equal  in 
power,  the  war  of  positions  is  the  only  one  possible.  Admit- 
ting that  the  line  of  resistance  of  one  of  them  may  be  tempo- 
rarily pushed  back  on  a  large  extent  of  front,  and  that  two  or 
even  three  successive  lines  of  positions  may  be  carried,  there 
always  remains  in  the  rear  another  line  of  positions,  under  the 
cover  of  which  the  vanquished  party  may  reorganize  his 
forces;  the  parts  of  the  front  adjoining  that  which  has  given 
way  accept  the  necessity  of  retirement  and  set  themselves  to 
work  to  straighten  out  the  line.  War  of  movement  is,  there- 
fore, restricted  to  the  space  which  separates  the  positions 

captured  from  the  positions  behind  them. 

[7] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  victorious  offensive  definitively  cuts 
the  enemy's  line,  war  of  movement  may  find  wider  scope. 
ESther  the  beaten  troops  become  demoralized  and,  if  pursued 
with  energy,  tlirow  their  own  reserves  into  disorder  —  thus 
causing  a  disaster  which  the  resistance  of  a  few  fragments  of 
i  he  line  will  have  great  difficulty  in  repairing;  or  else  the  rem- 
nants of  these  troops,  falling  back  on  unshaken  reserves,  are 
able,  with  them,  to  rally  on  new  positions;  in  this  latter  case 
each  fragment  individually  experiences  war  of  movements, 
though  it  tends  to  establish  itself,  for  actual  fighting,  in  a 
position  which  it  either  reinforces  or  prepares  afresh. 

War  of  movement  is  thus,  for  the  time  being,  generally 
imposed  by  the  stronger  on  the  weaker  side;  in  fact  it  logically 
betokens  the  beginning  of  victory.  But  it  modifies  itself  more 
or  less  rapidly,  according  to  the  courage  or  the  tenacity  of  the 
defeated  troops,  into  a  war  of  positions;  it  thus  permits  the 
equilibrium  of  combat  to  be  reestablished  and  a  new  line  of 
resistance  to  be  formed.  Then  the  war  of  positions  begins 
again. 

There  are,  nevertheless,  circumstances  in  which  the  war 
does  not  present  the  aspect  of  two  lines  of  opposing  positions, 
each  endeavoring  to  force  the  other  back,  but  in  which  it 
resumes  the  features  of  a  war  of  movement. 

These  instances  are  as  follows: 

1.  When  one  of  the  armies  is  insufficiently  supplied  either 
with  men  or  matenel,  to  cover  the  fronts  which  it  must  hold; 

2.  When  one  of  the  armies,  having  its  front  well  supplied, 
lacks  sufficient  reserves  either  in  men  or  in  materiel,  to  go  to 
the  rescue  in  case  a  breach  is  made.    This  might  occur  when  a 

[8] 


CHARACTER  AND  FORMS  OF  WARFARE 

belligerent,  enfeebled  by  the  wastage  of  the  war,  did  not 
soon  enough  accept  the  necessity  of  shortening  his  front. 

3.  When  the  armies  facing  each  other  have  to  manoeuver 
over  a  large  space  in  comparison  with  the  amount  of  their 
effectives  —  as  in  East  Africa  or  Equatorial  Africa,  in  Meso- 
potamia, etc. 

In  these  different  instances,  the  troops  are  no  longer  held  in 
by  a  continuous  barrier  which  prevents  manoeuvering.  And 
yet,  when  they  come  into  contact,  they  all  consolidate  their 
positions  by  digging  trenches,  by  providing  them  with  acces- 
sory defenses,  by  utilizing  their  artillery  to  the  best  possible 
advantage.  Thus  the  actual  combat,  which  follows  these 
preparations,  takes  on  the  same  character  as  the  war  of 
positions. 

Movement,  when  it  becomes  possible,  is  limited,  further- 
more, by  a  reason  other  than  the  encountering  of  organized 
positions;  this  is  the  difficulty  of  transporting  an  adequate 
supply  of  materiel  and  of  provisions. 

Bold  and  rapid  manoeuvers,  such  as  used  to  be  carried 
out,  have  become  very  difficult.  Napoleon  could  say  that  he 
"  made  war  by  the  legs  of  his  soldiers,"  because  his  success 
came  through  bringing  up  his  infantry  by  forced  marches,  in 
order  that,  at  the  critical  moment,  they  should  intervene  on 
the  battle  field. 

To-day,  it  is  the  heavy  artillery  which  must  be  moved  in 
order  to  win.  For  this,  railroads  are  necessary,  or  at  least 
excellent  roads  that  will  support  immense  burdens.  As  the 
defeated  army  is  certain  to  destroy,  or  at  least  to  injure,  its 
lines  of  communication  in  its  retreat,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
repair  them.    The  preparation  of  gun-emplacements,  and  of 

[9] 


THE  I'KESENT  WAR 

ammunition  depots,  demands  much  labor;  for  the  heaviest 
guns  it  is  even  necessary  to  construct  platforms.  The  installa- 
t  i.>ri  of  telephones  between  the  observing  stations,  the  guns, 
and  the  commanders  is  a  long  affair.  The  artillery  fire  must 
be  adjusted  on  new  targets.  All  these  preparations  take  time. 
!\ ,  t his  art illery  will  be  of  very  little  use  in  the  battle  if  it 
is  not  furnished  with  an  enormous  amount  of  ammunition, 
capable  of  being  supplied  without  interruption;  this  one  great 
need,  with  which  are  connected  so  many  others  relative  to  the 
supplying  of  the  troops,  makes  essential  a  system  of  communi- 
cations in  which  railroads,  coming  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
front  line,  are  necessary. 

Rapidity  and  range  of  movement  in  the  present  war  are, 
consequently,  proportional  to  the  mobility  of  the  heavy 
artillery. 

The  most  important  feature  of  moving  from  one  position  to 
another  no  longer  consists  in  the  approach  of  the  infantry  and 
of  the  field  artillery,  but  rather  in  the  transportation  and  in  the 
setting  up  of  the  heavy  artillery.  Movement  is  made  easier 
if  it  be  possible  to  keep  in  hand  a  supply  of  heavy  materiel 
loaded  on  wheels  or  tractors,  ready  to  follow  instantly  in  the 
wake  of  victorious  troops. 

Detachments  of  all  arms  excepting  heavy  artillery,  but  in- 
cluding field  pieces,  motor-carried  guns,  and  armored  cars,  may 
have  important  results  in  a  pursuit;  they  may  also  promote 
success  by  effecting  a  surprise  or  by  making  a  diversion.  But 
they  cannot  assault  a  strongly  organized  position  defended  by 
seasoned  troops. 

To  gain  victory,  it  is  essential  to  have  heavy  artillery  in  as 
large  quantities  as  possible,  furnished  with  up-to-date  means 
of  transport,  and  supplied  with  abundant  ammunition. 
[10] 


CHARACTER  AND  FORMS  OF  WARFARE 

This  heavy  artillery  must  be  of  the  rapid-fire  type,  since  in 
the  same  length  of  time  a  rapid-fire  gun  will  throw  as  many 
projectiles  as  several  slow-firing  ones,  since  it  can  be  much 
more  easily  moved  and  installed  in  a  new  position,  and  since 
it  demands  fewer  men  to  handle  it. 

The  considerable  breadth  of  the  zone  in  which  an  attack 
must  be  carried  out,  from  one  position  to  another,  demands 
immense  expenditure  of  ammunition,  and  causes  rapid  deterio- 
ration of  the  guns.  Only  intensive  manufacture  can  keep  up 
with  this  prodigious  consumption  of  cannon  and  shells. 

Thus  the  present  war  is,  from  many  points  of  view,  a  war  of 
materiel. 


fn] 


CHAPTER  II 

COMBAT  ON  A  FRONT 

Fronts  in  General 

A  front  is,  from  the  strategic  point  of  view,  an  unbroken 
line  of  positions,  limited  in  length  by  an  insurmountable 
obstacle  at  each  end. 

A  front  is  generally  subdivided  into  a  series  of  zones,  each 
of  which,  by  an  extension  of  meaning,  is  called  a  front.  Tins 
occurs  particularly  when  several  allied  nations  share  the  same 
front;  in  such  cases  one  speaks,  according  to  the  nationality  of 
the  troops  engaged,  of  the  Belgian  front,  the  English  front,  the 
French  front. 

Whatever  may  be  the  number  of  fronts  held  by  a  single 
nation  or  by  several  allied  nations,  one  essential  principle  must 
dominate  in  the  conflict :  the  perfect  coordination  of  efforts. 

For  a  nation,  acting  independently,  this  coordination  is 
ensured  by  the  Commander-in-Chief.  For  a  group  of  allied 
nations,  it  is  secured  by  a  single  body,  a  sort  of  Superior  Coun- 
cil, whose  orders  are  executed  by  the  Commanders-in-Chief  on 
each  front. 

The  judicious  distribution  of  human  effectives  or  of  material 
reserves,  the  opportunities  of  bringing  them  into  action,  the 
intensifying  or  easing  up  of  attacks  on  this  or  that  front  are 
thus  regulated  by  a  supreme  authority  whose  sole  aim  is  to 
win. 

[12] 


COMBAT  ON  A  FRONT 

Victory  is  obtained  by  the  destruction  of  the  armies  of  the 
enemy.  On  every  front,  therefore,  this  is  the  result  which  must  be 
attained. 

Normal  and  Intensive  Attrition 

Combat  on  a  front  is  the  sum  total  of  the  daily  engagements 
which  occur  there,  both  offensive  and  defensive. 

Its  aim  is  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  army. 

This  army  is  protected  by  a  trench,  a  long  barrier  bristling 
with  positions.  It  has  at  command  reserves  which  are  dis- 
tributed behind  the  principal  zones,  ready  to  move  toward 
any  threatened  point. 

The  endeavor  is  to  compass  the  destruction  of  this  army 
by  attrition. 

Attrition  is  the  loss  in  men  and  in  materiel  imposed  upon  the 
adversary  during  a  definite  period. 

Attrition  in  men  is  irreparable.  Even  supposing  that  a 
higher  birth  rate  may  more  than  compensate  the  losses  of  a 
nation,  this  increase  will  be  of  no  advantage  to  the  armies 
for  twenty  years.  Attrition  in  men  is  estimated  by  adding 
together  the  killed  and  the  permanently  disabled.  Its  real 
importance  is  determined  at  any  given  period  by  comparing 
two  numbers:  the  total  number  of  men  who  were  subject  to 
mobilization  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  or  have  become  so 
since,  and  the  total  number  of  the  killed  and  unfit. 

Attrition  in  materiel  may  be  repaired  by  increased  activity 
in  the  factories.  Thus  its  real  importance  is  estimated  by  the 
difference  between  production  and  consumption;  it  depends, 
furthermore,  on  the  difference  between  the  stock  of  raw 
material  and  the  demands  of  manufacture.  If  either  one  of 
these  differences  diminishes  to  the  vanishing  point  every 

[13] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

increased   demand  for  consumption  and  every  accidental 
delay  in  production  may  mean  disaster. 

Attrition  is  the  more  dangerous  for  a  nation,  all  of  whose 
fronts  are  being  engaged,  in  that  it  possesses  the  less  reserves. 
There  comes  a  moment  in  fact  when  the  dearth  of  effectives  is 
refected  not  only  in  the  number  of  troops  at  the  front,  but 
also  in  the  number  of  workers  in  the  factories.  Then  it 
becomes  necessary  either  to  shorten  the  front,  or  to  diminish 
industrial  production. 

Attrition,  on  the  contrary,  is  less  dangerous  for  a  nation 
which  has  a  considerable  reservoir  of  human  reserves. 

In  any  event,  it  is  always  necessary  to  keep  a  close  watch  on 
attrition  in  materiel,  since  the  number  of  cannon  adequately 
furnished  with  munitions  is  often  more  important  than  the 
number  of  battalions  in  the  line.  Hitherto,  it  was  the  infantry 
of  the  two  opposing  sides  that  came  into  collision;  the  victory 
went  to  that  one  which  at  the  last  moment  could  avail  itself 
of  further  reserves  to  throw  in  against  the  troops  already  ex- 
hausted by  the  combat.  But  to-day  the  effect  of  artillery  on 
the  earthworks  and  guns  of  the  enemy  is  the  decisive  factor  in 
success;  victory  goes  to  that  army  which  has  guns  in  good 
condition  and  abundant  munitions,  as  against  an  enemy  whose 
supplies  have  given  out.  The  flinging  of  innumerable  infantry- 
men against  batteries  that  are  still  intact  results  in  nothing  but 
useless  slaughter. 

Normal  attrition  occurs  in  zones  which  are  stationary, 
in  other  words,  in  trench  warfare.  It  cannot  lead  to  any  deci- 
sive result.  On  the  other  hand  its  effectiveness  must  never  be 
lost  sight  of,  and  is  frequently  pointed  out  to  the  troops 
engaged,  because  it  stimulates  their  morale  and  their  activity 
during  those  periods  when  operations  have  slowed  down. 

[14] 


COMBAT  ON  A  FRONT 

Intensive  attrition  occurs  either  through  offensive  opera- 
tions which  are  conducted  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  out  the 
enemy  in  his  entrenchments,  and  which  cost  him  heavy  losses 
in  men  and  in  materiel,  either  through  capture  or  destruction; 
or  by  defensive  actions  which  prohibit  the  enemy  from  access 
to  occupied  positions. 

It  is  the  methodical  offensive  of  the  infantry,  prepared  and 
accompanied  by  a  powerful  artillery  fire,  which  at  a  given 
moment  causes  a  break  in  the  balance  of  power  between  the 
two  armies  by  reason  of  intensive  attrition  throughout  a 
large  zone. 

Principles  of  the  Offensive  on  a  Front 

The  offensive  on  a  given  front  is  always  general,  in  the  sense 
that  all  zones  are  constantly  preparing  for  conflict,  and  are 
continually  studying  the  methods  of  conducting  a  successful 
advance. 

Attacks  are  actually  set  in  motion,  however,  only  in  a  few 
zones,  since  it  would  demand  unlimited  reserves  both  in  men 
and  in  materiel  to  sustain  them  over  the  entire  front. 

The  principle  of  economy  of  forces  in  a  general  offensive, 
therefore,  makes  it  advisable  not  to  attack  in  certain  zones. 
In  particular,  it  is  wiser  to  rest  on  the  defensive  when  opposite 
positions  the  taking  of  which  would  have  no  important  tactical 
results,  or  would  necessitate  sacrifices  disproportionate  to 
possible  gains. 

The  zones  of  attack  are  determined  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  They  are  always  considerable  in  extent,  from  fifteen 
to  twenty  miles  or  more,  and  ordinarily  correspond  to  the 
strength  of  an  army.    Attacks  executed  on  a  narrower  front 

[15] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

force  the  troops  into  a  salient,  and  thus  expose  them  to  consid- 
er:! Lie  losses  without  obtaining  any  result. 

The  zones  of  attack  are  the  object  of  thorough  prelimi- 
nary study,  which  bears  on  the  organization  of  the  terrain,  as 
will  as  on  the  configuration  and  the  defense  of  the  enemy 
posit  ions.  Tins  study  takes  into  account  the  measure  of  com- 
pleteness  reached  by  the  preparations  for  the  offensive  in  all 
zones.  The  troops  in  the  trenches  should  devote  themselves 
unremittingly  to  these  preparations. 

Each  zone,  whether  or  not  it  be  in  the  plan  of  attack,  has  at 
call  its  own  reserves.  General  reserves,  in  as  large  numbers  as 
possible,  are  at  the  disposal  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

Different  attacks  are  not  necessarily  simultaneous;  if  they 
occur  in  succession  it  tends  to  disconcert  the  enemy. 

One  of  them  is  ordinarily  considered  the  principal  attack. 
It  has  as  its  object  the  capture  of  one  or  of  many  successive 
positions.  It  aims  to  enlarge  the  breach  already  made,  and  to 
bring  about  the  fall  of  the  positions  on  either  side  of  it. 

Secondary  attacks  are  as  far  as  possible  made  at  other 
points.  Their  purpose  is  not  only  to  make  the  enemy  uncer- 
tain as  to  the  direction  of  the  principal  attack  and  to  hold  in 
place  the  reserves  of  the  different  zones,  but  also  to  disor- 
ganize and  break  the  enemy's  fines  and  to  cause  him  to  move 
back. 

Every  attack  ought  to  be  conducted  with  extreme  vigor, 
until  its  predetermined  object  is  entirely  accomplished.  The 
chief  officer  charged  with  executing  it  should  assure  himself 
beforehand  that  he  has  at  his  disposal  the  means  necessary  to 
carry  it  through.    It  is  not  fcr  him  to  ask  whether  his  is  the 

[16] 


COMBAT  ON  A  FRONT 

principal  or  secondary  attack,  but  merely  to  take  to  heart  the 
idea  that  his  success  may  give  the  victory  to  his  country. 

Luck  plays  a  great  part  in  battles.  An  attack  considered  at 
the  beginning  as  secondary  may  become  the  principal  one,  if  its 
crushing  success  in  the  zone  where  it  occurs  brings  about 
unhoped  for  results. 

Thus,  every  partial  attack,  having  no  other  aim  than  that  of 
"  making  a  demonstration  "  ought  to  be  avoided.  It  can 
result  in  nothing  useful.  Even  the  capture  of  a  few  trenches 
does  not  deceive  the  enemy,  and  often  costs  the  troops  engaged 
heavier  losses  than  an  attack  of  great  magnitude. 

Two  conditions  are  essential  to  the  success  of  an  offensive: 
secrecy  of  preparation  and  rapidity  of  execution. 

Secrecy  is  obtained  by  the  disciplined  discretion  of  the  troops 
and  of  the  civil  population;  by  the  constant  carrying  on  of 
work  of  the  same  character  along  the  whole  front;  by  the 
ceaseless  watchfulness  of  the  aviators,  which  prohibits  recon- 
naissance by  the  enemy's  aviators. 

Rapidity  is  ensured  by  the  habits  of  order  and  discipline  of 
the  troops;  by  knowledge  of  and  obedience  to  the  rules  relat- 
ing to  the  occupation  of  positions;  by  the  foresight  of  the 
generals  and  their  staffs  during  their  preliminary  studies  and 
the  period  of  preparation. 

A  successful  attack  makes  a  breach  in  the  front  line  of 
the  enemy,  a  breach  which  becomes  deeper  and  wider  each 
day  through  the  fall  of  lateral  and  successive  positions. 

The  result  is  that  other  parts  of  the  front,  in  danger  of  being 
attacked  from  the  rear,  are  obliged  to  fall  back  in  order  to 
straighten  the  line. 

[17] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

This  is  the  movement  for  which  all  the  troops  in  line  are 
watching.  Through  incessant  activity  they  try  to  keep  the 
enemy  fixed  where  he  is;  they  thus  prohibit  him  from  retiring 
Ins  artillery  and  clearing  the  men  from  his  trenches;  they 
inform  themselves  concerning  his  situation  and  his  intentions 
by  every  possible  means,  especially  at  night. 

On  learningof  the  expected  retreat  they  followup  the  enemy's 
troops  closely,  harass  them  in  every  possible  way,  and  pursue 
them  without  respite.  Not  only  do  they  thus  secure  a  large 
section  of  territory,  of  which  the  possession  may  be  useful; 
but  above  all  they  bring  about  the  capture  or  destruction  of 
men  and  matenel  in  large  quantities,  which  is  a  sure  token  of 
victory. 

R6le  of  the  High  Command  in  an  Offensive 

The  Commander-in-Chief  chooses  the  zones  of  attack,  de- 
termines the  effectives  which  he  will  devote  to  each  of  them, 
and  fixes  the  day  on  which  the  attack  shall  take  place. 

He  confides  his  purpose  to  each  of  the  army  commanders 
whose  business  it  is  to  direct  an  attack.  He  indicates  to  each 
of  them  the  zone  which  is  to  be  his,  the  task  entrusted  to  him, 
the  effectives  and  material  resources  at  his  command,  and  the 
ultimate  aim  for  him  to  attain. 

Each  army  commander  acting  on  these  data  attends  to  the 
distribution  of  his  army  corps  and  to  the  drawing  up  of  the 
reserves  at  his  disposal;  he  indicates  to  every  commander  of 
an  army  corps  his  zone  of  attack,  the  part  he  is  to  play  and 
his  successive  objectives;  he  gives  all  the  orders  necessary  for 
the  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  positions,  the  preparation 
of  the  terrain,  the  organization  of  supplies. 

[18] 


COMBAT  ON  A  FRONT 

Each  army  corps  commander  gives  orders  relative  to  the 
preparation  and  execution  of  the  attack  within  the  limits  of 
his  own  zone  and  his  own  particular  mission. 

When  the  date  agreed  on  for  the  attack  is  near,  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, who  has  been  kept  constantly  informed  as  to 
the  state  of  preparation  for  the  different  attacks,  makes  certain 
that  this  preparation  is  absolutely  complete.  He  launches  the 
attacks  at  the  moment  winch  seems  to  him  opportune, 
either  simultaneously  or  in  succession. 

During  every  attack,  exactitude  and  continuity  of  informa- 
tion from  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  the  official  ladder  are  one 
of  the  essential  conditions  of  success. 

Each  army  commander  continually  reports  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief the  objectives  reached,  subsequent  possibili- 
ties, and  difficulties  encountered.  For  this  it  is  necessary  that 
he  himself  should  be  accurately  informed.  It  is  moreover  es- 
sential that  he  should  have  precise  information,  in  order  to  be 
able  to  play  his  personal  part,  limited  though  it  be,  in  the 
action  which  he  has  prepared,  since  he  has  to  send  in  his 
reserves  at  the  right  moment  if  the  attack  appears  to  be 
approaching  success,  and  must  not  waste  them  uselessly  if 
the  attack  has  encountered  insurmountable  difficulties. 

It  is  the  army  commanders,  who,  by  their  reports,  furnish 
the  Commander-in-Chief  with  the  means  of  making  a  decision; 
for,  in  the  equation  to  be  solved,  they  substitute  concrete  num- 
bers for  algebraic  symbols.  Whatever  may  be  the  accuracy  of 
the  data  which  the  General  may  have  collected  beforehand  as 
to  the  objective  of  the  attack,  he  cannot  foretell  the  enemy's 
capacity  of  resistance,  because  this  depends  on  factors  impos- 
sible to  estimate  —  the  destructive  effect  of  the  attacking 

[19] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

artillery,  the  quality  of  the  enemy's  Command,  the  tenacity  of 
his  troopfl  in  defense,  etc. —  factors  which  are  completely 
revealed  only  during  the  course  of  the  attack. 

Only  the  Commander-in-Chief  who  is  informed  as  to  the 
collective  result  of  the  attacks  has  sufficient  knowledge  to 
continue  them,  to  develop  them,  or  to  stop  them. 

When  he  has  discovered  the  zone  in  which  it  is  to  his  interest 
to  continue  his  efforts,  he  directs  his  general  reserves  thither 
and  diminishes  gradually  those  attacks  which  have  become 
secondary.  At  need  he  even  draws  upon  the  reserves  of  other 
zones  in  order  to  turn  the  scale  of  victory. 

The  rapid  transport  of  troops  to  the  theatre  of  the  principal 
attack  is  assured  by  railroads,  of  which  the  entire  system  has 
been  steadily  improved  and  completed  in  view  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  such  eventuality;  by  motor  transport,  which  can  be 
utilized  up  to  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  front. 

Thus  the  Commander-in-Chief  distributes  his  reserves  of 
men  and  matenel  with  a  full  knowledge  of  actual  conditions, 
in  order  to  accomplish  the  end  which  he  has  constantly  before 
him  —  the  destruction  of  the  hostile  army.  The  attainment  of 
predetermined  objectives  and  the  taking  of  powerful  positions 
are  simply  the  means  destined  to  bring  him  nearer  to  this  aim. 

Every  army  commander  acts  according  to  the  same  prin- 
ciple in  his  own  zone  of  attack.  If  his  task  is  completely 
accomplished,  new  horizons  may  suddenly  open  before  him. 
He  has  his  own  reserves  at  his  disposal,  and  is  thus  enabled  to 
keep  his  troops  going  and  the  front  line  supplied,  while  he  is 
waiting  for  the  decision  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

Although  the  idea  of  destroying  the  enemy  remains  the 
supreme  rule  of  war,  it  must  never  be  the  guiding  star  of  an 
[20] 


COMBAT  ON  A  FRONT 

army  corps  or  of  an  inferior  unit;  for  if  it  were,  there  would  in 
certain  instances  be  grave  danger  of  such  units  being  drawn  on 
toward  positions  where  the  High  Command  would  have  neither 
the  wish  nor  the  means  to  support  them.  Their  initiative  and 
dash  find  proper  expression  only  within  the  limits  of  the  tasks 
confided  to  them.  When  their  leaders  see  larger  possibilities, 
they  report  immediately  to  their  superior  officers;  the  army 
commanders  report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  while 
waiting  for  his  decision,  give  such  preliminary  orders  as  the 
situation  demands,  in  order  to  enable  them  to  follow  up  the 
success  without  delay.  An  attack  should  never  be  set  in  mo- 
tion unless  the  means  of  putting  it  through  have  been  prepared. 

The  Defensive 

To  rest  on  the  defensive  cannot  lead  to  any  decisive  result. 

The  losses  which  it  causes  the  enemy  do  not  prevent  him 
from  concentrating  his  forces  for  attack  whenever  and  wher- 
ever he  wishes;  its  effects  can  in  no  case  suffice  to  bring  the 
enemy  to  terms. 

A  local  defensive  may  be  determined  on  for  certain  zones,  to 
be  maintained  during  the  period  of  a  general  offensive;  but 
it  is  subject  to  rules  which  prohibit  it  from  being  passive; 
these  rules  will  be  studied  later  in  the  section  entitled  Defense 
of  a  Position. 

A  general  defensive  may  be  considered  as  a  possibility,  when 
the  enemy  has  taken  the  initiative  in  operations  along  the 
whole  front,  but  even  then,  passivity  is  no  more  excusable 
than  in  a  local  defensive. 

The  role  of  the  High  Command  in  such  a  case  is  analogous 
to  that  which  it  plays  in  an  offensive. 

[21] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

The  Commander-in-Chief,  fully  informed  by  frequent  and 
precise  reports  as  to  the  progress  of  the  different  attacks  which 
tic  must  inert,  discovers  the  principal  one;  at  an  opportune 
momenl  he  proceeds  to  the  redistribution  of  his  reserves  and  of 
his  materiel.  His  presence  of  mind,  decision,  and  judgment 
should  enable  him  to  avoid  a  haste  which  might  be  irreparable 
or  a  delay  which  might  be  fatal. 

It  is  his  duty  to  choose  the  moment  when  the  enemy  is 
repairing  his  losses  or  has  made  a  blunder  to  launch  a  counter 
attack  of  great  dimensions. 

If  he  has  kept  in  hand  sufficient  reserves  he  may  even  pass 
to  the  counter-offensive,  and,  taking  advantage  of  his  adver- 
sary's temporary  demoralization,  due  to  the  failure  of  the 
lattcr's  attempts  and  the  losses  of  his  troops,  win  a  victory 
which  could  not  have  been  gained  by  a  direct  offensive. 

Army  commanders  conform  to  the  same  principles  within 
the  limits  of  their  zones  of  attack  and  the  orders  that  have 
been  given  them.  Thejr,  in  particular,  have  it  in  their  power 
to  arrest  the  attack  of  the  enemy  and  to  regain  the  advantage 
by  means  of  opportune  counter  attacks. 

As  to  army  corps  and  lesser  units,  it  is  their  absolute  duty, 
except  in  case  of  formal  orders  to  the  contrary  from  the  High 
Command,  to  hold  the  positions  confided  to  their  charge,  cost 
what  it  may. 

A  wise  and  vigorous  defensive  may  prepare  the  way,  through 
the  losses  imposed  by  it  on  the  adversary,  for  an  ultimate 
offensive  which  will  break  the  enemy's  front  and,  in  conse- 
quence, bring  victory. 


[22] 


CHAPTER  III 

ROLES  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  DIFFERENT 
ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE 
Infantry 

Infantry  is  powerless  without  the  aid  of  artillery,  which 
shares  with  it  the  principal  role  in  combat.  But  its  task  is  the 
finest  and  the  most  heroic ;  since,  in  spite  of  the  curtain  of  fire 
with  which  the  artillery  tries  to  protect  it,  the  infantry  is 
obliged  deliberately  to  expose  itself  to  danger  and  to  pour  out 
its  blood  generously  in  order  to  win  success. 

It  acts  by  movement  and  by  fire.  During  an  attack  on  a 
position,  its  movement  assumes  the  character  of  successive 
assaults,  since  its  object  is  to  carry  lines  situated  at  short 
distances  from  each  other.  As  a  result  of  the  protection 
given  to  the  enemy  by  his  trenches,  the  bayonet  no  longer 
plays  as  important  a  part  in  these  assaults  as  formerly;  it  is 
superseded  or  replaced  by  the  grenade,  the  revolver,  and  the 
knife. 

Its  movement  assumes  the  aspect  of  a  march  of  approach 
when  it  occurs  between  two  positions  more  or  less  widely 
separated  from  each  other. 

By  the  use  of  appropriate  formations  the  infantry  can  pass 
through  artillery  barrages  or  diminish  the  effects  of  machine- 
gun  and  rifle  fire.  From  the  time  it  enters  the  zone  of  combat 
it  ought  absolutely  to  avoid  close  order  formations  such  as 
columns  of  four. 

[23] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

On  the  defensive,  movement  consists  in  counter  attacks 
which,  launched  at  an  opportune  moment,  may  have  a  de- 
cisive effect;  and  in  retovrs  offensijs  in  case  the  lines  have 
been  carried. 

Infantry  fire  is  the  work  of  the  rifle,  the  machine  gun,  the 
automatic  machine  rifle,  the  revolver,  the  rifle  grenade,  and 
t  lie  1  iand  grenade  —  and  those  artillery  pieces  called  infantry 
cannon,  trench  mortars,  etc. 

On  the  offensive,  fire  plays  a  less  important  part  than 
formerly.  It  is  begun  with  rifle  and  machine  gun,  when  an 
advance  cannot  otherwise  be  made.  Under  these  circum- 
stances it  becomes  a  means  of  progression  for  the  whole 
fighting  line,  as  well  as  a  moral  support  for  the  skirmisher 
who  has  been  obliged  to  stop;  but  its  employment,  when  it 
becomes  general  on  an  attacking  front,  indicates  either  serious 
difficulties  or  betokens  a  repulse. 

Rifle  grenades,  automatic  machine  rifles,  as  well  as  machine 
guns  boldly  placed  and  cleverly  managed,  throw  the  enemy 
into  disorder,  oblige  him  to  dig  in,  and  cause  losses.  These 
weapons  make  it  possible  to  keep  up  the  advance  little  by 
little.  On  the  approach  to  the  trenches  which  are  being 
attacked,  and  during  the  course  of  the  struggle  which  de- 
velops around  them,  automatic  machine  rifles,  hand  grenades, 
and  revolvers  take  their  toll  from  the  enemy's  infantry.  Port- 
able pieces,  such  as  the  37  mill.  (1.5-inch)  guns,  bring  success 
against  machine  guns  and  defenses  which  remain  in  being. 
These  pieces,  furthermore,  render  important  sendee  in  con- 
tinuing the  advance. 

On  the  defensive,  fire  retains  all  its  effectiveness.  A  line  of 
infantry  under  shelter,  which  keeps  its  presence  of  mind,  has 

[24] 


DIFFERENT  ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE 

a  good  chance  of  stopping  the  enemy  by  means  of  its  machine 
guns,  its  rifles  and  its  grenades.  Even  if  it  has  been  shaken 
by  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  even  if  its  trenches  and  its 
accessory  defenses  have  been  smashed  in,  it  can  lay  low  its 
assailants  before  it  comes  to  a  hand  to  hand  conflict,  and  with 
the  bayonet  dispose  of  the  demoralized  survivors. 

Machine  guns,  employed  with  the  same  audacity  as  on  the 
offensive,  play  a  considerable  part,  especially  by  flanking  fire 
and  enfilade.  Automatic  machine  rifles,  kept  under  cover  dur- 
ing the  bombardment,  are  set  up  at  an  opportune  moment; 
they  demand,  for  transportation  and  service,  a  less  numerous 
personnel  than  machine  guns;  handled  by  experienced  and 
resolute  marksmen,  they  have  great  effect.  Indeed,  if  these 
weapons  are  skilfully  utilized  on  the  defensive,  it  is  often 
possible  to  hold  the  first  line  with  a  smaller  number  of  troops. 
Trench  artillery,  which  is  not  intended  to  accompany  an 
advance,  but  only  to  prepare  the  way  for  it  by  its  effect  on 
the  enemy's  trenches,  may  be  more  powerful  than  pieces 
which  are  taken  forward  with  the  infantry;  it  is,  however, 
sometimes  put  out  of  action  by  the  enemy's  preparatory 
bombardment,  and  cannot  be  speedily  replaced. 

To  sum  up:  infantry  can  make  no  attempt  against  a  posi- 
tion unless  the  artillery  has  destroyed  the  accessory  defenses, 
smashed  the  trenches  and  demoralized  their  occupants.  To 
succeed,  furthermore,  it  must  needs  advance  with  prudence 
and  method,  with  the  constant  support  of  its  artillery,  and 
display  to  the  full  its  courage  and  its  energy. 

On  the  other  hand,  infantry  sheltered  by  its  trenches,  which 
clings  to  the  terrain  with  the  determination  to  hold  it  at 
whatever  cost,  may  inflict  enormous  losses  on  the  assailant 
and  stop  his  advance. 

[25] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

Artillery 

Artillery  plays  a  preponderant  part  in  combat.  On  the 
offensive  it  thoroughly  prepares  the  attack;  it  protects  the 
infantry  during  the  action  and  facilitates  its  advance.  Finally 
it  is  moved  forward  if  the  position  is  captured,  in  order  to 
make  the  pursuit  easier  and  to  prepare  if  necessary  the  attack 
on  the  next  position. 

On  the  defensive,  it  fires  on  the  concentrations  and  on  the 
changes  of  position  of  the  enemy's  troops  as  these  are  reported. 
It  delivers  barrages  when  the  infantry  calls  for  them.  At  the 
order  of  the  commander  it  effects  concentrations  of  fire,  which, 
on  account  of  the  great  range  of  the  pieces,  can  be  accomplished 
without  moving  them;  these  concentrations  are  directed  upon 
those  points  where  it  is  desirable  to  subject  the  enemy  to  the 
severest  kind  of  pounding.  Lastly,  it  can  assign  to  batteries 
and  isolated  pieces  the  task  of  catching  the  ranks  of  the 
assailants  as  much  as  possible  by  flanking  fire  or  enfilade; 
these  pieces  fire  until  the  last  moment,  sacrificing  themselves, 
if  need  be,  for  the  infantry. 

Heavy  artillery  acts  through  destructive  fire  on  well-defined 
objectives  and  on  strictly  limited  zones;  on  it  devolves  the 
duty  of  putting  out  of  action  or  at  least  of  neutralizing  the 
enemy's  artillery;  it  alone  is  able  to  smash  organized  defen- 
sive positions  which  have  been  long  established  and  con- 
stantly improved. 

Field  artillery  has  the  task  of  destroying  accessory  defenses 
or  lightly  built  shelters,  and  of  firing  on  the  enemy's  troops. 
Its  mobility  permits  it  to  take  part  in  the  forward  movement 
of  the  infantry,  to  continue  its  indispensable  support,  and  to 
play  a  role  in  pursuit. 

[26] 


DIFFERENT  ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE 

Trench  mortars  are  used  in  the  preparation  of  an  attack 
and  may  even  smash,  quite  unaided,  the  enemy's  first  line. 
During  the  combat  the  lightest  of  them  may  constitute  a 
sort  of  "infantry  artillery,"  advancing  in  the  wake,  and  at 
the  disposal,  of  the  infantry  units.  Tanks  are  automatically 
moving  pieces,  capable  of  traversing  every  kind  of  ground; 
they  accompany  or  precede  the  infantry,  in  order  to  facilitate 
the  accomplishment  of  its  task. 

The  first  essential  to  make  it  possible  for  the  artillery  to  fire 
to  good  advantage  is  that  it  should  be  able  to  see.  The  choice 
of  permanent  observing  stations  for  the  artillery  should  be 
primarily  determined  by  this  consideration,  and  is  of  great 
importance.  Indications  furnished  by  the  infantry,  either 
during  its  stay  in  the  trenches  or  during  the  course  of  its 
advance,  are  collected  by  special  observers  attached  to  it,  and 
in  constant  communication  with  the  batteries  by  telephone 
or  other  means.  Lastly,  in  many  instances,  the  aviators  are 
alone  able  to  furnish  precise  information  concerning  the 
objectives  to  be  fired  at  and  the  adjustment  of  the  guns;  if 
provided  with  accurate  observers  they  are  invaluable  collab- 
orators for  the  artillery;  captive  balloons  are  of  great  service 
to  the  heavy  artillery. 

Waste  of  ammunition  is  a  fault  which  cannot  be  too 
severely  reprehended.  A  large  expenditure  is  necessary  when 
favorable  opportunities  present  themselves,  with  the  cer- 
tainty of  attaining  useful  results;  for  that  very  reason  a  wise 
economy  is  the  more  indispensable  when  there  is  no  definite 
target  to  fire  at. 

Engineers 

The  engineers  are  the  constant  and  indispensable  auxiliary 
of  the  infantry.     Their  role  consists  in  organizing  positions, 

[27] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

together  with  the  infantry,  in  establishing  and  improving 
communications, ;incl  in  executing  or  directing  all  sapping  and 
mining  operations. 

The  wax  of  positions  has  greatly  developed  the  duties  of  the 
engineers,  so  much  so,  in  fact,  as  to  render  them  very  onerous. 
They  often  have  to  be  reserved  for  urgent  or  delicate  opera- 
tions, while  for  the  less  important  jobs  a  few  non-commissioned 
officers  and  sappers  direct,  aid,  and  advise  workmen  from  the 
infantry. 

On  the  offensive,  the  engineers  have  the  duty  of  preparing 
the  ways  of  access  to  the  enemy,  such  as  saps,  and  breaches 
for  sorties  in  the  accessory  defenses.  They  do  not  have  to 
open  passages  in  the  enemy's  defenses,  for  this  job  devolves 
on  the  artillery,  but  only  to  improve  them,  whenever  circum- 
stances permit.  If  possible,  they  connect  the  saps  through 
which  the  troops  emerge  from  their  trenches  with  the  first 
of  the  enemy's  trenches  which  are  taken. 

They  follow  the  first  waves  into  the  trenches,  in  order  to 
clean  the  latter  out,  to  repair  them,  and  if  need  be,  to 
reverse  them. 

If  the  position  is  taken,  the  engineers  consolidate  it  rapidly 
wit  h  the  aid  of  the  infantry,  provide  it  with  accessory  defenses 
and  accumulate  obstacles  which  can  be  used  to  oppose  a 
counter-attack:  not  till  later  do  they  undertake  a  methodical 
and  complete  organization  of  the  position. 

In  case  of  a  pursuit,  they  see  to  it  that  the  places  which  can 
be  utilized  for  the  passage  of  automobiles,  artillery,  cavalry, 
and  cyclists  are  completely  cleared,  and  constantly  maintained 
in  good  condition. 

[28] 


DIFFERENT  ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE 

On  the  defensive,  the  engineers  take  part  in  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  position  according  to  orders  given  by  the  com- 
manding officer;  they  install  and  repair  accessory  defenses 
and  construct  all  sorts  of  works  intended  to  augment  the  re- 
sisting power  of  the  trench,  and  the  security  of  its  occupants. 

The  engineers  have  special  charge  of  mining  operations. 
They  do  not  engage  in  them  however  except  as  a  means  to  an 
end  —  such  as  the  possession  of  an  important  post  of  observa- 
tion, or  the  occupation  of  a  flanking  salient;  for  the  smashing 
of  a  trench  has  no  great  intrinsic  importance.  They  are  some- 
times obliged  to  do  this,  however,  in  order  to  oppose  mining 
activities  by  the  enemy;  in  such  cases  they  limit  their  opera- 
tions to  those  which  are  indispensable  for  purposes  of  pro- 
tection. 

Cavalry 

Cavalry  plays  a  restricted  part  in  the  war  of  positions;  it 
can  only  be  utilized  in  pursuit  when  the  offensive  succeeds. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  resumes  its  full  activity  in  a  war  of 
movement. 

When  a  position  has  been  taken,  the  cavalry,  which  up  to 
this  time  has  been  kept  in  the  rear,  is  brought  forward  by 
ways  previously  reconnoitered,  and  crosses  the  trenches  by 
specially  prepared  bridges.  Its  officers  must  have  famil- 
iarized themselves,  by  actual  inspection  and  by  means  of 
maps,  with  the  terrain  on  which  they  are  going  to  send  their 
troops  into  action;  they  receive  from  the  High  Command  in- 
formation concerning  the  enemy,  collected  ever  since  the 
beginning  of  the  engagement,  and  indications  of  the  services 
they  may  be  able  to  render,  but  they  retain  a  large  measure  of 
initiative. 

[29] 


THE  PRESENT  WAR 

From  thai  lime  on,  the  cavalry  has  for  its  essential  function 
the  acceleration  and  completion  of  the  rout  of  the  enemy; 
for  this  purpose  it  operates  by  movement  and  by  fire.  It 
mpts  to  overtake  the  artillery  units  in  position  or  in 
re1  n  .1 1 :  and,  if  it  cannot  catch  up  with  them,  to  destroy  them 
by  its  fire.  It  separates  from  their  units  delayed  groups  of 
infantry  and  stragglers,  throws  the  reserves  into  confusion, 
causing  heavy  losses,  and  suiprises  transports  and  convoys. 
It  spreads  out  behind  the  enemy's  front,  thus  threatening  from 
the  rear  the  troops  still  in  line;  it  breaks  telegraph  and  tele- 
phone lines,  cuts  railways,  occupies  or  keeps  watch  on  centres 
of  communication.  It  sends  back  frequent  items  of  informa- 
tion to  the  commanding  officer. 

This  task  presents  very  great  difficulties.  The  crossing  of 
the  zone  of  hostile  trenches  can  only  be  accomplished  along 
routes  reconnoitered  either  by  the  infantry  or  by  cavalrymen 
sent  on  in  advance.  However  great  their  bravery  and  their 
skill,  the  latter  cannot  ride  across  ground  furrowed  in  all 
directions  by  trenches  and  boyaux,  pitted  with  shell  craters, 
and  worst  of  all,  strewn  at  every  step  with  barbed  wire.  Even 
supposing  that  none  of  the  hostile  groups  which  usually  hold 
out  here  and  there  can  fire  on  them,  they  are  soon  dismounted 
by  falls  and  injuries  to  their  horses.  Lastly,  a  single  machine 
gun  or  a  single  piece  of  artillery  may  take  frightful  and  almost 
immediate  toll  of  them. 

Therefore  cavalry  must  generally  follow  the  roads  in  order 
to  cross  the  zone  of  the  hostile  trenches;  but  if  batteries 
succeed  in  getting  them  under  fire  —  and  this  is  easy  on 
account  of  their  limited  speed  —  they  are  likely  to  be  almost 
completely  destroyed. 

[30] 


DIFFERENT  ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE 

Granted  that  it  succeeds  in  surmounting  these  obstacles 
unchecked,  the  cavalry  may,  in  the  course  of  pursuit,  en- 
counter a  second  position,  and  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
defending  artillery.  Only  in  case  of  deficient  organization  of 
this  position,  or  of  complete  demoralization  of  the  enemy,  does 
it  have  the  opportunity  of  effecting  a  surprise:  and  yet  this 
chance  should  always  be  taken,  for  if  success  ensues,  it  will 
bring  victory. 

Aviation 

The  aviation  corps  fulfills  the  functions  of  scouting,  of 
observation,  and  of  combat.  It  constitutes  a  permanent 
auxiliary  to  the  High  Command,  and  an  indispensable  adjunct 
of  the  artillery. 

It  includes  airplanes  of  different  types,  observation  bal- 
loons, and  dirigibles. 

The  essential  task  of  airplanes  is  to  reconnoiter  the  enemy's 
positions;  they  make  out  the  plan  of  his  trenches,  determine 
the  location  of  field  works  and  that  of  batteries;  they  achieve 
excellent  results  in  observation  by  means  of  photography. 
They  should  also,  in  their  daily  expeditions,  keep  watch  over 
the  movements  of  the  enenty  on  roads  or  on  railroads,  over 
changes  of  appearance  in  his  shelters,  over  the  works  he  has 
undertaken,  and  concentrations  of  his  troops.  All  information 
furnished  by  these  reconnaissances  is  sent  as  soon  as  possible 
to  the  High  Command. 

Airplanes  are  the  actual  posts  of  observation  for  the  artillery, 
when  observers  on  the  ground  have  an  inadequate  view;  they 
adjust  the  fire  of  the  batteries  by  means  of  signals  or  by  wire- 
less messages;  they  attempt  at  all  times  to  discover  and  indi- 
cate hostile  batteries  not  previously  located.    Artillery  officers 

[31] 


THE  PKESENT  WAR 

.should  make  themselves  familiar  with  the  science  of  aerial 
observation. 

During  :i  battle,  airplanes  are  both  means  of  reconnais- 
sance and  of  coordination.  They  must  keep  an  eye  on  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  on  concentrations  for  counter- 
attacks, on  forward  movements  of  the  reserves,  and  on  the 
directions  in  which  the  defeated  troops  retreat.  At  the  same 
time  they  keep  in  sight  of  the  attacking  troops;  they  signal  to 
the  commander  and  to  the  artillery  the  position  of  the  first 
line  of  infantry,  and  receive  and  transmit  the  latter's  requests. 

Airplanes  are  also  weapons  of  offense  and  defense. 

Their  usual  function  on  the  offensive  is  to  go  over  the 
enemy's  territory  in  order  to  drop  bombs  on  important  tactical 
points:  —  railway  stations,  factories,  camps,  depots,  barracks 
of  reserves,  points  of  concentration,  centres  of  communication. 
Airplanes  designated  for  bombardment  are  accompanied  by 
swifter  craft  armed  with  machine  guns  or  pom-poms,  whose 
duty  it  is  to  protect  them  against  possible  attack. 

During  a  battle,  they  can  play  a  valuable  part  by  using 
their  bombs,  their  cannon,  and  their  machine  guns  against 
troops  on  the  march  and  even  against  small  defensive  posi- 
tions. 

The  defensive  function  of  airplanes  is  to  establish  barrages 
along  the  approaches  to  the  front  line.  Battleplanes  strive  to 
prevent  the  observations  and  the  attacks  of  hostile  planes  by 
launching  themselves  in  pursuit  of  them  and  driving  them 
down.  Certain  planes  are  specially  used  against  observation 
balloons  or  dirigibles;  they  are  armed  with  specialized  imple- 
ments for  the  burning  or  destruction  of  these  machines.  The 
enemy  is  thus  hampered  in  the  acquisition  of  information, 

[32] 


DIFFERENT  ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE 

the  adjustment  of  his  fire,  and  in  making  trouble  behind  the 
lines. 

Observation  balloons  have  the  function  of  keeping  watch 
over  a  definite  area  of  the  enemy's  positions  and  of  furnishing 
the  Command  with  the  information  they  have  acquired.  They 
are  the  constant  auxiliaries  of  the  heavy  artillery,  with  which 
they  are  connected  by  telephone;  the  observers,  carrying 
field  glasses  of  long  range  and  high  magnifying  power,  indicate 
the  target  and  control  the  fire.  These  balloons,  placed  at  a 
sufficient  distance  from  the  enemy's  fines  to  be  compara- 
tively invulnerable  to  his  artillery,  are  defended  against  aerial 
attack  by  battleplanes  and  anti-aircraft  batteries. 

Dirigibles  are  used  for  fighting.  As  their  vulnerability  by 
artillery  fire  prevents  them  from  venturing  over  the  enemy's 
territory  by  daylight,  they  are  useless  for  reconnoitering. 
Their  offensive  role  is  limited  to  the  bombardment  of  positions 
of  military  importance,  and  their  defensive  role  to  opposing 
raids  by  hostile  dirigibles.  They  are  used  in  the  defense  of 
the  seacoast,  as  in  naval  warfare,  in  order  to  indicate  the 
movements  of  the  enemy's  vessels  and  to  reveal  the  presence 
of  submarines. 


[33] 


PART  II 
POSITIONS 


CHAPTER  I 

ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

Definition  of  Positions  and  their  Elements 

A  position  generally  coincides  with  a  geographical  entity. 
It  is  designated  by  a  name  borrowed  from  the  geography  of 
the  locality,  such  as  that  of  a  village  (Langemarck) ,  of  a  moun- 
tain (Le  Mort- Homme),  or  by  a  name  created  for  the  occasion 
(the  Labyrinth). 

It  comprises  one  or  several  centres  of  resistance. 

A  centre  of  resistance  is  a  tactical  element  composed  of 
one  or  of  several  supporting  points,  such  as  villages,  woods, 
heights,  and  surrounding  field  works. 

Positions  and  centres  of  resistance  correspond  to  the  natural 
topographical  elements  of  the  Front. 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  distribution  of  the  troops  and  the 
operation  of  the  service,  a  position  is  generally  subdivided 
into  sectors  or  sub-sectors  which  are  given  geographical  or 
numerical  designations. 

These  sectors  and  sub-sectors  in  turn  include  trenches, 
which  are  given  geographical  or  numerical  designations,  or 
are  named  for  brave  men  who  have  been  killed  in  action. 

Positions  are  of  variable  importance.  The  measure  of  this 
depends  on  their  strategical  or  tactical  value,  on  their  topog- 
raphy, on  the  value  and  configuration  of  the  hostile  positions 
opposite  them,  on  the  number  and  activity  of  the  enemy's 

[37] 


34666 


POSITIONS 

troops,  etc    The  size  of  1  heir  garrisons  depends  solely  on  the 
measure  of  this  importance,  and  not  on  their  extent. 

Each  sector  and  sub-sector  corresponds  to  the  extent  of 
terrain  which  can  be  held  by  a  unit  of  infantry  —  such  as  a 
brigade  or  a  regiment.  The  density  with  which  the  unit  must 
be  distributed  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  terrain,  on  itB 
tactical  importance,  etc.  Sectors  and  sub-sectors,  therefore, 
have  fixed  garrisons,  but  variable  areas.  One  of  them  may, 
consequently,  either  become  identical  with  a  centre  of  resist- 
ance, or  constitute  a  subdivision  of  it. 

Trenches 

The  word  "  trench,"  as  commonly  employed,  is  used  to 
designate,  singly  or  as  a  whole,  the  elements  which  compose 
the  front. 

The  trench,  in  its  original  or  specific  meaning,  is  the  shelter 
which  is  dug  in  the  ground  by  the  first  line  skirmishers:  it 
enables  them  to  protect  themselves  from  being  hit  or  seen  by 
the  foe,  and  to  get  into  touch  with  one  another.  It  marks,  on 
the  terrain,  the  limit  of  the  infantry's  efforts  during  the  com- 
bat; it  traces  the  line  which  this  infantry  has  been  unable  to 
pass  in  its  advance,  or  that  on  which  it  has  stopped  in  its 
retreat. 

The  trenches,  in  the  most  general  sense  in  which  they  are 
spoken  of  by  the  troops,  are  the  ensemble  of  the  field  works 
established  by  the  infantry  in  any  given  position,  to  afford 
them  shelter  and  a  means  of  going  about  in  proximity  to  the 
enemy.  This  ensemble  contains  trenches  in  the  more  specific 
sense,  boyaux,  shelters,  observation  posts,  and  depots. 

The  organization  of  villages,  of  woods,  and  of  other  sup- 
porting points  is  effected  according  to  the  same  principles  as 

[38] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

in  previous  wars.  It  comprises,  however,  a  more  complete  util- 
ization of  underground  work,  and  a  more  liberal  equipment 
of  the  edges  and  the  interior  with  machine  guns.  Whenever 
possible,  it  is  essential  that  the  details  of  this  organization 
be  concealed  from  the  enemy's  airplanes.  The  supporting 
point,  which  is  often  more  easily  visible  than  its  surround- 
ings, should  be  made  as  far  as  possible  to  blend  with  the 
adjacent  territory,  on  pain  of  being  singled  out  for  the  heavy 
fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 

The  study  of  a  position,  therefore,  brings  us  back  to  that  of 
the  elements  of  which  a  trench  or  trenches  are  composed, 
when  the  ribbon-like  ditch  made  by  the  first  diggings  of  the 
skirmishers  has  progressively  ramified  itself  for  purposes  of 
communication  and  of  defense. 

First  line  trenches  are  connected  with  the  rear  by  boyaux 
running  perpendicular  to  them.  Communicating  and  sup- 
port trenches  are  dug  in  a  direction  in  general  parallel  to 
those  of  the  first  line,  in  order  to  support  them  or  to  provide 
additional  space.  A  line  of  redoubts  and  trenches,  called  a 
covering  line  for  artillery,  is  used  to  afford  the  cannon  a  greater 
measure  of  security  in  case  of  an  enemy  attack.  Shelters 
are  places  dug  in  the  ground,  either  separately  or  collectively, 
to  protect  the  troops,  their  arms,  and  their  machine  guns 
against  projectiles  or  bad  weather.  Observing  stations  are 
topographical  points,  so  situated  as  to  be  available  for  looking 
out  in  front,  and  so  organized  as  to  permit  observation  of  the 
enemy,  without  being  observed  by  him  or  exposed  to  danger. 
Depdts  are  shelters  in  which  to  keep  munitions,  grenades, 
materiel,  water,  and  provisions,  all  of  which  may  be  imme- 
diately needed  in  case  of  battle.    Emplacements  for  batteries  are 

[39] 


POSITIONS 

used  to  install  the  pieces  of  different  calibres  at  points  suit- 
ably chosen  from  a  technical  point  of  view.  Th'ey  are  provided 
with  shelters  and  accessories,  necessary  for  the  proper  service 
of  (lie  pieces,  and  the  security  of  the  gunners. 

Plan  of  Organization 

The  general  organization  of  a  position  is  carried  out  in 
accordance  with  a  complete  plan,  elaborated  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  unit  which  occupies  it. 

This  plan  contemplates,  from  the  first,  both  the  defense 
of  the  position  captured,  and  the  attack  of  the  opposing  posi- 
tion, and  is  for  this  reason  divided  into  two  parts;  for 
works  should  usually  be  constructed  with  the  double  object 
of  progressing  further,  and  of  retaining  the  conquered 
terrain. 

This  plan  is  drawn  up  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  troops 
have  been  installed  in  the  position,  in  order  to  avoid  mistakes, 
discussions,  and  indecision.  It  takes  into  account  the  provi- 
sional work  carried  out  on  the  orders  of  the  commanders  of 
sectors  and  of  sub-sectors,  in  order  to  meet  first  needs.  But, 
as  soon  as  it  has  been  settled,  it  is  obligatory  on  every  one  to 
conform  to  it  absolutely. 

In  order  that  the  organization  of  a  position  may  be  methodi- 
cal and  homogeneous,  it  must  be  carried  out  not  only  with  a 
view  to  the  needs  of  the  position  as  a  whole,  but  also  with  a 
view  to  its  continuance  by  subsequent  occupants.  Thus,  in 
case  of  a  relief,  the  plan  of  organization  is  faithfully  trans- 
mitted to  the  new  unit,  and  scrupulously  followed  out:  it  can 
only  be  modified  on  the  order  of  the  new  commander  of  the 
position. 

[40] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

No  trench  ought  to  be  considered  as  provisional,  and 
destined  to  be  abandoned  in  consequence  of  a  forward  move- 
ment. This  conception,  though  it  contains  a  measure  of 
truth,  is  prejudicial  to  the  security,  comfort,  and  discipline  of 
the  troops.  It  often  results  in  an  inadequate  defense,  a  make- 
shift installation,  and  in  habits  of  carelessness  and  idleness. 

The  outline  of  the  first  line  trench  depends,  at  the  outset, 
solely  on  the  hazards  and  difficulties  of  the  actual  combat,  and 
does  not  always  correspond  to  a  tactical  idea. 

Thus  the  initial  outline  of  the  trench  may  be  modified  as  a 
whole,  or  in  detail,  in  accordance  with  a  thorough  examination 
of  the  position.  Such  a  modification,  when  carried  out  at 
leisure,  in  relative  security,  saves  the  defenders  many  mis- 
takes; otherwise  they  may  be  obliged  to  effect  it  under  pressure 
from  the  enemy  and  in  the  midst  of  the  gravest  dangers. 
The  hypothesis  of  a  hostile  attack,  with  all  its  consequences, 
ought  to  guide  the  commander  of  a  position  in  reaching  his 
decision,  quite  as  much  as  the  prospect  of  the  resumption  of 
the  advance. 

There  will  seldom  be  any  modification  of  the  original  out- 
line if  the  commander  of  a  position  decides  to  be  guided  by 
advice  asked  of  subordinates.  Either  through  vainglory  or 
simple  inertia,  the  commanders  of  small  units  —  such  as 
companies  or  battalions  —  often  prefer  to  retain  a  defective 
line,  rather  than  to  abandon  to  the  enemy  a  few  hundred 
yards.  Furthermore,  in  a  consultation  of  this  kind,  neighbor- 
ing sectors  and  sub-sectors,  as  well  as  units  in  actual  occupa- 
tion and  relief  units,  would  have  to  be  brought  to  agreement  — 
which  is  impossible,  save  by  the  maintenance  of  the  status 
quo.  And  yet,  sometimes  a  slight  change  will  save  losses 
which  might  ultimately  prove  very  costly. 


POSITIONS 

The  final  outline  of  the  first  line  trench  is  determined,  in 
principle,  by  the  commander  of  the  sector.  It  is  approved  by 
the  commander  of  the  position,  who  limits  himself  to  such 
modifications  as  are  necessitated  either  by  the  tactical  situa- 
lion  of  the  position,  or  by  the  need  of  good  communication 
between  the  sectors.  It  constitutes  the  first  element  of  the 
plan  of  organization. 

The  outline  of  a  trench  is  very  difficult  to  decide  upon  at 
first  sight,  if  account  be  taken  of  all  the  conditions,  at 
times  contradictory,  which  it  must  fulfil,  and  if  due  regard  be 
had  to  the  conformation  of  the  terrain,  to  the  situation  and 
intentions  of  the  enemy,  to  the  security  and  well-being  of  the 
soldiers.  Thus  it  is  knowledge  of  the  ground,  aided  by  good 
judgment  and  keen  observation,  which  leads  to  the  adoption 
of  the  best  measures. 

This  reasoned  outline  is  often  found  to  coincide  with  that 
one  which  has  been  instinctively  traced  on  the  ground  by  the 
infantrymen  when  seeking  to  escape  from  artillery  fire,  to  con- 
ceal themselves  from  the  sight  of  the  opposing  infantry,  to 
obtain  a  sufficient  field  of  fire,  etc.  Often,  also,  this  outline  is 
very  different  from  the  one  which  would  have  been  selected  as 
a  result  of  unintelligent  application  of  theory. 

The  trench  must  be  continuous.  It  may,  however,  include 
zones  less  strongly  held  than  others,  at  points  where  material 
obstacles  offer  a  sufficient  barrier  to  the  enemy's  efforts:  yet 
care  must  be  taken  lest  these  obstacles  disappear  in  fine 
weather  (as  might  be  the  case  with  certain  swamps)  and  to  see 
that  they  are  constantly  swept  by  the  fire  of  the  neighboring 
trenches.  Trenches  which  are  thus  lightly  held  are  little 
more  than  means  of   communication,   but   they  have  the 

[42] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

advantage  of  causing  the  enemy's  aviators  to  believe  that 
there  is  no  discontinuity  in  the  line. 

Inactive  zones  without  trenches,  solely  defended  by  artificial 
obstacles  such  as  barbed  wire  entanglements,  and  by  the 
oblique  fire  of  cannon  and  machine  guns,  present  risks  which 
are  so  great  that  they  should  as  far  as  possible  be  avoided. 
They  permit  the  enemy's  fire  to  be  concentrated  on  more 
limited  spaces,  in  which  the  troops  suffer  more  losses;  they 
prevent  direct  liaison  between  neighboring  units,  thus  im- 
peding their  mutual  support  and  the  concentration  of  their 
efforts;  they  expose  the  first  line  to  the  danger  of  being 
pierced  in  case  the  enemy  succeeds  in  destroying  the  artificial 
defenses  or  in  neutralizing  the  artillery  fire;  they  render  more 
difficult  the  intervention  of  reinforcements  in  zones  which 
have  not  been  provided  with  shelter.  These  different  defects 
outweigh  advantages  such  as  economy  of  forces  and  lightening 
of  the  service. 

The  interior  shape  of  the  trench  depends  primarily  on  the 
nature  of  the  soil. 

Generally  speaking,  a  trench  is  so  arranged  as  to  permit 
the  men  in  it  to  stand  erect  when  firing,  and  has  a  parapet 
composed  of  the  soil  thrown  up  in  the  process  of  construction. 
In  this  parapet  loopholes  are  arranged  for  firing  and  obser- 
vation, and  there  is  a  step  for  those  who  use  them  to  stand  on. 

Trenches  do  not  run  in  straight  lines;  they  are  interrupted 
every  five  or  six  yards  by  traverses.  These  traverses,  dug  in 
the  natural  soil,  are  about  two  yards  thick,  and  protect  each 
compartment  of  the  trench  from  projectiles  exploding  in 
the  neighboring  ones;  they  also  prevent  the  enemy,  in  case  he 
penetrates  into  one  compartment,  from  enfilading  the  whole 
trench  with  his  machine  guns  and  his  rifles. 

[43] 


/ 


POSITIONS 

First  line  trenches  contain  special  emplacements  and  shelters 
for  machine  guns.  The  emplacements,  carefully  chosen,  are 
distributed  along  the  trench,  in  such  fashion  as  to  bear  to  the 
best  possible  effect  on  the  important  points  of  the  enemy's 
line,  and  also  on  the  whole  space  between  the  two  lines.  A 
machine  gun  should  operate  on  the  flanks,  that  is  to  say,  it 
should  attempt  to  enfilade  the  lines  of  possible  assailants. 
Each  machine  gun  has  a  clearly  marked  sector  of  fire.  The 
shelters  are  placed  close  at  hand;  they  serve  to  protect  the 
machine  guns  and  those  who  serve  them,  when  they  are  not 
firing. 

The  location  of  emplacements  and  shelters  of  machine  guns 
should  not  be  apparent  from  the  exterior  shape  of  the  trench; 
otherwise  they  are  destined  to  be  speedily  destroyed  by  the 
enemy's  artillery.  Sometimes  the  shelter  is  put  on  the  very 
line  of  the  trench:  the  machine  gun  and  gunners  installed 
there  are  given  an  opportunity  to  fire  through  a  loophole  which 
is  plugged  with  a  sand-bag,  and  opened  only  at  night  or  in  case 
of  an  attack.  The  difficulty  with  this  system  is  that  it  exposes 
the  machine  gun  to  the  danger  of  being  buried  in  the  earth, 
and  put  out  of  action,  in  case  its  shelter  is  directly  hit  during 
a  bombardment.  Thus  it  is  usually  a  better  plan,  despite  the 
loss  of  time  which  results,  to  place  the  machine  gun  in  a  safer 
shelter  a  little  behind  the  trench;  in  case  of  pressing  danger,  it 
can  be  put  into  action  at  some  point,  such  as  in  a  part  of  the 
parapet  that  has  been  destroyed,  or  else  in  a  shell  hole. 

It  is  useless  to  lay  down  any  absolute  rules  relative  to  the 
outline  or  dimensions  of  a  trench,  or  to  the  placing  of  the 
machine  guns  it  contains,  for  the  observance  of  such  rules 
would  often  be  rendered  impossible  by  the  nature  of  the  soil. 

[44] 


\ 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

Frequently  the  ingenuity  of  the  troops  hits  on  the  form  best 
suited  to  overcome  local  obstacles. 

In  marshy  ground,  for  instance,  the  trench  is  transformed 
into  a  parapet  erected  above  the  normal  base  of  the  ground. 
This  parapet  is  made  up  of  fascines,  hurdles,  gabions,  sand- 
bags, etc.:  it  makes  use  of  hedges  and  slopes;  since  it  thus 
becomes  very  easy  to  see,  it  should  be  concealed  in  a  multi- 
tude of  different  ways;  false  parapets  are  even  erected  to 
deceive  the  enemy. 

An  essential  condition  which  a  trench  should  fulfill  is  that 
of  permitting  its  occupants  to  shoot  easily,  in  as  large 
numbers  as  possible,  and  at  the  same  time  to  remain  under 
cover.  This  condition  is  often  forgotten  by  troops  in  sectors 
which  have  remained  quiet  for  some  time;  thus,  with  the 
idea  of  ensuring  their  comfort,  the  men  put  up  contrivances 
and  shelters  which  hamper  or  prevent  access  to  the  parapet, 
save  at  the  spots  reserved  for  the  sentries.  Commanders  of 
units  should  be  on  the  watch  to  prevent  these  abuses,  and  to 
cause  loopholes  to  be  made. 

Loopholes  are  arranged  obliquely,  partly  in  order  not  to 
expose  those  using  them  to  direct  fire,  and  partly  to  furnish  an 
opportunity  for  flanking  fire.  They  may  be  furnished  with 
rifles  on  stands,  pointed  in  the  direction  of  danger. 

In  reality  these  loopholes  are  of  scant  value  as  means  of 
combat:  they  even  limit  the  field  of  fire,  and  prevent  fire 
from  being  concentrated  on  a  determined  objective.  They 
rather  constitute  a  means  of  keeping  guard,  and  of  looking  out. 

Nevertheless,  during  periods  of  stationary  fighting,  these 
loopholes  make  it  possible  to  inflict  upon  the  foe  losses  which 
play  a  large  part  in  the  war  of  attrition.    In  case  of  a  hostile 

[45] 


POSITIONS 

attack,  they  are  for  the  most  part  destroyed  by  the  enemy's 
bombardment;  even  if  they  should  be  spared,  they  would  be 
of  little  use.  It  is  rather  on  the  remains  of  the  parapet,  and 
on  shell  holes  that  reliance  must  be  placed:  it  is  in  these  that 
machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles  must  be  placed. 

Doubling  Trenches 

Behind  the  first  line  trenches,  there  are  usually  constructed 
what  are  called  doubling  trenches,  connected  with  the  first 
line  ones  by  boyaux.  Their  location  is  determined  by  the  plan 
of  organization.  In  these  doubling  trenches  the  command- 
posts  of  the  leaders  of  sections  are  usually  placed. 

These  trenches  play  an  absolutely  different  part  from  the 
first  line  ones,  for  they  are  not  trenches  to  be  fired  from,  save 
in  cases  where  there  is  a  sufficient  slope  of  the  ground.  They 
are  intended  to  afford  shelter,  rest,  and  sleep  to  the  men  who 
are  not  on  duty;  for  this  purpose  they  are  furnished  with 
dugouts  arranged  in  accordance  with  the  character  of  the 
ground,  sometimes  as  deep  as  regular  subterranean  passages, 
sometimes  on  a  level  with  the  bottom  of  the  trench,  sometimes 
above  it,  in  the  sides  of  the  trench,  in  niches,  as  it  were. 

Comfortable  second-line  shelters  afford  a  body  of  troops 
a  considerable  alleviation  of  their  stay  in  a  trench.  The  com- 
manding officers,  when  determining  the  periods  of  the  reliefs, 
ought  to  take  into  account  the  conditions  under  which  their 
troops  have  been  placed  in  the  line  as  well  as  the  state  of  their 
health. 

In  sectors  where  the  character  of  the  ground  does  not  per- 
mit of  the  construction  of  suitable  shelters  the  situation  is 
infinitely  more  difficult.  The  soldiers  possess  only  precarious 
refuges  where  their  rest  is  constantly  disturbed  by  the  going 

[46] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

and  coming  of  men  bringing  supplies  and  of  patrols,  by  shots, 
and  by  those  who  are  on  the  watch,  etc.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
they  never  get  many  consecutive  hours  of  rest. 

From  the  tactical  point  of  view,  doubling  trenches  are  of 
great  value. 

On  the  offensive,  they  permit  the  troops  selected  to  follow 
the  first  waves  of  assault,  and  after  them  the  reserves  at  the 
disposal  of  the  commander,  to  get  together  near  the  departure 
parallel. 

On  the  defensive,  they  maintain,  in  immediate  proximity 
to  the  firing  trench,  the  troops  which  are  to  man  it  in  case  of 
alarm,  without  exposing  them  to  useless  fatigues.  They  are 
also  of  great  help  in  expelling  the  enemy  from  the  first  line 
trench,  in  case  he  has  been  able  to  take  it;  for  they  make  it 
possible  to  counter-attack  him,  or  to  hem  him  in  by  the 
boyaux. 

When  the  character  of  the  ground  renders  impossible  the 
construction  of  doubling  trenches,  it  is  a  good  plan  to  con- 
struct false  ones.  This  subterfuge  has  the  advantage  of 
attracting  to  these  trenches  a  large  part  of  the  fire  of  the 
enemy's  artillery,  and  of  not  permitting  him  to  suspect  the 
weakness  of  the  single  front  line. 

Doubling  trenches,  although  not  in  theory  intended  to 
play  a  part  in  combat,  ought  nevertheless  to  be  protected 
by  accessory  defenses  which  should  be  as  efficacious  and  as 
invisible  as  possible;  for  the  enemy,  who  in  his  assaults  will 
go  straight  ahead  in  order  to  gain  ground  without  troubling 
about  boyaux,  will  thus  find  himself  stopped  by  unexpected 
obstacles  which  his  artillery  will  not  have  been  able  to  disarm 
or  to  destroy,  and  which,  when  encountered,  may  prove  fatal 
to  his  elan. 

[47] 


POSITIONS 

Transversal  Trenches. 

Systems  of  t  renches  are  far  from  being  uniform.  Sometimes 
there  are  a  small  number  of  successive  trenches  behind  one 
another;  sometimes  there  are  many,  irregularly  laid  out,  ac- 
cording to  circumstances  and  local  necessities.  These  succes- 
sive trenches,  of  various  lengths,  shapes,  and  constructions  are 
called  transversal  trenches.  They  cut  across  two  or  more 
boyaux,  and  may  be  protected  by  accessory  defenses. 

Often  these  transversal  trenches  are  simply  shell-holes, 
which  have  been  organized  and  connected  with  one  another, 
so  as  to  constitute  a  number  of  scattered  objectives  whose 
location  may  well  be  unknown  to  the  enemy's  infantry  and 
artillery.  Some  of  them  contain  machine  guns,  which  are 
disposed  in  depth  according  to  the  plan  of  organization;  others 
may  be  used  by  small  groups  of  grenadiers.  They  may  also 
be  utilized  for  lateral  communications. 

These  transversal  trenches  may  be  in  front  of  or  behind  the 
support  trenches. 

The  captains'  command-posts  are  usually  placed  in  one  of 
the  transversal  trenches  between  the  doubling  and  the  support 
trenches.  Often  in  fact  a  transversal  trench  is  specially  con- 
structed for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  such  a  command-post, 
in  proximity  to  an  observation  post,  whose  location  is  de- 
termined by  the  lay  of  the  land. 

Support  Trenches 

A  position,  whether  or  not  provided  with  a  doubling  trench, 
generally  includes  support  trenches,  some  distance  behind 
the  first  line.  Their  location  is  determined  by  the  plan  of 
organization,  and  is  so  chosen  as  to  place  them  beyond  the 
range  of  the  enemy's  barrages,  which  are  intended  to  iso- 

[48] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

late  the  first  line  trenches  from  the  interior  of  the  position, 
when  a  hostile  attack  is  in  progress. 

The  command-posts  of  the  battalion  commanders  are  placed 
on  this  line. 

Support  trenches  are  designed  to  stop  the  enemy  in  case 
the  first  line  is  broken.  They  are,  therefore,  firing  trenches 
which  can  be  speedily  occupied  by  the  reserve  units,  and  which 
the  first  line  units,  when  obliged  to  give  way,  attempt  to  reach. 
They  may  or  may  not  be  supplied  with  accessory  defenses. 
The  distance  between  the  first-line  trench  and  the  support 
trench  may  vary  from  400  to  1200  yards  or  more,  according 
to  circumstances  and  the  local  topography.  The  reserve  units 
detailed  to  occupy  the  support  trenches  remain  in  shelters 
close  to  them,  or  in  more  comfortable  and  less  exposed  dug- 
outs a  very  short  distance  away,  as  the  nature  of  the  ground 
and  the  distance  from  the  first  line  may  determine. 

As  a  means  of  increasing  the  resisting  power  of  these 
trenches,  machine  guns  are  placed  in  salients  whence  those 
parts  of  the  terrain  over  which  the  enemy  might  advance  may 
be  swept  by  oblique  fire  or  by  enfilade.  These  machine  guns, 
which  are  only  called  upon  in  case  the  enemy  breaks  into  the 
position,  should  nevertheless  have  their  crews  complete,  and 
be  all  ready  for  action;  their  shelters,  constructed  in  the  most 
comfortable  manner  possible,  are  utilized  as  barracks  for  par- 
tial rest  for  the  machine-gun  crews  of  the  first  line. 

In  order  to  complete  the  system  of  support  trenches,  which 
cannot  be  indefinitely  developed  in  depth,  other  machine  guns 
are  placed  here  and  there,  either  in  sections  of  trench  a  few 
yards  long,  or  in  bombproof  redoubts  surrounded  by  accessory 
defenses;  they  should  be  able  to  sweep  with  their  fire  all  im- 
portant points  of  approach,  such  as  ravines,  bridges,  cross- 

[49] 


POSITIONS 

roads,  exposed  passages  of  every  sort,  where  the  enemy  cannot 
avoid  advancing  on  a  narrow  front.  These  machine  guns  may 
do  considerable  damage  to  the  enemy  if  their  crews  are  re- 
solved to  hold  out  till  the  last.  Their  shelters  are  generally 
furnished  with  a  deep-cut  or  subterraneous  boyau,  which  per- 
mits the  materiel  to  be  removed  and  the  crew  to  escape  to  the 
rear  at  the  last  moment. 

It  is  often  from  the  shelter  of  these  support  trenches  that 
counter-attacks  to  stop  the  enemy's  progress  are  prepared,  or 
retours  offensifs  directed  against  his  first  line.  Thus  their 
organization  ought,  as  far  as  possible,  to  be  planned  with  a 
view  to  the  grouping  and  debouching  of  the  units  which  are  to 
be  employed  in  these  operations. 

As  long  as  the  support  trenches  are  strongly  held,  the 
position  is  not  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

If  the  position  is  taken,  there  remains  behind  it  a  second 
position,  on  which  the  fragments  of  the  troops  in  the  first  may 
retire  so  as  to  stiffen  the  resistance,  and  so  as  to  resume  the 
offensive  at  the  opportune  moment. 

The  covering  line  for  artillery  is  made  up  of  a  fine  of  trenches 
and  redoubts  which,  for  lack  of  time  or  means,  may  not  always 
be  continuous.  The  location  of  these  works  is  determined  by 
the  general  plan  of  organization.  They  are  frequently  placed 
on  a  reverse  slope,  so  as  to  escape  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery,  and  to  confront  assailants  with  an  intact  and  unex- 
pected obstacle. 

The  covering  line  for  artillery,  like  the  line  of  support,  is 
permanently  occupied.  On  this  line  are  placed  the  command- 
posts  for  colonels. 

[50] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

Boyaux  are  intended  to  connect  the  different  trenches  with 
one  another,  and  with  the  rear.  Their  general  direction 
is  thus  perpendicular  to  the  first  fine  trench  and  to  the 
others. 

Boyaux  are  essentially  different  from  trenches  in  that  they 
are  solely  means  of  communication,  instead  of  being  means  of 
defense  and  of  shelter.  To  this  end  they  should  be  free  from 
all  encumbrances;  it  should  therefore  be  forbidden  to  dig, 
along  the  sides  of  them,  individual  or  collective  shelters,  depots 
for  materiel,  munitions,  water  or  supplies.  It  is  better  to  con- 
struct a  new  element  of  transversal  trench  than  to  risk 
causing  difficulties  in  circulation. 

In  principle,  boyaux  should  be  deep  and  narrow,  so  as  to 
afford  the  best  possible  protection  from  the  enemy's  fire  for 
the  troops  or  carriers  who  are  using  them;  but  the  dimensions 
depend  primarily  on  the  nature  of  the  ground. 

The  narrowness  of  the  boyaux  renders  it  difficult  for  men  to 
pass  one  another  in  them.  This  difficulty  may  be  obviated  by 
constructing  turnouts  at  stated  distances,  so  that  supply 
porters  and  laborers  can  stand  aside  while  troops  go  by,  or 
rest  without  obstructing  circulation;  or  so  that  units  may  set 
down  men  who  have  been  wounded  while  passing  through  the 
boyaux.  It  is  also  an  excellent  plan  to  settle  on  the  direction 
in  which  each  boyau  is  to  be  followed  —  certain  ones  for 
going  forward,  others  back;  signs  with  arrows  should  indicate 
these  directions,  and  if  need  be  sentries  may  be  posted  to  see 
to  the  execution  of  the  orders  given. 

On  occasions  when  the  needs  of  the  front  line  take  preced- 
ence over  all  others,  as  for  example  in  case  of  an  urgent  call 
for  reinforcements,  all  the  boyaux  may  be  used  for  forward 

[si] 


POSITIONS 

movements  save  those  for  the  evacuation  of  the  wounded;  in 
this  case  the  signs  are  turned  about  in  those  boyaux  whose 
direction  has  been  modified,  and  the  sentries  notified. 

Boyaux  do  not  run  in  straight  lines,  so  as  not  to  be  exposed 
to  the  enfilading  fire  of  machine  guns  or  of  batteries  of  artil- 
lery. Their  zigzags  are  sufficiently  marked  to  form  a  natural 
protection,  without  exasperating  the  troops  by  constant 
changes  in  the  direction  of  their  march,  or  excessively  in- 
creasing the  length  of  their  journey.  The  principal  boyaux 
have  the  same  name  from  the  rear  to  the  front  line. 

Boyaux  leading  to  the  front  spread  out  in  branches  which 
become  increasingly  numerous  as  they  approach  the  first  line 
trench.  At  the  forks  are  placed  signs,  which  indicate,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  names  adopted  in  the  official  plan  of  the  trenches, 
the  principal  direction  in  which  each  one  leads.  In  imme- 
diate proximity  to  the  trenches  these  signs  should  be  such  as 
to  enable  the  troops  easily  to  find  the  units,  the  posts  where 
the  officers  are,  and  any  sort  of  depdt.  At  important  forks, 
sentries  are  placed  in  special  shelters,  so  as  not  to  impede 
circulation. 

The  men  occupying  the  trenches  should  soon  learn  how  to 
find  their  way  about  without  hesitation  or  mistake  in  the  ele- 
ment occupied  by  their  company  and  in  the  neighboring  ones. 
They  must  know  the  post  where  their  captain  is  placed,  the 
situation  of  the  dep6ts  of  materiel  assigned  to  their  unit,  the 
boyaux  of  access  and  of  evacuation;  they  can  thus  furnish 
useful  information  to  any  one  who  comes  along. 

When  the  number  of  boyaux  is  not  sufficient  for  the  num- 
ber of  troops  who  have  to  use  them,  passage  has  to  be  regu- 
lated by  the  signals  of  sentries  stationed  between  the  places 

[52] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  POSITIONS 

d'armes  as  on  a  single  track  railway.  But  it  is  preferable  to 
make  supplementary  boyaux,  provided  this  can  be  done  with- 
out too  much  difficulty.  Above  all  it  is  essential  to  avoid 
having  the  entrance  and  exit  of  the  troops,  porters,  laborers, 
and  materiel  necessary  for  a  relatively  extended  front  effected 
by  a  single  boyau  forming  a  bottle  neck.  This  arrangement 
will  inevitably  produce  congestion,  however  many  exits  may 
be  provided  in  the  interior  of  the  position. 

Evacuation  boyaux,  specially  intended  to  permit  movement 
from  the  front  to  the  rear,  constitute,  at  all  times,  an  admirable 
means  of  exit;  but  in  principle  they  are  reserved  at  periods  of 
heavy  losses  for  the  evacuation  of  the  wounded.  Thus  they 
are  run  in  a  more  nearly  straight  line,  and  are  wider  than  the 
ordinary  boyaux,  so  as  to  permit  the  passage  of  fitters  carried 
horizontally. 

Methodical  organization  and  vigorous  policing  of  the 
boyaux  are  indispensable  to  ensure  free  circulation,  smooth 
working  of  the  reliefs,  rapidity  of  reinforcements,  and  good 
liaisons.  The  commander  of  the  position  gives  all  the  nec- 
essary instructions  to  secure  this. 

Shelters,  observing  stations,  observation  posts,  telephone 
posts,  places  d'armes,  and  dep6ts  are  so  constructed  as  to 
protect  the  men  and  the  material  occupying  them  from  the 
enemy's  fire. 

They  are  located  with  reference  to  the  sum  total  of  the 
conditions  which  they  must  fulfill,  or,  when  they  are  contra- 
dictory, with  reference  to  the  most  important  of  them. 

Shelters  intended  for  troops  should  be  dug  in  the  ground,  so 
as  to  resist  heavy  shells.  Their  depth  varies  according  to  the 
character  of  the  ground,  the  protection  given  by  the  form  of 

[53] 


POSITIONS 

the  terrain,  the  weather,  the  number  of  men,  and  the  material 
means  available.  One  difficulty  is  that  they  become  graves 
in  case  of  a  cave-in.  They  are  therefore  provided  with  exits 
at  opposite  ends  and  are  permanently  furnished  with  shovels 
and  picks.  Among  them  may  be  included  command-posts, 
which  are  intended  to  provide  shelter  for  the  leaders  of  the 
different  units,  and  their  staffs. 

Observing  stations  are  established  for  the  infantry  Com- 
mand, and  for  the  artillery.  They  are  placed  at  points  which 
enjoy  a  wide  outlook,  and  are  generally  at  quite  a  distance 
behind  the  first  line  trenches.  They  have  a  special  personnel, 
and  are  very  completely  organized. 

Observation  posts  are  set  up  for  officers  of  all  ranks  down 
to  and  including  company  commanders,  and  are  found  all  the 
way  up  to  the  first  fine.  They  are  intended  to  enable  their  oc- 
cupants to  see;  but  the  finding  of  places  where  this  condition 
can  be  fulfilled,  as  well  as  the  measures  which  must  be  taken  to 
protect  them,  inevitably  expose  them  to  grave  dangers.  It  is 
well  to  have  several  of  them  for  the  same  purpose.  The  ob- 
servation post  for  each  commander  is  always  selected  before 
the  regular  command-post,  which  should  be  as  near  to  it  as 
possible. 

Places  d'armes  are  used  to  assemble  reinforcements  and 
reserves,  where  they  will  be  sheltered  from  the  observation 
and  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

Depots  occupy  central  positions,  in  order  to  be  easily 
utilized  by  the  different  units  they  supply;  but  they  should  be 
carefully  concealed  so  as  to  escape  being  seen  by  aircraft,  and 
solidly  constructed  so  as  to  withstand  the  projectiles  shot  by 
heavy  cannon. 

[54] 


CHAPTER  II 

TRENCH  DUTIES 

Tkench  duties  include  the  following :  ensuring  the  occupation 
of  the  terrain  whose  limit  is  marked  by  the  first  fine  trench; 
preventing  the  enemy  from  gaining  access  thereto;  observing 
the  dispositions  taken  in  the  opposite  position;  transmitting  to 
the  Command  any  information  obtained;  inflicting  losses  on 
the  enemy;  finally,  preparing  the  forward  movement. 

Liaison  is  the  word  used  to  indicate  the  means  by  which 
the  units  installed  in  the  trenches  are  enabled  to  keep  in 
constant  communication  with  their  superior  officers,  with  the 
units  on  either  side  of  them,  with  the  artillery  and  the  other 
arms,  and  vice  versa.    It  is  effected  laterally  and  in  depth. 

The  proper  working  of  the  liaisons  is  of  great  importance. 
It  permits  the  units  in  line  to  understand  and  to  support  one 
another;  it  makes  possible  communication  of  all  sorts  between 
these  units  and  the  Command,  and  also  constant  collaboration 
between  the  different  arms.  By  means  of  these  liaisons,  each 
commander  is  apprised  of  every  movement,  and  can  give  his 
orders  rapidly  and  with  certainty;  by  the  same  means,  the 
infantry,  the  artillery,  the  aviators,  the  engineers  and  the 
cavalry  can  collaborate  to  good  advantage. 

The  duty  of  obtaining  and  forwarding  information  and 
messages  is  entrusted  to  aerial  observers,  to  observers  on  the 
ground  or  to  liaison  agents. 

[55] 


POSITIONS 

Observers  in  airplanes  or  in  balloons  are  furnished  with 
high-power  glasses  to  enable  them  to  obtain  information  con- 
cerning enemy's  troops  situated  far  away.  Since  they  com- 
municate with  the  earth  by  rapid  means  (such  as  wireless  in 
the  case  of  the  airplanes,  telephones  in  that  of  the  observation 
balloons,  or  visual  signals  in  both  cases)  they  can  pass  on  in- 
formation speedily  to  the  Command,  and  also  transmit  orders. 
They  have  very  powerful  photographic  apparatus,  which 
enables  them  to  verify  the  information  they  have  secured. 

Observers  on  the  ground  have  the  advantage  of  a  fixed 
position;  they  remain  in  place  at  all  times  and  seasons,  day 
and  night.  They  are  thus  able  not  only  to  complete  and  to 
control  the  items  furnished  by  the  aerial  observers,  but  in  cer- 
tain cases  they  constitute  the  sole  means  of  information.  They 
are  installed  in  observing  stations  specially  fitted  out,  well 
protected  and  concealed.  The  information  they  furnish  is 
gathered  in  and  coordinated  in  every  body  of  troops  by  an 
officer  specially  assigned  to  this  task,  and  known  as  the 
"  intelligence  officer." 

The  liaison  agents  of  the  larger  units  are  not  merely  means 
of  transmitting  information,  but  also  means  of  obtaining  it. 

The  commander  of  every  large  unit,  such  as  an  army,  army 
corps,  or  division,  details  a  liaison  agent  to  each  of  the  units 
immediately  below  him.  This  agent  should  be  chosen  on 
account  of  his  military  knowledge,  intelligence,  and  judgment; 
it  is  his  duty  to  furnish  his  commander  all  information  of 
particular  importance,  to  give  him  any  explanation  about 
the  state  of  affairs  which  may  be  useful,  and  to  inform  him 
in  regard  to  the  execution  of  his  orders. 

In  the  smaller  units,  on  the  other  hand,  such  as  regiments, 
battalions,  etc.,  the  liaison  agents  are  detailed  by  the  inferior 

[56] 


TRENCH  DUTIES 

units  to  the  superior  ones;  practically  they  are  used  only  for 
the  purpose  of  transmitting  information. 

Transmission  of  information  is  secured  by  numerous  means 
of  liaison;  such  as  telephones,  runners,  signallers,  rockets, 
Bengal  lights,  carrier  pigeons,  dogs,  cycles,  telegraphs,  and 
automobiles;  they  are  chosen  according  to  circumstances,  and 
the  ground  to  be  traversed. 

All  these  means  of  liaison  ought  to  supplement  or  replace  one 
another  according  to  circumstances;  they  should,  therefore, 
be  utilized  frequently,  so  as  to  be  kept  in  working  order.  In 
every  regiment,  one  officer  is  specially  charged  with  the  organi- 
zation and  coordination  of  the  liaisons;  usually  the  telephone 
officer  does  this.  In  every  unit  larger  than  a  regiment,  a 
staff  officer  looks  after  the  liaisons.  The  commanders  of  the 
different  units,  moreover,  take  great  care  to  provide  for  means 
of  liaison  when  drawing  up  the  plan  of  organization  of  a 
position. 

Lateral  liaisons  are  effected  either  by  way  of  the  first  line 
trenches  or  of  the  communicating  trenches,  or  else  by  more 
complicated  routes;  the  boyaux  and,  if  necessary,  even  open 
places  are  utilized  for  this  purpose.  Liaisons  in  depth  are 
effected  by  the  boyaux  and  open  spaces;  in  the  interior  and 
at  the  rear  of  a  position,  roads  are  utilized  for  this  purpose. 

The  most  practical  and  the  swiftest  means  of  liaison  is  of 
course  the  telephone.  In  every  army  there  is  a  general  system 
of  telephone  lines,  and  connected  with  it  there  are  special 
systems  for  each  army  corps.  Each  system  includes  (1)  a  sys- 
tem for  the  commanders,  connecting  the  command-posts  of  the 
different  units,  and  also  connecting  the  units  of  infantry 
(regiment  or  battalion)  with  the  artillery  which  has  been 

[57] 


POSITIONS 

given  the  task  of  supporting  it;  (2)  a  system  for  the  artillery, 
connecting  the  artillery  commanders  with  one  another,  and 
with  their  observing  stations,  as  well  as  with  the  infantry 
which  it  is  their  duty  to  support.  The  liaison  of  the  artillery 
and  the  infantry  is  thus  doubly  provided  for  by  the  system  for 
the  commanders  and  by  that  for  the  artillery. 

The  plan  of  these  telephone  systems  is  drawn  up  by  the 
heads  of  the  telephone  service  of  the  front;  it  avoids  the 
construction  of  an  excessive  number  of  direct  lines.  Con- 
fidential information  should  not  be  telephoned  except  in 
cipher;  telephone  communications  should  be  regulated  by  a 
rigorous  discipline  so  as  to  avoid  cumbering  the  lines  with 
useless  conversations. 

The  telephone  system  for  an  army  is  set  up  and  operated  by 
army  telegraph  men.  In  that  of  an  army  corps  the  system 
for  the  commanders  is  set  up  and  operated  by  army  corps 
and  division  telegraph  men;  in  the  case  of  regiments  and 
smaller  units,  it  is  operated  by  the  infantry  telephone  men. 
The  system  for  the  artillery  is  set  up  and  operated  by  tele- 
graph men  as  far  as  the  "  centrals  "  of  the  artillery  groups, 
and  beyond  them  by  the  artillery  telephone  men. 

The  weak  point  of  the  telephone  is  that  it  is  often  broken  by 
a  bombardment,  or  by  earthslides;  this  can  be  remedied  by 
burying  the  important  lines,  by  duplicating  them  along  dif- 
ferent routes,  and  by  summoning  the  telephone  workers  to 
make  repairs  at  the  earliest  possible  opportunity.  The  tele- 
phone system,  both  lateral  and  in  depth,  is  the  first  thing  to 
be  installed  in  a  trench.  For  this  purpose,  gangs  of  telephone 
men,  furnished  with  all  the  requisites,  follow  the  troops.  The 
lines  are  run  above  ground  at  first,  so  as  to  save  time,  but  are 
subsequently  buried. 

[58] 


TRENCH  DUTIES 

Wireless  and  ground  telegraphy  serve  to  double  the  tele- 
phone lines  and  to  replace  them  when  they  have  been  cut. 
Portable  machines  for  this  purpose  are  distributed  to  the  army 
corps  and  divisions;  but  only  in  small  numbers  on  account 
of  the  fact  that  their  currents  interfere  with  each  other. 
Wireless  installations  moreover  hinder  the  working  of  the  wire- 
less liaisons  with  the  airplanes,  and  those  for  ground  telegraphy 
make  difficulties  for  telephone  conversations  and  for  listening 
posts. 

The  runners,  or  liaison  agents,  are  alert,  brave,  and  intelli- 
gent soldiers,  who  are  given  the  task  of  carrying  orders  or  writ- 
ten information.  They  go  two,  or  even  three  or  four  at  a  time, 
in  the  case  of  important  messages,  separated  by  a  sufficient  in- 
terval so  that  two  shall  not  fall  victims  to  the  same  shell.  Their 
duty  is  to  bring  the  message  entrusted  to  them  to  its  recip- 
ient, come  what  may.  They  often  find  opportunities  to  look 
about  and  observe  during  their  trips,  and  thus  to  furnish 
useful  information.  In  certain  cases,  chains  of  runners  are 
established  by  means  of  relays,  each  of  which  has  two  or  three 
men  at  its  disposal. 

Signallers  have  the  duty  of  maintaining  liaison  by  arm 
signals,  with  or  without  flags,  during  the  day,  and  by  lanterns 
or  electric  flash  lights  during  the  night.  This  is  a  delicate  task, 
for  they  must  manage,  by  choosing  their  positions  well,  to  be 
seen  by  those  with  whom  they  would  communicate,  without 
being  exposed  to  the  enemy;  such  conditions  are  frequently 
almost  impossible  to  realize.  There  are  not  more  than  so 
many  signallers  in  each  battalion  or  regiment,  and  they  receive 
a  special  training;  if  they  are  absent  or  out  of  action,  or 
insufficiently  trained,  signalling  becomes  very  difficult.  There 
are  in  fact  so  many  difficulties  in  the  way  of  securing  good 

[59] 


POSITIONS 

liaisons  by  means  of  signallers,  that  they  should  be  looked 
upon  merely  as  subsidiary. 

Signalling  by  electric  flash  lights  ought  however  always  to  be 
organized  with  a  view  to  supplementing  or  temporarily  re- 
placing the  telephone  lines.  In  order  not  to  reveal  the  position 
of  the  instruments  to  the  enemy,  it  is  used  as  far  as  possible 
only  for  sending  messages  from  the  front  to  the  rear. 

Rockets  are  used  to  establish  immediate  liaison  from  front 
to  rear,  especially  with  the  artillery.  They  may  have  different 
meanings,  according  to  the  rules  laid  down  for  their  different 
colors:  a  call  for  a  barrage  or  for  a  deeper  or  for  a  shorter 
fire,  notice  of  a  hostile  attack,  announcement  of  arrival  at  a 
determined  point,  etc.  Bengal  lights  of  different  colors  may 
be  used,  when  the  terrain  is  suitable,  to  obtain  the  same 
results.  The  code  adopted  must  be  very  simple,  and  identical 
throughout  the  army,  if  errors  are  to  be  avoided. 

Carrier  pigeons  and  dogs  can  take  the  part  of  messengers 
from  front  to  rear;  but  they  run  the  same  risks  as  the  infan- 
trymen whom  they  accompany,  and  may  be  put  out  of  action 
before  they  have  accomplished  any  purpose.  They  have  the 
advantage  of  runners  in  that  they  are  faster  and  less  vulner- 
able; but  on  the  other  hand  they  cannot  vary  their  course  to 
suit  the  sender.  The  pigeons  utilized  by  the  units  of  the  first 
line  are  grouped  at  pigeon  posts;  they  are  cared  for  there  by 
men  who  are  specially  trained  for  the  purpose;  they  ought  to 
be  treated  less  well  there  than  at  the  dovecote,  in  order  to 
cause  them  to  return  to  the  latter  at  once,  when  they  are  let 
go.  Any  message  which  they  bring  back  to  the  dovecote 
should  be  sent  on  without  the  least  delay  to  the  person  for 
whom  it  is  intended. 

[60] 


TRENCH  DUTIES 

Cyclists  are  used  to  advantage  inside  the  position,  as  soon  as 
there  is  a  practicable  road;  they  are  swifter  than  runners, 
without  being  any  more  vulnerable.  It  is  worth  while  to 
create  relays  of  cyclists  on  such  routes,  to  replace  severed 
telephone  lines  or  runners. 

Telegraphs  and  automobiles  are  the  means  of  liaison  which 
are  used  especially  for  communication  between  the  position 
and  the  rear.  Wireless  telegraphy,  however,  is  employed  by 
the  commander  of  the  position  and  by  the  artillery,  especially 
in  broken  country,  when  keeping  liaison  with  the  airplanes. 

Under  exceptional  circumstances,  automobiles  are  used 
in  the  interior  of  the  position;  for  instance,  motor-carried 
machine  guns,  when  they  have  had  occasion  to  make  a  dash 
forward,  will  do  better  to  bring  back  important  and  urgent 
information  to  the  commander  themselves,  rather  than  try  to 
send  it  through  by  means  of  uncertain  intermediaries. 

To  sum  up,  two  means  of  liaison  are  essential,  telephones 
and  runners;  others  are  of  service  in  special  circumstances,  or 
when  the  former  are  lacking. 

The  Stay  In  the  Trenches 

It  is  not  especially  dangerous  to  remain  and  to  go  about  in 
a  normally  constructed  trench,  except  in  case  of  an  intense 
and  well-conducted  bombardment,  provided,  of  course,  one 
respects  the  rules  derived  from  experience.  On  the  other  hand, 
even  a  momentary  stay  in  a  trench  may,  at  any  time,  prove 
fatal  to  the  newcomer  or  the  greenhorn,  as  well  as  to  the  fool 
or  the  braggart. 

In  the  presence  of  an  attentive  enemy,  every  fault  receives 
severe  chastisement  at  his  hands;  individual  imprudence  is  in- 
stantly punished  by  death ;  the  revelation  of  collective  move- 
ment draws  murderous  fire;   an  ill-concealed  machine  gun 

[61] 


POSITIONS 

is  a  target  for  artillery  fire.    Thus,  prudence  must  be  the  rule 
of  all  those  who  stay  in  the  trenches,  or  pass  through  them. 

Silence  is  one  of  the  essential  rules  of  the  trench.  It  should 
become  the  unvarying  habit  of  the  troops,  because  of  its  many 
advantages;  it  keeps  the  enemy  in  ignorance  as  to  the  strength 
in  which  the  trench  is  held;  it  helps  the  sharpshooters  and  the 
observers  to  do  their  work,  and  to  detect  the  least  noise;  it 
enables  the  chief  to  transmit  an  order  from  man  to  man,  with- 
out raising  the  voice;  in  case  of  alarm,  it  helps  each  man  to 
take  his  place  quickly.  It  is  one  of  the  first  qualities  of  well- 
disciplined  troops. 

R6le  of  the  Commanders 

The  commander  in  a  trench  has  various  duties,  according  to 
the  extent  of  his  command.  He  must  take  account  of  the  pro- 
fessional ability  of  his  subordinates,  the  morale  of  his  soldiers, 
the  task  confided  to  him,  the  situation  of  his  trenches,  and  of 
all  special  or  unforeseen  circumstances,  in  order  to  determine 
for  himself  his  line  of  conduct. 

One  principle  which  no  commander  should  forget  is  the 
necessity  for  his  frequent  presence  in  the  midst  of  his  men. 
It  would  be  childish  to  try  to  determine  the  exact  number 
of  hours  which  the  leader  of  a  small  unit  should  pass  in  his 
trenches,  or  the  number  of  visits  winch  the  leader  of  a  large 
unit  should  pay  to  them :  so  many  conflicting  necessities  arise 
that  each  must  learn  from  his  conscience  alone  how  to  fulfill 
his  whole  duty. 

Direct  contact  with  the  troops  on  as  many  occasions  as 
possible  is  the  most  certain  way  to  gain  their  confidence.  A 
leader  whose  face  and  voice  are  known,  whose  reputation  is 
established  with  his  subordinates,  can  have  a  pronounced 

[62] 


TRENCH  DUTIES 

influence  before,  during,  and  after  the  combat.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  leader  who  has  not  taken  the  trouble  to  make  himself 
known  cannot  enjoy  the  same  ascendancy,  no  matter  how 
great  his  coolness  in  face  of  danger. 

The  frequent  presence  of  the  commander  is,  moreover,  in- 
dispensable for  other  important  reasons.  It  permits  him  to 
ascertain  whether  the  orders  given  have  been  well  executed. 
Such  verification,  carried  out  within  the  limits  appropriate 
to  each  grade  of  the  command,  forestalls  possible  negligence 
and  cruel  surprises. 

It  also  helps  the  leader  really  to  know  the  trenches,  to  take 
cognizance  of  all  the  difficulties,  and  to  avoid  giving  any 
orders  which  are  impracticable  or  impossible  of  execution. 

Finally,  it  gives  him  the  chance  to  examine  his  position  as  a 
whole,  to  improve  and  draw  together  the  links  of  his  chain,  to 
face  all  eventualities,  either  of  attack  or  of  defense,  to  dis- 
cover and  fill  in  all  gaps  —  in  a  word,  to  look  ahead. 

To  see  means  to  foresee.  Negligence  and  carelessness  on  the 
part  of  the  leader  are  generally  reflected,  little  by  little,  right 
down  to  the  lowest  steps  of  the  hierarchy,  and  produce  deplor- 
able effects. 

On  the  contrary,  the  commander  who  has  seen  with  his  own 
eyes  the  trench  and  the  terrain,  with  reference  to  which  his 
orders  are  drawn  up,  expresses  his  thought  with  a  precision 
and  a  certainty  which  no  theoretical  instruction  can  impart. 

Activities  of  the  Troops 

If  the  leader  of  a  medium-sized  unit  seems  to  lose  interest  in 
the  trenches,  or  at  least  to  neglect  them,  the  leaders  of  the  small 
units  under  his  orders  will  have  a  tendency  to  take  root  in  their 
command-posts.     From  that  moment  the  troops  stagnate, 

[63] 


POSITIONS 

grow  slack,  and  think  of  but  one  thing  —  the  relief.  Their 
attention,  instead  of  being  continually  directed  forward,  is 
turned  to  the  rear.  Thus  work,  even  during  periods  of  calm, 
is  indispensable  for  the  moral  and  physical  health  of  all. 

An  excellent  way  to  occupy  the  soldier,  and  to  sustain 
his  capacity  for  offense,  is  to  turn  his  thoughts  continually 
towards  the  opposing  trench  and  to  direct  his  activity 
against  it. 

The  best  shots  of  the  company  are  given  the  task  of  cover- 
ing the  vulnerable  places  in  the  enemy's  line,  and  all  eventual 
objectives. 

Men  of  careful  attention  and  tested  judgment  are  chosen  as 
watchers,  to  discover  the  enemy's  movements,  the  hours  of  his 
relief  or  supply,  his  offensive  or  defensive  works,  the  location 
of  his  trench  weapons  or  machine  guns,  and  his  observation 
posts.  They  are  furnished  with  watches,  spy  glasses,  and 
periscopes. 

The  most  active  and  venturesome  serve  as  patrols,  and 
endeavor  to  reconnoitre  certain  important  points,  to  gather 
information  as  to  the  adversary's  intentions,  and  to  take 
prisoners. 

It  is  well  to  point  out  to  the  soldier  the  effect  of  attrition; 
thus,  let  him  see  how,  by  putting  out  of  action,  every  day  of 
the  week,  and  on  every  mile  of  the  front,  a  small  number 
of  enemies,  immense  damage  to  the  opposing  army  will 
ultimately  result.1 

The  necessary  activity  in  the  trench  degenerates  into  fruit- 
less and  dangerous  enterprises,  if  it  has  not  predetermined 
ends,  or  if  it  involves  the  troops  in  costly  struggles.   The  initia- 

1  Sixteen   men  per  mile  each  day   put  out  of  action  makes  240,000  per 
month  on  a  front  of  500  miles. 
[64] 


TRENCH  DUTIES 

tive  in  small  operations,  if  left  in  the  hands  of  leaders  of  units 
who  are  inexperienced  or  impatient,  may  cause  useless  loss  of 
men,  or  regrettable  waste  of  artillery  ammunition.  Thus,  the 
Command  watches  carefully  over  the  leaders  of  the  units  in 
line,  in  order  to  avoid  abuses  as  well  of  action  as  of  inaction. 

Besides  this  activity  directed  towards  the  enemy,  there  is 
considerable  work  to  be  done  every  day  in  the  trench  itself. 
This  work,  whose  importance  escapes  those  who  are  not 
accustomed  to  trench  life,  consists  in  rebuilding  parapets, 
boyaux,  and  shelters  destroyed  by  bombardment,  by  water, 
or  by  frost;  in  replacing  and  completing  accessory  defenses, 
digging  wells  and  drainage  channels,  putting  in  new  latrines 
and  refuse-pits  and  filling  up  the  old  ones;  taking  measures 
against  landslips;  repairing  the  endless  damage  caused  by 
shells,  which  uncover  bodies,  obstruct  passages,  and  cut 
telephone  lines.  In  fact,  in  periods  of  intense  bombardment, 
this  work  is  so  exhausting  that  it  uses  up  the  troops  who 
are  going  to  fight,  and  should  be,  in  part,  turned  over  to 
workmen  sent  from  the  rear  during  the  night. 

The  supply  of  the  trench  with  food,  munitions,  and  materiel 
of  all  sorts  should  be  effected  daily.  It  can  generally  take 
place  only  at  night,  in  order  not  to  expose  those  who  are 
entrusted  therewith  to  loss  or  delay. 

Food  is  brought  by  the  cooks  and,  if  need  be,  by  certain 
fatigue  parties  placed  at  their  disposal  by  their  units;  the 
personnel  of  these  parties  is  changed  as  much  as  possible  in 
order  to  increase  the  number  of  soldiers  capable  of  establish- 
ing liaisons  day  and  night  between  front  and  rear.  The 
kitchens  are  situated  behind  the  front,  so  as  to  be  compara- 
tively sheltered  from  bombardment  and  not  betrayed  by  their 

[05] 


POSITIONS 

smoke.  Since  it  is  a  long  way  from  the  kitchens  to  the  first 
line  trenches,  it  is  worth  while  to  shorten  the  trip  as  much  as 
possible  by  the  use  of  light  railways,  barrows,  and  push  carts, 
both  in  order  to  relieve  the  cooks,  and  to  increase  the  com- 
fort of  the  soldier  in  the  trench. 

The  kitchens  in  each  company  are  under  the  charge  of  a 
responsible  non-commissioned  officer,  and  are  inspected  with- 
out warning  by  officers  and  N.  C.  Os.  detailed  by  the  captains 
or  majors;  they  must  be  kept  absolutely  clean,  and  also  their 
surroundings,  and  must  employ  none  but  men  regularly 
assigned  to  them. 

The  supply  of  infantry  munitions  is  usually  effected  by  the 
relieving  units.  Each  man  carries  a  specified  number  of  car- 
tridges; if  he  has  not  used  them  up  at  the  moment  when  he 
is  relieved,  he  turns  the  surplus  over  to  a  munition  depot 
organized  for  the  company  and  at  the  disposal  of  the  captain; 
there  is  also  a  battalion  depot,  supplied  by  similar  means.  An 
account  exhibiting  the  daily  intake  and  distribution  enables 
the  commanding  officers  to  know  at  any  moment  whether  the 
number  of  cartridges  is  sufficient  for  such  needs  as  may  arise. 
The  same  system  of  depots  is  employed  for  grenades,  for 
trench-weapon  ammunition,  for  lighting  or  signalling  rockets, 
etc.,  but  the  supply  is  carried  out  by  special  details  coming 
with  those  which  bring  the  materiel. 

Artillery  munitions  are  generally  replenished  by  employing 
all  the  improved  means  of  transport  which  are  compatible 
with  the  situation  of  the  batteries.  The  supply  of  the  heavy 
pieces  depends  especially  upon  the  service  in  the  rear;  every- 
thing is  done  to  improve  the  railways  and  motor  transports, 
which  insure  a  rapid  and  regular  arrival  of  projectiles  at  a 
convenient  distance  from  their  pieces. 

[66] 


TRENCH  DUTIES 

The  supply  of  materiel  includes  the  bringing  up  of  wire  and 
posts,  of  all  sorts  of  accessory  defenses,  tools,  beams,  wood,  and 
straw,  in  short  of  all  the  utensils  and  articles  necessary  to  the 
organization,  the  security,  and  the  comfort  of  the  trench. 

It  is  determined  by  the  daily  demands  of  the  leaders  of 
units,  based  upon  their  immediate  needs  or  their  expectations 
for  the  future.  The  transport  of  materiel  is  continued  as  far 
as  possible  by  mechanical  means  in  order  to  gain  time  and  to 
save  labor  and  waste  of  men;  then  it  is  carried  forward  by 
special  gangs  of  workmen,  taken  from  the  troops  in  the  rear. 
At  the  point  where  the  materiel  is  distributed  to  the  workmen, 
the  leader  of  each  gang  receives  a  list  of  what  is  turned  over  to 
him;  for  this  he  must  bring  back  a  receipt  signed  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  unit  supplied. 


[67] 


CHAPTER  III 

RELIEF 

Relief  is  the  operation  of  replacing  the  troops  occupying  a 
certain  group  of  trenches  by  other  troops,  either  equal, 
superior,  or  inferior  in  strength.  It  includes  the  march  of  a 
unit  from  its  cantonment  to  the  trench,  the  replacing  of  the 
unit  in  line,  and  the  return  of  the  unit  relieved  to  the  rest 
cantonment. 

General  relief  is  the  term  applied  to  the  relief  of  a  whole  posi- 
tion, when  the  troops  relieved  are  large  units,  such  as  army 
corps  or  divisions.  Interior  relief  is  the  term  applied  to  the 
relief  of  one  sector  or  a  portion  of  a  sector,  when  the  troops 
relieved  are  regiments  or  battalions. 

General  Principles  of  Relief 

Interior  relief  is  executed  every  six  days.  This  period  may 
be  reduced  when  the  stay  in  the  trenches  is  particularly 
arduous,  or  prolonged  when  it  is  comfortable;  it  constitutes 
the  minimum  necessary  for  getting  acquainted  with  a  new 
sector,  for  undertaking  and  carrying  out  works  of  construction 
and  installation,  or  for  preparing  and  executing  raids. 

It  is  advisable  to  arrange  the  relief  between  units  which 
have  friendly  relations  to  one  another,  such  as  battalions  of  the 
same  regiment,  in  order  that  the  trench  duties  may  be  more 
easily  carried  on  and  continuity  of  effort  maintained.  For 
this  purpose  it  is  necessary  that  the  units  in  service,  such  as 
regiments,  should  be  echeloned  in  depth,  one  part  at  the 
Cos] 


RELIEF 

cantonment  of  "part-rest"  (such  as  the  division  or  reserve), 
while  the  other  part  holds  the  trenches. 

It  is  also  advantageous  not  to  shift  troops  constantly  from 
sector  to  sector  or  region  to  region,  except  in  cases  of  tactical 
necessity.  Units  which  are  sure  of  coming  back  to  their 
trenches  fit  them  out  pleasantly,  keep  them  up  with  a  regard 
for  hygiene  and  cleanliness,  and  increase  the  solidity  of  the 
defenses  and  the  security  of  the  shelters;  they  show  an  interest 
in  the  work  undertaken,  study  all  the  details  of  the  enemy's 
position,  and  prepare  day  by  day  for  the  future  attack. 

General  relief  is  executed  either  when  large  units  are  going 
to  "full  rest"  at  the  rear,  in  suitably  chosen  cantonments,  or 
else  when  units  are  removed  from  one  part  of  the  front  to 
another  for  strategic  reasons. 

It  is  executed  in  the  same  way  as  interior  relief;  divisions 
and  regiments  being  relieved  successively,  but  never  simul- 
taneously. 

Therefore  it  is  enough  to  study  the  mechanism  of  the  relief 
of  small  units. 

The  march  of  a  unit  from  its  cantonment  to  the  trenches  is 

a  night  march  carried  out  according  to  the  usual  rules. 

The  time  of  departure  is  so  fixed  that  the  unit  shall  arrive 
at  the  trench  and  effect  the  relief  early  enough  for  the  unit 
relieved  to  get  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy  before  daylight.  In 
summer,  when  the  nights  are  very  short,  the  slightest  delay 
may  be  fatal  to  the  unit  relieved,  if  it  should  be  seen  by  the 
enemy's  artillery  and  taken  under  fire. 

There  is  every  advantage,  even  after  a  rest,  in  transporting 
the  men  by  motor  trucks  as  far  forward  as  possible,  if  their 

[69] 


POSITIONS 

cantonments  are  distant,  so  that  the  whole  unit  shall  arrive 
fresh  in  the  trenches. 

A  soon  as  the  march  brings  the  men  within  sight  of  the 
enemy,  they  should  neither  smoke,  flash  electric  torches  nor 
make  any  noise.  During  halts,  the  roads  are  left  open  and 
crossings  and  forks  are  kept  clear. 

At  points  agreed  on  in  advance,  each  battalion  finds  guides 
sent  by  the  unit  which  it  relieves.  There  is  usually  one  guide 
for  each  platoon  leader,  one  guide  for  each  company  com- 
mander, and  one  for  each  battalion  commander.  These  guides 
attach  themselves  to  the  commanders  of  the  units  to  which 
they  are  assigned,  and  accompany  them  until  they  reach  the 
commanders  of  the  units  relieved;  they  do  not  allow  them- 
selves to  be  diverted  from  their  errand,  even  for  a  moment, 
under  any  pretext.  When  numerous  groups  of  guides  are 
assembled  at  one  point,  the  leaders  of  each  one  must  keep  on 
the  alert,  to  see  that  no  battalion  or  company  goes  past  with- 
out getting  its  guides. 

The  departures  of  the  various  elements  are  calculated  so 
that  all  the  units  in  line  shall  not  be  relieved  simultaneously. 
Care  must  be  taken  at  the  approaches  and  in  the  boyaux  to 
avoid  straggling,  clogging,  and  crossing  of  units.  The  com- 
mander of  the  unit  relieved  sends  in  advance  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  relieving  unit  all  needful  information,  and  gives 
his  guides  precise  instructions  as  to  the  routes  to  be  followed. 

The  replacing  of  the  unit  in  line  constitutes  the  relief, 
strictly  speaking. 

Its  method  of  execution  depends  on  the  number  of  men 
concerned;  since  two  units  of  the  same  theoretical  strength, 
may,  according  to  circumstances,  be  very  different  in  the 
number  of  men  that  they  actually  contain. 

[70] 


RELIEF 

It  also  depends  on  the  front  to  be  occupied,  for  the  com- 
manding officer  often  takes  the  opportunity  offered  by  the 
relief  to  increase  or  diminish  the  length  of  the  trench  entrusted 
to  one  unit. 

These  are  the  considerations  that  govern  the  relieving  unit 
in  making  its  arrangements  to  hold  the  first  line  with  elements 
which  will  afford  sufficient  density,  and  to  distribute  the  sur- 
plus, if  need  be,  in  the  shelters  of  the  second  line,  in  the  sup- 
port trenches,  or  in  reserve.  Such  dispositions  should  be 
planned  before  starting,  in  order  to  avoid  hesitation,  delay, 
pushing  back,  and  crowding,  all  of  which  are  sources  of  dis- 
order, fatigue,  and  danger. 

If  the  relief  is  complicated  by  simultaneous  changes  in  the 
two  factors  of  effectives  and  front,  and  thus  becomes  particu- 
larly difficult  to  carry  out,  it  is  indispensable  to  take  special 
measures  for  its  proper  execution;  in  such  cases  a  detachment 
of  N.  C.  Os.,  like  the  camping  party  that  is  sent  ahead  under 
command  of  an  officer  to  prepare  a  cantonment,  goes  into  the 
trench  the  night  before  to  prepare  all  the  details  of  moving  in. 
These  details  attended  to,  the  N.  C.  Os.  wait  in  the  trench  for 
their  respective  elements,  which  are  brought  up  by  the  guides, 
and  help  the  men  to  install  themselves  quickly  and  silently. 

The  true  unit  of  relief  is  the  battalion. 

While  the  relieving  elements  come  to  take  their  stations 
and  the  elements  relieved  begin  to  move  toward  the  rear  (so 
far  as  possible  by  another  route  or  by  other  boyaux),  their 
commanders  meet  to  give  each  other  local  information  and 
directions. 

The  commanders  of  battalions  and  companies  relieved 
transmit  to  the  new  arrivals,  at  the  respective  command-posts, 
all  information  concerning  the  trench,  maps,  sketches,  photo- 

[71] 


POSITIONS 

graphs,  results  of  reconnaissance,  state  of  works  undertaken 
and  works  projected,  positions  of  depots  of  munitions,  of  food 
and  of  water,  condition  of  these  depots,  amount  of  materiel, 
points  in  the  line  to  be  specially  watched,  indications  of  the 
intentions  of  the  enemy,  dangerous  approaches,  etc.  The 
])la1oon-leaders  do  likewise,  furnishing  all  sorts  of  practical  in- 
formation concerning  the  parts  of  the  trench  they  occupy. 

As  soon  as  their  units  are  in  place,  the  company  commanders 
send  to  the  battalion  commander,  by  telephone,  brief  notifica- 
tion that  the  relief  has  been  accomplished  with  or  without 
incidents;  he  in  turn  reports  back  in  the  same  manner  to  his 
superior  officer. 

Immediately  after  the  completion  of  the  relief,  the  com- 
manders of  the  different  units  should  make  sure  of  their  liaisons 
both  laterally  and  in  depth.  For  this  purpose,  they  send 
N.  C.  Os.  or  intelligent  soldiers  to  get  into  touch  with  the 
elements  on  the  right  and  the  left,  and  to  ascertain  that  all 
parts  of  the  trench  are  manned  with  numbers  proportional  to 
the  needs  of  the  moment.  Each  company  commander  has 
the  command  posts  of  adjoining  companies  and  battalions 
reconnoitred  not  only  by  one  agent  but  by  several,  so  that  he 
will  never  find  himself  at  a  loss.  The  telephone  operators  make 
sure  that  their  lines  are  in  working  order.  The  battalion  com- 
mander, on  his  part,  having  as  liaison  agents  an  N.  C.  0.  and 
a  soldier  for  each  company,  causes  first  one  of  them  and  then 
the  other  to  reconnoitre  the  command-posts  of  his  captains.1 

1  A  practical  way  of  establishing  reciprocal  liaison  between  the  battalion 
commander  and  his  captains  is  the  following: 

Each  company,  on  leaving  the  cantonments,  sends  two  men  to  the  battalion 
commander.  These  men  march  with  the  battalion  commander's  liaison  as  far 
as  his  command-post,  with  which  they  familiarize  themselves;  thence  they 
rejoin  their  respective  companies,  which  have  meantime  reached  the  trenches 
that  have  been  assigned  to  them;  they  are  guided  thither  by  an  agent  of  the 
[72] 


RELIEF 

The  mechanism  of  relief,  apparently  quite  simple,  is  com- 
plicated by  a  mass  of  detail  arising  from  the  terrain  and 
the  circumstances.  The  way  of  accomplishing  it,  therefore, 
should  not  be  too  narrowly  or  precisely  laid  down.  But  it  is 
necessary  for  the  battalion  commander  to  give  exact  orders, 
and  for  the  captains  to  see  to  it  that  they  are  strictly  executed. 

A  relief  badly  carried  out  results  in  masses  of  men  being 
huddled  in  the  boyaux,  able  neither  to  advance  nor  retreat, 
and  to  whom  it  is  impossible  to  give  orders.  If  the  enemy  at- 
tacks at  such  a  moment,  or  even  if  he  limits  himself  to  well- 
adjusted  artillery  fire,  the  results  of  the  errors  committed  may 
prove  disastrous. 

One  may  judge  of  the  degree  of  instruction  of  troops  by  the 
manner  in  which  they  carry  out  a  relief;  but  as  there  are 
always  two  units  involved,  care  must  be  taken,  in  judging 
them,  not  to  attribute  to  one  the  mistakes  of  the  other;  for 
the  blameless  unit  is  often  the  first  victim. 

As  soon  as  the  liaisons  are  established,  the  leaders  of  the 
different  elements  make  their  initial  tests  after  taking  their 
stations.  They  have  the  battle  alarm  given,  so  as  to  cause 
each  man  to  occupy  the  post  which  he  is  to  take  in  case  of 
an  attack,  and  to  make  certain  that  the  trench  is  well  de- 
fended.   The  roll  call  is  taken  at  this  juncture. 

These  initial  tests  are  for  the  purpose  of  making  all  the 
necessary  verifications  and  observations.    They  are  directed 

commander  of  the  battalion  to  be  relieved,  and  accompanied  by  another  agent 
of  the  commander  of  the  relieving  battalion.  The  agents  of  the  two  battalion 
commanders  bring  back  with  them  two  other  men  from  each  company.  The 
6econd  liaison  agent  of  the  relieving  battalion  commander  then  goes  back  with 
these  two  men  to  identify  his  company. 

This  movement  of  going  and  coming,  utilized  for  the  transmission  of  daily 
items,  of  orders  and  of  reports,  familiarizes  a  considerable  number  of  soldiers 
from  the  outset  with  a  route  which  it  is  absolutely  essential  to  know  in  case  of 
unexpected  events  or  of  breakdown  of  the  telephone  connections. 

[73] 


POSITIONS 

upon  the  communications  between  the  different  command- 
postfl  to  make  sure  that  their  itineraries  are  properly  chosen 
from  the  tactical  point  of  view,  and  arranged  in  the  best 
possible  way  from  the  practical  standpoint;  on  the  state  of 
the  parapet,  which  should  not  be  obstructed  by  shelters,  and 
ought  to  be  maintained  at  a  sufficient  height  and  thickness;  on 
the  state  of  the  accessory  defenses,  shelters,  observation  posts, 
boyaux,  latrines,  refuse-holes,  munition  depots,  etc. 

These  reconnaissances  permit  the  different  leaders  to  get  a 
look  at  the  trench  which  they  occupy  as  a  whole,  and  to  decide 
on  any  improvements  to  be  made;  they  enable  them  to  make 
certain  how  the  work  of  their  subordinates  is  organized  and 
performed,  and  to  know  whether  the  liaisons  established  are 
working  properly.  They  form  the  subject,  in  each  company, 
of  a  written  report.  The  battalion  commander  summarizes 
and  coordinates  these  reports,  at  the  same  time  that  he  keeps 
in  mind  everything  which  he  has  himself  observed.  He  then 
sends  to  his  superior  officer  the  report  of  the  installation, 
accompanied  by  a  sketch. 

A  sketch  made  at  night  is  of  slight  value;  it  can  do  little 
more  than  reproduce  the  sketch  which  is  usually  passed  on  by 
the  commanders  of  the  unit  that  has  been  relieved,  together 
with  an  indication  of  the  places  occupied  by  the  elements  of 
the  relieving  force.  In  this  manner,  inaccurate  sketches  are 
transmitted  indefinitely,  from  unit  to  unit,  because  the  guiding 
principle  is  to  furnish  without  any  delay  the  information  de- 
manded. It  is  the  duty  of  the  captains  and  battalion  com- 
manders to  verify  the  exactness  of  every  kind  of  document 
handed  over  to  them,  and  to  indicate  all  the  rectifications  to 
be  made  in  it.  They  make  use,  to  this  end,  of  all  the  infor- 
mation obtainable,  and  particularly  of  photographs  taken  by 

[74] 


RELIEF 

aviators.  Such  a  work  can  only  be  accomplished  in  the  day- 
time, and  demands  care;  it  should  be  regarded  as  performed 
not  only  for  the  benefit  of  the  unit  in  actual  occupation,  but 
for  that  of  all  those  which  succeed  it  in  the  same  trench. 

Reconnaissances  during  the  daytime  thus  complete  those  of 
the  night,  and  above  all  make  it  possible  to  study  the  enemy's 
position.  They  ought  to  be  made  by  officers  and  N.  C.  Os.  of 
all  ranks,  for  they  serve  to  give  the  men  exact  information 
about  their  situation  and  that  of  the  units  close  to  them,  about 
the  enemy's  trenches,  and  about  all  the  points  to  be  specially 
watched. 

The  soldier,  arriving  at  night,  his  body  tired  from  carrying 
his  pack,  ammunition  and  provisions,  his  mind  dulled  by  the 
march  and  by  the  danger,  is  not  generally  apprised  of  the  lay 
of  the  land  when  daybreak  comes ;  and  if  the  trench  possesses 
important  salients  or  advanced  posts,  this  lack  of  local  topo- 
graphical knowledge  may  cause  mistakes.  He  should  be 
enlightened  as  early  as  possible  by  precise  information  from 
his  superior  officers. 

The  return  of  the  unit  relieved  to  its  rest  cantonment  in- 
cludes getting  out  of  the  trench,  and  then  the  march  to  the 
cantonment. 

Detailed  orders  concerning  the  relief  are  given  by  the 
battalion  commanders,  who  carefully  provide  all  the  necessary 
measures.  Only  the  battalion  commander  can  regulate  the 
movement  so  that  there  shall  be  no  collisions,  crowdings  nor 
delays;  good  intentions  and  previous  agreement  between 
captains  are  never  sufficient,  unless  they  are  directed  by  clear 
and  precise  orders. 

[75] 


POSITIONS 

Getting  out  of  the  trench  requires  as  much  method  as 
getting  in.  It  is,  if  possible,  effected  by  different  boyaux  and 
different  ionics,  at  least  at  the  start. 

The  march  is  made  by  platoons,  the  platoon  leader  leaving 
the  trench  last,  after  giving  full  information  to  his  successor 
an<  1  making  sure  that  the  new  platoon  is  installed;  an  N.  C.  0., 
accompanied  by  a  man  who  is  intimately  acquainted  with  the 
route,  marches  at  the  head  of  the  platoon. 

The  captain  appoints  a  place  for  his  platoons  to  reassemble; 
he  does  not  leave  his  trench  until  the  guides  sent  to  bring  up 
the  relieving  platoons  have  come  to  report  on  the  execution  of 
their  errand;  these  guides  attach  themselves  to  his  liaison 
until  they  are  able  to  rejoin  their  platoons.  The  place  of 
assembly  of  the  company  is  fixed  far  enough  away  to  clear 
the  approaches  of  the  position  entirely,  not  to  block  general 
traffic,  and  to  be  as  far  as  possible  protected  from  the  enemy's 
fire.  Roll  call  is  taken  in  the  platoons  and  reported  to  the 
captain. 

On  the  way  out,  the  most  absolute  silence  must  be  pre- 
served. Men  who  have  been  relieved  have  a  tendency  to 
scorn  the  danger  which  they  are  leaving  behind;  they  should 
remember  that  the  men  who  have  taken  their  places  are  ex- 
posed to  the  fire  of  artillery  whose  observers  are  listening  for 
the  slightest  noise.  This  artillery  will  not  limit  itself  to  the 
first  line  when  it  opens  fire,  and  may  make  them  pay  dear  for 
their  rashness  by  accompanying  them  on  their  return  journey. 

All  rules  of  conduct  for  the  march  in  the  boyaux  are  strictly 
observed.  In  case  of  doubt,  troops  relieved  always  give  way 
to  relieving  troops. 

The  battalion  commander,  who  gets  in  touch  with  his  suc- 
cessor at  the  command-post,  receives  there,  either  by  tele- 

[76] 


RELIEF 

phone  or  by  liaison  agent,  the  report  of  the  relief  of  each 
company.  He  leaves  with  his  liaison  as  soon  as  the  last  com- 
pany is  relieved;  he  is  accompanied  by  the  four  stretcher- 
bearers  usually  located  near  his  command-post,  so  as  to  bring 
along  or  to  report  any  wounded  who  may  have  been  left 
behind. 

The  march  to  the  cantonment  is  conducted  in  accordance 
with  the  ordinary  rules  for  night  marching.  It  is  the  first 
occasion  on  which  the  men  are  once  more  taken  in  hand,  after 
the  relaxation  of  their  habits  which  often  results  from  a  stay 
in  the  trenches;  discipline  of  the  ranks  is  therefore  vigorously 
maintained. 

Save  in  case  of  necessity  the  battalion  commander  does  not 
fix  a  spot  for  his  battalion  to  assemble;  in  order  to  spare  the 
men  useless  waits  and  fatigues,  each  company  goes  directly 
to  the  cantonment  which  has  been  assigned  to  it. 

The  cooks  depart  before  the  battalion  is  relieved,  as  soon  as 
the  last  meal  has  been  prepared,  under  the  conduct  of  a 
N.  C.  0.,  designated  by  the  battalion  commander;  they 
march  in  perfect  order,  with  their  small  carts  if  they  have 
utensils  to  transport,  or  else  with  the  necessary  carriers;  they 
install  themselves  at  the  cantonment  in  sufficient  time  to  be 
able  to  provide  hot  soup  or  coffee. 

The  ambulance  outfit  and  the  horses  of  the  battalion  come 
out  from  the  cantonment  where  they  were  stationed  in  the 
rear,  repair  to  a  point  determined  by  the  commander  of  the 
regiment,  and  wait  there  for  the  companies  of  the  battalion 
to  pass. 

During  the  march,  an  energetic  N.  C.  0.  and  several  men 
are  placed  behind  the  rear  rank  of  each  company,  in  order  to 
prevent  any  laggard  from  stopping.    If  a  man  is  so  sick  or 

[77] 


POSITIONS 

t  ired  that  he  cannot  keep  up,  he  is  given  a  certificate  signed  by 
the  captain,  and  awaits  the  battalion  ambulance.  This  ambu- 
lance follows  the  last  company  relieved,  and  is  accompanied  by 
the  rear  guard  of  police  of  the  battalion.  No  laggard  must  be 
left  behind;  if  necessary  the  pace  of  this  rear  guard  is  slowed 
down. 

Marches  executed  after  a  stay  in  the  trench  are  painful, 
especially  in  winter,  because  the  men's  bodies  are  numb  from 
immobility,  and  their  feet  tortured  by  cold  and  wet.  When  a 
long  distance  must  be  covered,  the  use  of  auto-transports 
brings  great  relief  to  the  troops. 

On  arrival  at  the  cantonment,  the  companies  rest.  The 
next  morning,  before  beginning  any  work,  the  captains  and 
the  majors  make  a  rapid  inspection,  in  order  to  prescribe  such 
modifications  as  are  often  necessary  in  the  arrangements  made 
by  the  party  preparing  the  cantonment  and  adopted  during 
the  night;  modifications  made  at  a  later  date  would  cause  use- 
less fatigue  and  loss  of  time.  Then  the  men  settle  themselves; 
they  care  for  the  needs  of  their  health,  as  well  as  for  the  clean- 
ing of  their  arms  and  of  their  effects.  The  duties  of  the  place 
are  taken  over  at  the  hour  fixed  by  the  commander  of  the  regi- 
ment, in  accordance  with  the  agreement  concluded  with  the 
preceding  one,  if  such  there  was;  sentries  are  placed  at  the 
exits,  the  police  guard  is  posted,  the  patrols  ordered  and  their 
rounds  prescribed. 

The  major  and  the  captains  look  out  for  the  sanitation  of 
the  cantonment;  they  insist  that  the  location  of  the  latrines 
and  of  the  refuse  pits  be  fixed,  from  the  moment  of  arrival. 
They  inform  themselves  concerning  the  attitude  of  the  troops 
towards  the  local  inhabitants,  and  examine  any  complaints  or 
claims  that  may  be  made.    A  unit  with  habits  of  order  and 

[78] 


RELIEF 

discipline  is  well  received  by  the  local  population,  which  knows 
that  it  deserves  respect  and  admiration. 

Good  conduct  and  carriage,  and  external  marks  of  respect, 
are  rigorously  exacted.  No  man  ought  to  go  out  before  he  has 
washed  and  cleansed  himself  and  his  equipment  in  the  man- 
ner prescribed.  At  each  meeting  of  the  company,  a  few  of  the 
regular  evolutions,  or  a  part  of  the  manual  of  arms,  will 
restore  to  the  soldier  a  sense  of  the  discipline  of  the  ranks. 

A  body  of  troops  which  is  clean,  carries  itself  well,  salutes 
correctly,  and  manoeuvres  properly,  shows  the  good  leadership 
and  discipline  which  bring  victory. 


[79] 


PART  III 
ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 


CHAPTER  I 

GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  OFFENSIVE 
COMBAT 

The  general  form  of  offensive  combat  is  an  attack  on  a 
position. 

Even  in  the  war  of  movement,  the  encounter  between  two 
forces  takes  tins  form.  For,  whenever  troops  are  in  contact, 
they  take  advantage  of  short  cessations  of  fighting,  and,  above 
all,  of  night  time,  to  dig  trenches,  to  make  shelters  for  them- 
selves, and  to  anchor  themselves  to  the  ground;  in  other 
words  they  organize  positions. 

Thus  the  offensive,  starting  from  an  organized  position 
and  having  as  its  objective  a  hostile  position,  opens  with 
an  assault. 

This  assault  should  be  preceded  by  a  preparation,  whose 
object  is  to  facilitate  it  in  every  way. 

It  has  not  the  character  of  a  rapid  and  decisive  act,  but  is 
developed  progressively,  with  alternations  of  movements  and 
stationary  periods.  It  may  thus  be  designated  by  the  name  of 
an  attack,  in  order  to  reserve  the  name  of  assault  for  the 
separate  acts  forming  parts  of  a  struggle  which  is  often 
protracted. 

In  case  of  success,  the  offensive  is  continued,  either  by  pur- 
suit, in  case  the  enemy  attempts  to  get  away,  or  by  a  march 
of  approach,  in  case  he  occupies  a  second  position  behind  the 

[83] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

first.    As  soon  as  the  enemy  resists,  the  phases  of  the  offensive 
are  renewed. 

These  phases  succeed  one  another  in  the  following  cycle: 
preparation  of  the  attack,  attack,  pursuit,  march  of  approach 
— up  to  the  moment  of  definitive  victory.  This  order  is  invari- 
able, whatever  the  initial  phase  may  be  —  march  of  approach 
in  a  war  of  movement,  attack  in  case  of  a  surprise — but  the 
duration  and  importance  of  each  phase  depends  entirely  on 
circumstances.  They  should  follow  one  another,  without  res- 
pite, in  such  wise  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  occupying  at 
need  the  successive  positions  which  he  has  previously  organ- 
ized, or  from  preparing  fresh  ones. 

These  phases  will  now  be  studied  and  described  in  their 
complete  development,  as  carried  out  by  the  divisions  of  an 
army  corps  which  has  been  given  the  task  of  attacking  a  posi- 
tion. By  reducing,  according  to  circumstances,  the  scale  of 
one  or  another  of  them,  it  will  be  possible  to  get  a  picture 
of  a  specific  offensive  combat. 

Parts  played  by  the  different  Arms  in  the  Engagement 

The  infantry  and  the  artillery,  acting  in  close  and  constant 
liaison,  are  the  two  arms  which  play  the  principal  part  in  the 
combat. 

The  heavy  and  the  field  artillery  prepare  the  way  for  the 
infantry  to  enter  the  battle,  by  smashing  the  enemy's  position 
with  their  fire,  by  reducing  his  artillery  to  impotence,  and  by 
destroying  his  defensive  organization.  During  the  attack  they 
protect  the  infantry  —  by  fire  directed  against  the  enemy's 
batteries,  as  soon  as  the  latter  get  into  action,  and  by  barrage 
fire,  intended  both  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  the  enemy's  re- 
serves, and  to  stop  counter-attacks.  They  also  facilitate  the  in- 

[84] 


OFFENSIVE  COMBAT 

fantry's    progress  by  concentrating    their   fire   on    specific 
objectives. 

Because  of  this  interdependence,  a  general  commanding  a 
first-line  division  has  under  his  orders,  over  and  above  his 
divisional  artillery,  batteries  of  corps  artillery,  and  batteries 
of  heavy  artillery,  so  that  he  can  utilize  them  during  the  com- 
bat. Rapidity  and  efficacy  of  fire  against  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries, many  of  which  are  not  unmasked  till  the  very  moment 
of  the  attack,  are  of  such  importance  that  it  is  sometimes 
worth  while,  if  the  number  of  guns  be  large  enough,  to  allot  to 
certain  artillery  units  the  special  task  of  acting  as  counter- 
batteries;  those  who  are  acting  as  observers  for  them,  both  on 
the  ground  and  in  the  air,  see  to  it  that  fire  is  opened  as  rapidly 
as  possible  on  such  of  the  enemy's  batteries  as  are  taking  the 
attacking  infantry  for  their  target. 

The  infantry  is  launched  against  the  indicated  objectives 
without  misgivings;  that  is  to  say,  with  the  certainty  that 
they  will  not  be  left  to  their  own  resources,  in  case  they  reach 
their  goal  in  reduced  numbers.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  army 
corps  commander,  who  has  calculated  beforehand  the  numbers 
necessary  for  each  task,  to  see  to  it  that  the  combat  is  carried 
on  methodically,  and  if  need  be  to  call  on  the  army  commander 
for  such  measures  as  are  necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of 
the  task  assigned  to  him. 

The  aviation  corps  affords  valuable  assistance  in  the  con- 
duct of  the  combat.  From  the  beginning  of  the  period  of 
preparation,  it  seeks  to  blind  the  adversary  by  striking  at  his 
airplanes  and  captive  balloons.  Before,  as  well  as  in  the  course 
of  the  action,  it  furnishes  information  in  regard  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy's  troops,  and  the  location  of  his  batteries. 
It  also  adjusts  the  artillery  fire.    It  therefore  makes  possible 

[85] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

the  disorganization  of  a  counter-attack,  even  before  it  has 
been  launched,  by  discovering  the  point  where  it  is  being  pre- 
pared, and  adjusting  the  fire  on  that  point.  During  the  com- 
bat, it  is  obliged  to  expose  itself  especially  freely,  in  order  to 
make  precise  observations;  but  it  thus  plays  one  of  the  most 
useful  and  heroic  parts  possible.  Fighting  airplanes  protect 
from  the  enemy's  machines  those  planes  which  are  used  for  ob- 
servation and  for  directing  fire,  as  well  as  the  captive  balloons. 
Sometimes,  too,  the  airplanes  take  a  direct  part  in  the  battle, 
by  attacking  reserves,  concentrations,  troops  on  the  march, 
important  points,  etc.,  with  bombs  and  machine-gun  fire. 

The  engineers  help  in  preparing  the  assault,  and  subse- 
quently, in  organizing  the  conquered  position. 

The  cavalry,  utilized  in  case  of  pursuit,  does  not  move  with- 
out reliable  information,  in  order  to  avoid  premature  action 
and  fruitless  sacrifice.1 

1  In  February,  1915,  the  author  compiled  a  "  Memorandum  "  in  order  to 
recall  to  his  young  officers,  in  half-humorous  and  half-serious  fashion,  the  modi- 
fications which  have  taken  place  in  the  conduct  of  battle.  This  little  work 
adopted,  and  at  the  same  time  transformed,  the  phrases  of  our  old  regulations, 
and  expressed  itself,  for  example,  as  follows: 

"  The  principal  arm  in  combat  is  no  longer  infantry;   it  is  artillery. 

"  The  artillery  conquers  and  holds  the  terrain;   the  infantry  occupies  it. 

"  Brave  infantry,  energetically  led,  may,  however,  march  against  trenches 
provided  with  machine  guns  and  barbed-wire  entanglements,  without  artil- 
lery preparation;  it  is  certain  to  get  possession  of  the  terrain,  but  in  a 
tragically  fatal  manner.  The  same  holds  true  of  infantry  launched  in  an 
attack  against  intact  artillery. 

"  Experience  of  recent  combats  has  indeed  demonstrated  that  in  the 
struggle  between  metallic  and  human  projectiles,  the  former  are  bound  to 
win." 

And  elsewhere, 

"  The  organism  of  the  army  may  be  compared  to  that  of  the  human  body: 
the  High  Command  constitutes  the  head  and  brains  of  the  army;  the  artil- 
lery is  its  body  with  its  strength  and  power  of  resistance ;  the  infantry  are  the 
legs,  indispensable  for  forward  movement ;  the  engineers  are  the  arms  which 
are  used  for  manual  labor;  the  aviators  are  the  eyes,  without  which  all  effort 

[86] 


OFFENSIVE  COMBAT 

R6le  of  the  Command 

An  army  corps  commander,  when  he  has  learned  from  the 
army  commander  the  limits  of  his  zone  of  attack,  his  task  and 
his  successive  objectives,  proceeds  to  make  his  reconnaissances. 

Before  the  attack,  he  establishes  a  detailed  plan  of  action, 
arranges  his  divisions,  gives  them  their  instructions  and  their 
objectives,  determines  the  placing  and  eventual  duty  of  his 
reserves;  be  indicates  to  the  artillery  and  to  the  engineers 
their  essential  tasks,  he  orders  the  artillery  commander  to 
draw  up  a  plan  of  action,  distributes  the  airplanes  and  the 
balloons  which  have  been  placed  at  his  disposal  and  tells  them 
what  is  expected  of  them,  and  provides  the  necessary  measures 
for  supply  and  evacuation.  In  his  plan  of  action,  he  takes  into 
account  the  reliefs  which  may  become  necessary,  as  well  as  the 
manoeuvers  for  widening  possible  breaches.  He  assigns  to 
each  unit  a  front  which  should  be  narrow  and  deep  when  the 
terrain  of  attack  is  suitable  to  an  advance,  but  widely  ex- 
tended when  the  chances  of  progressing  are  slight. 

During  the  attack,  he  decides  on  the  reliefs  necessitated  by 
losses  or  fatigue,  and  divides  up  the  artillery  at  his  disposal, 
according  to  the  ends  to  be  attained.  He  reports  to  the  army 
commander  frequently  on  the  situation  of  his  troops. 

If  the  attack  succeeds,  he  maintains  contact  with  the  enemy, 
gives  all  necessary  information  to  his  cavalry,  and  pursues  the 
adversary  vigorously.    When  his  troops  are  stopped  by  a  new 

is  fruitless;  the  cavalry,  an  elegant  adornment,  left  behind  with  the  baggage  ' 

where  it  will  be  sheltered  from  the  hazards  of  conflict." 

This  military  parody  contains  obvious  exaggerations,  particularly  on  the 
subject  of  the  cavalry,  which  played  a  heroic  part  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war 
and  many  units  of  which  have,  since  that  time,  fought  on  foot  with  as  much 
bravery  as  the  infantry;  but  it  nevertheless  reflects  very  faithfully  the  feelings 
experienced  by  the  troops  in  regard  to  combat. 

[87] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

position,  he  calls  for  a  march  of  approach,  takes  all  measures 
necessary  for  attacking  the  position,  and  strives  to  carry  it. 

He  thus  continues  until  he  has  attained  the  position  fixed 
upon  as  Ins  ultimate  objective.  At  this  moment,  if  the  pursu- 
ing troops  run  up  against  a  new  position,  he  executes  a  march 
of  approach,  gives  orders  preparatory  to  the  attack,  sends 
forward  the  necessary  artillery,  and  reports  to  the  army 
commander,  whose  directions  he  then  awaits. 

Division  commanders,  and  commanders  of  smaller  units, 
should  concentrate  their  minds  on  the  task  of  fulfilling  the 
instructions  given  to  them,  and  of  attaining  the  objectives 
assigned  to  them. 

It  is  indispensable  to  the  good  progress  of  the  combat  that 
the  tasks  assigned  to  all  ranks  should  be  clearly  defined,  and 
the  objectives  exactly  determined.  Soldiers  must  know  what 
is  expected  of  them;  they  ought  also  to  be  assured  that,  if 
they  devote  themselves  entirely  to  their  task,  they  will  not 
be  abandoned  to  their  own  resources  in  case  of  difficulties. 

If  there  is  an  objective  beyond  which  the  advance  should 
not  be  pushed,  this  fact  should  be  clearly  indicated.  The 
division  commander  and  the  leaders  of  the  smaller  units  must 
halt  their  men  without  pushing  on  further,  and  without  mak- 
ing decisions  which  belong  to  the  High  Command.  It  is  much 
more  useful,  moreover,  in  many  cases,  to  secure  possession  of 
one  captured  position  than  to  press  forward  with  insuffi- 
cient means  to  the  attack  of  another;  the  former  course  serves 
both  to  confirm  a  success  that  has  been  won,  and  to  avoid  a 
possible  check  whose  consequences  might  prove  serious. 

The  momentary  halt  on  a  line  previously  fixed,  and  the 
organization  of  the  conquered  terrain  should  in  no  wise  pre- 

[88] 


OFFENSIVE  COMBAT 

vent  the  commander  of  a  small  unit  from  taking  all  the  meas- 
ures necessary  for  eventually  continuing  the  forward  move- 
ment. His  patrols  and  scouts  should  remain  in  contact  with 
the  enemy;  they  furnish  him  information  which  he  does  his 
utmost  to  expedite  to  his  superior  officers. 

If  the  continuation  of  the  movement  is  ordered,  and  if  it  is 
assumed  by  fresh  troops,  he  passes  on  to  those  troops  all  the 
information  that  has  been  gathered,  furnishes  them  guides,  if 
need  be,  and  holds  himself  in  readiness  to  support  them. 


[89] 


CHAPTER  II 

PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

The  preparation  of  the  attack  is  the  more  delicate  the  longer 
the  troops  have  occupied  the  same  trenches,  because  the 
enemy  has  had  leisure  to  organize  and  fortify  his  position,  and 
to  furnish  it,  little  by  little,  with  all  the  most  perfect  means  of 
defense. 

It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  much  shorter,  and  at  the  same  time 
it  presents  better  chances  of  success,  if  the  enemy  has  but  re- 
cently been  installed  in  his  position.  This  case  occurs  during 
a  pursuit,  when  the  conquered  side  tries  to  face  about  and 
resist;  then,  it  is  advisable  to  hurry  the  attack. 

The  preparation  comprises  several  parts,  successive  or 
simultaneous,  according  to  circumstances.    These  are: 

The  detailed  study  of  the  two  opposing  positions; 

The  material  am^nagement  of  the  position  of  departure; 

The  complete  smashing  of  the  position  to  be  attacked; 

The  physical,  professional,  and  moral  training  of  the  attack- 
ing troops. 

The  detailed  study  of  the  two  opposing  positions  pre- 
cedes, in  principle,  all  other  operations. 

As  far  as  the  position  of  departure  is  concerned,  the  com- 
mander of  a  small  unit,  such  as  a  regiment  or  a  battalion,  ought 
not  to  restrict  himself  to  consulting  the  frequently  unreliable 
topographical  sketch  which  may  come  into  his  hands;  it  is  his 
duty  to  go  through  the  trenches  himself,  to  know  their  windings, 

[90] 


PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

and  to  rectify  or  establish  the  plan  of  them;  an  exact  plan  is 
specially  valuable  for  the  reserves,  in  order  to  permit  them  to 
move  rapidly  and  know  exactly  where  they  are  coming  out.  His 
reconnaissances  should  not  be  limited  to  the  places  occupied 
by  his  own  troops,  or  to  those  which  are  assigned  to  him  to 
attack;  they  should  be  extended  to  the  ground  adjacent  to 
him,  so  that  he  may  become  familiar  with  their  topography. 

The  study  of  the  position  to  be  attacked  is  effected  by 
the  aviators,  the  infantry,  and  the  artillery  in  collaboration. 
Detailed  plans  are  drawn  up  from  their  observations;  these 
are  called  guide-plans  and  are  distributed  to  all  the  arms  of 
the  service.  Guide-plans  on  a  large  scale  and  containing  the 
enemy's  first  line  trenches  are  given,  before  the  attack,  to  all 
infantry  officers  down  to  the  leaders  of  half-platoons,  and  to 
all  artillery  officers  down  to  battery  commanders.  Guide- 
plans  on  a  smaller  scale,  containing  all  information  obtained 
concerning  the  successive  enemy  lines,  are  also  distributed  to 
the  officers  of  the  infantry,  so  as  to  enable  them  to  advance 
into  the  interior  of  the  position  and  beyond  it. 

Usually  only  the  aviators  can  obtain  a  general  view  of  the 
position;  they  take  photographs,  which  make  it  possible  to 
locate  on  a  large  scale  map  the  trenches,  fortified  works, 
and  artillery  emplacements;  they  furnish,  moreover,  all  the 
information  they  collect  each  day  concerning  the  occupation 
of  the  trenches  by  the  enemy's  troops,  the  state  of  his  works, 
the  progress  of  the  destruction  effected,  and  the  situation  of 
his  batteries;  they  thus  help  to  rectify  and  to  complete  the 
map  which  has  been  drawn  up  by  means  of  photography,  and 
on  which  abandoned  trenches,  unfinished  earthworks,  and 
even  sham  emplacements  for  batteries  may  appear. 

[91] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

Observations  on  the  ground  are  made  from  the  observing 
stations  of  the  Command,  and  of  the  artillery.  A  plan  of 
observation,  drawn  up  in  each  sector,  furnishes  the  occupants 
of  these  observing  stations  such  information  as  they  need, 
and  defines  their  duties.  The  artillery  observing  stations 
are  different  from  those  intended  for  fire  adjustment;  their 
purpose  is  to  seek  out  targets,  particularly  hostile  batteries; 
but,  even  the  observing  stations  for  adjustment  must  not  fail 
to  forward  any  information  which  they  may  obtain. 

The  infantry  devotes  itself  to  a  minute  observation  of  the 
enemy's  first  lines.  By  means  of  lookouts  specially  chosen 
and  placed,  and  of  scouts  and  patrols,  it  determines  the  con- 
tours of  his  lines,  and  the  situation  of  his  machine  guns.  In 
order  to  discover  certain  means  of  defense,  which  were  not 
intended  to  be  revealed  until  the  last  moment,  it  makes,  if 
need  be,  a  sham  attack,  taking  all  possible  precautions  to 
avoid  losses.  It  never  neglects  to  question  prisoners  and 
deserters,  and,  if  possible,  it  makes  them  define,  on  the 
ground,  the  information  which  they  have  given.     , 

The  artillery  can  obtain  very  useful  information,  if  its 
observers  carry  out  their  task  with  unfailing  attention.  By 
virtue  of  their  powerful  and  rigidly  mounted  telescopes,  these 
observers  often  have  the  means  and  the  time  to  render  definite 
certain  indications,  which,  as  furnished  by  the  airplanes  and 
infantrymen,  were  a  little  vague. 

Thus  the  communication  and  reciprocal  control  of  the  infor- 
mation obtained  by  the  three  arms  make  it  possible  to  lay  out 
a  detailed  plan  of  the  enemy's  position. 

This  plan,  drawn  up  under  the  direction  of  the  commander, 
is  communicated  to  the  leaders  of  the  subordinate  units, 

[92] 


PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

including,  if  possible,  the  very  lowest,  in  order  that  it  may 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  all  the  officers. 

It  is  accompanied  by  information  obtained  concerning  the 
enemy's  means  of  defense;  for  a  difficulty  that  has  been  fore- 
seen takes  the  heart  out  of  men  much  less  than  an  obstacle 
which  reveals  itself  unexpectedly. 

The  officers  should  not  limit  themselves  to  the  study  of  the 
plan  on  paper;  it  is  their  duty  to  visit  frequently  the  observ- 
ing stations  which  are  assigned  to  them;  they  should  go  to 
places  whence  they  can  most  advantageously  examine  the 
terrain,  carefully  identify  the  principal  points,  select  land- 
marks in  the  zone  where  they  are  going  to  operate,  determine 
the  location  of  fortified  redoubts,  batteries  or  machine  guns 
which  have  been  called  to  their  attention,  and  strive  to  see 
and  fix  in  their  minds  these  eventual  objectives,  in  all  their 
different  aspects.  In  this  way  they  can  avoid  having  to  make 
geographical  identifications,  find  directions,  and  consult  their 
maps,  in  the  midst  of  the  preoccupation  and  excitement  of 
combat. 

This  practical  and  visual  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  position 
will  have  been  already  acquired,  as  a  result  of  the  observations 
and  incidents  of  eachsucceeding  day,  by  a  body  of  troops  which 
has  been  given  the  duty  of  attacking  a  position,  opposite  which 
it  has  been  stationed  for  a  long  period;  it  gives  it  a  great  advan- 
tage over  any  other  body.  But  it  may  be  a  very  delicate  matter 
for  newly  arrived  troops  to  acquire  it;  this  task  should,  there- 
fore, be  facilitated  by  detailed  explanations  furnished  by  the 
detachments  which  are  being  relieved. 

Material  Amenagement  of  the  Departure  Position 

This  has  for  its  object  to  facilitate  the  task  of  the  attacking 
troops  and  to  enable  them  to  continue  the  combat  until  the 

[93] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

position  is  taken.  To  this  end,  it  brings  them  as  close  as  pos- 
sible to  the  enemy's  lines,  and  affords  them  the  means  of  leav- 
ing the  trenches  and  of  moving  forward  with  the  minimum  of 
loss.  It  provides  for  the  installation  and  the  rapid  deplace- 
ment  of  the  artillery  wliich  cooperates  with  the  attack.  It 
ensures  perfect  liaison  between  the  different  units,  especially 
between  the  infantry  and  the  artillery.  Furthermore,  it  should 
also  prepare  ways  of  access  suitable  for  ensuring  the  speedy 
arrival  of  reserves  and  of  fresh  supplies,  as  well  as  means  of 
exit  which  permit  the  easy  evacuation  of  the  wounded  and 
prisoners. 

This  task  is  confided  to  the  engineers,  aided  by  laborers 
from  the  infantry,  who  have  been  placed  at  their  disposal  by 
the  Command.  It  should  be  finished,  in  so  far  as  possible, 
several  days  before  the  attack,  because  it  is  always  susceptible 
of  rectification  and  perfection,  and  because  hasty  labors  are 
badly  performed,  and  also  cause  the  troops  great  fatigue. 

All  these  preparations  are  carried  out  according  to  a  com- 
prehensive plan;  they  form  the  logical  continuation  of  the 
work  done  during  the  period  of  installation  and  occupation, 
under  the  eye  of  a  commander  with  an  appreciation  of  his 
responsibilities. 

The  line  of  departure  for  the  assault  is  generally  brought 
close  to  the  enemy's  fine  by  means  of  saps.  The  distance  to  be 
traversed  by  the  troops  ought  certainly  to  be  short,  above  all 
in  open  ground,  where  the  assaulting  infantry  can  be  instan- 
taneously caught  by  a  barrage  fire;  it  should,  however,  be 
long  enough  to  permit  of  an  artillery  preparation  without 
endangering  the  attacking  troops.  In  view  of  these  conditions, 
it  is  well  to  place  the  departure  parallel  about  two  hundred 
yards  from  the  enemy's  line.    Its  direction  should  be  such  as  to 

[94] 


PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

place  the  troops  face  to  face  with  the  objective  to  be  attained; 
it  should  thus  run  parallel,  not  to  the  first  line  trench,  but  to 
the  line  of  the  enemy's  defense;  the  saps,  if  necessary,  are  thus 
of  different  lengths.  The  departure  parallel  thus  obtained  is 
a  straight  line  trench,  without  traverses,  which  permits  an 
instantaneous  rush  forward. 

Since  the  construction  of  departure  parallels  has  the  dis- 
advantage of  revealing  the  plans  of  attack  to  the  enemy,  it  is 
sometimes  better  to  start  from  the  trenches  themselves.  In 
this  case,  steps  are  constructed  in  the  trenches  to  allow  the 
troops  to  debouch  easily.  If  the  troops  debouch  simul- 
taneously from  several  parallels,  echeloned  in  depth,  foot 
bridges  are  thrown  across  the  intervening  trenches. 

The  installation  of  the  artillery  needed  in  the  attack  is 
effected  according  to  the  artillery  plan  of  action;  it  involves 
the  construction  of  important  works,  on  account  of  the  large 
number  of  pieces  of  all  calibres  which  take  part  in  the  offensive. 
It  is  so  planned  as  to  get  the  most  out  of  the  batteries,  the 
observing  stations,  the  visual  and  telephonic  liaisons  between 
the  batteries  and  the  observing  stations,  the  munition  shel- 
ters, and  the  supply  routes,  and  to  facilitate  the  deplace- 
ments  of  all  of  these  in  view  of  a  possible  advance. 

The  construction  of  those  works  which  are  sufficiently 
remote  from  the  first  line  need  not  be  so  rapidly  pressed  as 
elsewhere;  the  main  thing  is  to  hide  them  from  the  enemy's 
observation  by  camouflage.  Such  works  become  more 
important  the  nearer  they  approach  to  the  first  line;  but 
camouflage,  like  the  construction  of  sham  batteries,  is  at  all 
times  an  excellent  means  of  defense.  Finally,  each  piece  of 
artillery  may  have  several  emplacements,  in  order  to  discon- 

[95] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

cert  the  enemy's  observations  and  lessen  the  effects  of  his 
fire. 

The  ammunition  depots  must  have  carefully  chosen  situa- 
tions, so  that  the  work  of  delivery,  discharge,  and  evacuation 
may  take  place  without  congestion;  they  must  be  spread 
over  a  sufficiently  large  area  to  prevent  complete  destruction 
by  airplane  bombardment. 

The  approaches,  and  means  of  assuring  the  arrival  of  the 
reserves  and  of  fresh  supplies,  differ  in  kind. 

Towards  the  rear  there  are  railroads,  provided  with  all 
needful  improvements,  such  as  double  tracking  of  the  exist- 
ing lines,  laying  down  of  new  ones,  creation  of  branches  going 
towards  important  centres;  they  make  possible  the  rapid 
transportation  of  the  troops  and  of  the  reserves,  thus  facilitat- 
ing secrecy  and  surprise;  there  are  also  roads,  whose  constant 
upkeep  and  enlargement  make  it  possible  for  automobile 
convoys  to  move  speedily  and  securely. 

Nearer  the  front,  there  are  narrow  temporary  ways,  laid  out 
in  a  direction  parallel  to  the  trenches,  with  branches  running 
perpendicular  to  them. 

Finally  numerous  boyaux,  furnished  at  their  entrance  and 
at  their  forks  with  very  plain  sign  posts,  make  it  possible  to 
get  up  as  far  as  the  departure  trench. 

Places  d'armes  for  the  reserves,  depots  for  munitions,  for 
water,  for  provisions  and  for  grenades  must  be  made  at  con- 
veniently chosen  spots;  command-posts,  shelters,  and  observ- 
ing stations  must  also  be  established.  The  places  d'armes  may 
be  made  out  of  trenches  or  shelters  already  in  existence,  or 
they  may  be  specially  constructed  for  the  attack.  They 
should  be  as  near  the  first  line  as  possible. 

[96] 


PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

Exits  are  of  the  same  description  as  approaches,  but  must 
be  kept  separate  from  them  in  order  to  avoid  crossings,  con- 
gestions, and  blocking.  Such  wounded  as  can  walk,  as  well  as 
stretcher  bearers  carrying  the  severely  wounded,  should  fol- 
low evacuation  boyaux,  larger  than  the  others,  on  their  way  to 
the  dressing  stations:  it  is  of  great  importance  not  to  retard 
the  working  of  the  liaisons,  the  arrival  of  munitions,  or  the 
march  of  reserves. 

The  forwarding  of  reserves  and  artillery  is  made  possible  by 
the  preparation  and  equipment  of  routes,  paths,  sidings,  com- 
mand-posts, observing  stations,  and  emplacements  for  bat- 
teries; whenever  possible  the  works,  right  up  to  the  first  line, 
should  be  executed  in  advance  and  finished  with  camouflage. 

Particular  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  installation  of  the 
telephonic,  visual,  and  radio-telegraphic  liaisons;  these  liaisons 
must  be  carried  forward  at  the  same  time  as  the  troops. 

The  importance  of  all  of  these  works  depends,  in  large  meas- 
ure, on  the  activities  of  the  opposing  front,  and  the  counter 
activities  planned.  Like  many  another  factor  in  the  combat, 
it  is  determined  by  the  information  furnished  to  the  Command. 

Smashing  the  Enemy's  Position 

The  smashing  of  the  enemy's  position  is  effected  by  the 
heavy  and  field  artillery,  aided  by  the  trench  artillery  and 
the  engineers. 

Its  object  is  to  facilitate  the  march  of  the  infantry.  It 
should  consequently  endeavor  to  destroy  all  the  obstacles  that 
impede  the  latter's  march,  that  is  to  say,  the  enemy's  artillery, 
his  defensive  works,  and  his  morale.  It  should  likewise  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  re-forming,  or  getting  himself  in  hand. 

[97] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

Its  activity  is  by  no  means  limited  to  the  strip  of  territory 
which  contains  the  first  trenches,  but  extends  over  the  entire 
position,  and  even  the  succeeding  ones,  so  as  to  prepare  an 
easy,  continuous,  and  deep  advance. 

The  action  of  the  artillery  is  carefully  regulated  by  a  plan 
drawn  up,  in  the  case  of  each  large  unit,  by  the  artillery  com- 
mander, in  harmony  with  the  main  plan  of  action  of  the  gen- 
eral commanding  the  unit.  This  plan  determines  the  groups 
of  the  pieces,  chooses  their  emplacements  and  fields  of  fire, 
assigns  their  tasks,  organizes  their  liaisons,  ensures  their 
supply,  and  arranges  for  their  deplacement. 

The  destruction  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  or,  at  least,  its 
neutralization  at  the  moment  of  the  attack,  is  only  made  pos- 
sible by  the  efforts  of  careful  observers  on  the  ground  and  in 
the  air.  It  can  only  be  accomplished  when  the  aim  is  perfect, 
and  when  the  pieces  are  abundantly  supplied  with  ammu- 
nition. A  plan  of  the  enemy's  batteries  should  always  be 
accessible  at  each  headquarters.  Continual  observation  is, 
moreover,  needed  to  adjust  the  fire  when  it  has  ceased  to  be 
accurate. 

Only  the  heavy  artillery  is  capable  of  producing  sufficient 
effect  to  permit  the  infantry  to  go  forward  to  the  attack, 
when  the  enemy  has  had  time  to  perfect  his  organization  in 
advance.  It  alone  can  secure  results  against  the  deep  and 
buttressed  shelters  by  which  the  infantry  is  protected,  and 
against  shelters  for  machine  guns,  against  fortified  villages 
and  hamlets  containing  deep  vaulted  and  fortified  cellars, 
against  heavy  batteries  and  even  sometimes  against  first  line 
defenses.  Long  range  guns  make  trouble  in  the  rear  of  the 
enemy's  lines  by  firing  on  his  supply  convoys,  on  his  reliefs, 
on  Ins  works,  and  on  his  lines  of  communication. 

[98] 


PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

Field  artillery  is  chiefly  employed  to  destroy  barbed  wire 
entanglements  or  other  obstacles,  and  to  compel  the  defenders 
of  the  position  to  dig  themselves  in.  It  is  also  used  against 
field  batteries.  Finally  it  is  always  ready  to  start  a  bar- 
rage fire  in  opposition  to  the  enemy's  efforts  to  disturb  the 
preparations  for  the  attack. 

Trench  artillery  is  used  against  men  and  against  materiel. 
It  supplements  to  good  advantage  the  effects  obtained  by  the 
heavy  and  the  field  artillery  on  those  points  winch  lie  within 
its  range.  It  can  be  given  the  task  of  smashing  the  first  line 
trench  all  by  itself,  in  case  the  fire  of  the  other  kinds  of  artil- 
lery is  difficult  to  adjust  upon  this  target,  or  is  dangerous  for 
the  assaulting  troops. 

The  emplacements  of  this  trench  artillery  of  different  cali- 
bres are  arranged  one  behind  the  other.  Part  of  them  ought  to 
be  placed  near  the  first  line,  in  order  to  diminish  the  amount 
of  moving  forward  that  has  to  be  accomplished  during  the 
advance;  but  they  should  not  be  accumulated  in  narrow  areas, 
for  fear  of  being  neutralized  by  the  enemy's  guns,  and 
especially  by  asphyxiating  shells.  Their  emplacements  are 
selected  with  a  view  to  the  tasks  assigned  to  the  different 
pieces  and  to  their  special  qualities  and  characteristics,  as  well 
as  to  the  topography  of  the  position. 

The  zones  of  action  are  normal  or  eventual ;  the  normal  ones 
are  side  by  side,  the  eventual  ones  overlap.  When  a  target  is 
signaled,  fire  is  opened  by  the  group  of  guns  in  whose  normal 
zone  of  action  the  target  lies;  if  this  group  experiences  diffi- 
culties in  hitting  the  mark,  it  asks  some  other  group,  in  whose 
eventual  zone  of  action  the  target  lies,  to  open  fire.  Thus  there 
is  never  such  a  duplication  of  fire  as  to  interfere  with  the 

•        [99] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

adjustment;  but  duplication  does  occur  when  a  concentration 
of  fire  is  called  for. 

Observers  are  either  in  the  air  or  on  the  ground. 

Aerial  observers  are  placed  in  airplanes  or  balloons.  Their 
duties  vary.  Sometimes  they  are  detailed  to  furnish  informa- 
tion to  the  Command  about  the  organization  and  works  of  a 
sector  of  the  enemy's  line,  sometimes  to  watch  the  activity  of 
the  troops  in  a  sector,  sometimes  to  maintain  liaison  between 
the  artillery  and  the  other  arms,  or  to  adjust  the  artillery  fire. 

The  airplanes  generally  communicate  with  the  ground  by 
means  of  wireless  telegraphy;  they  also  use  wireless  telephones, 
electric  flash  lights,  weighted  messages,  and  rockets.  By 
means  of  the  Morse  code,  the  observer  is  able  to  make  himself 
known  to  the  receiving  station,  to  furnish  information  about 
the  troops  of  either  side,  to  point  out  objectives,  and  to  indi- 
cate errors  of  fire.  At  the  receiving  station  are  an  artillery 
officer  and  a  wireless  officer  who  forward  this  information  to 
its  destination.  On  the  other  hand  the  receiving  station  can 
give  the  observer  simple  messages  about  the  conduct  of  the 
fire,  by  the  aid  of  squares  of  white  cloth  or  electric  flash  lights. 

Balloons  communicate  with  the  ground  by  telephone.  On 
the  ground,  if  there  is  no  telephonic  communication  with  the 
command-posts  and  with  the  artillery  groups,  these  liaisons  are 
maintained  by  a  wireless  post.  In  practice  it  is  hard  for  bal- 
loons to  rise  above  1600  yards,  and  often  they  cannot  go  as 
high  on  account  of  the  wind.  They  must  remain  half  a  dozen 
miles  from  the  enemy,  owing  to  their  vulnerability. 

Observers  on  the  ground  are  placed  in  carefully  chosen 
observing  stations;  they  must  always  be  on  the  watch,  even 
in  sectors  which  appear  to  be  quiet;  at  times  they  have  to 

[100] 


PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

fill  the  place  of  the  aerial  observers,  who  cannot  go  out  in 
every  kind  of  weather.  Some  observing  stations  are  in- 
tended to  furnish  information,  and  so  have  a  wide  outlook ; 
others  are  used  for  fire  adjustment  for  specified  artillery  bat- 
talions or  batteries,  and  can  consequently  ensure  their  rapid 
action  and  effective  use. 

The  aviators  have  an  important  role. 

The  airplanes  and  the  balloons  not  only  furnish  the  Com- 
mand with  all  the  information  possible  concerning  the  enemy's 
position,  but  also  adjust  the  fire  of  the  artillery.  The  air  must 
not  be  encumbered  with  so  many  planes  that  they  hinder  one 
another,  nor  must  too  long  a  time  be  spent  in  the  process  of 
adjustment;  for  these  reasons,  the  aviators  operate  in  accord- 
ance with  a  methodical  program,  and  are  only  expected  to  col- 
lect information  unobtainable  by  observers  on  the  ground. 

The  use  of  airplanes  with  electric  flash  lights,  and  of  those 
carrying  weighted  messages,  makes  it  possible  to  increase  the 
number  of  planes  operating  at  once;  if  too  many  of  them  used 
wireless  it  would  cause  confusion  in  the  messages. 

In  addition,  the  airplanes  have  the  task  of  blinding  the 
enemy,  by  preventing  his  aerial  fleet  from  crossing  the  lines, 
from  taking  observations  for  the  adjustment  of  his  fire,  and 
from  obtaining  uninterrupted  opportunities  of  reconnoitering. 
The  destruction  of  the  enemy's  planes  and  balloons  has  the 
double  result  of  preventing  information  from  reaching  the 
enemy,  and  of  limiting  the  action  of  his  artillery. 

The  smashing  up  of  the  enemy's  position  is  as  carefuhy 
executed  as  it  has  been  thoroughly  prepared. 

Batteries  of  different  calibres  fulfill  the  special  functions 
which  have  been  assigned  to  them.    Heavy  artillery  of  the 

[101] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

long-range  type  fires  on  points  where  the  troops  pass  and  con- 
centrate in  the  rear,  on  the  principal  roads  and  crossroads; 
heavy  artillery  of  great  power  destroys  strongly  organized 
points  of  support;  ordinary  heavy  batteries  demolish  the 
trenches  and  their  different  shelters;  field  batteries  destroy 
the  accessory  defenses,  and  execute  barrage  fires.  Batteries 
of  all  calibres  are  used  to  oppose  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery. 

Thus,  while  fresh  supplies  of  men,  munitions,  and  provisions 
are  held  back  by  an  impassable  barrage,  the  position  to  be 
attacked'  is  smashed  from  top  to  bottom,  without  any  respite ; 
and  the  artillery  which  defends  it  is  taken  under  fire  the 
moment  it  reveals  itself. 

The  general  progress  of  this  smashing  is  attentively  followed 
by  the  airplanes  which  take  daily  photographs.  They  them- 
selves participate  in  the  operations  by  going  to  bombard 
stations,  road  forks,  concentrations,  headquarters,  and  all 
other  suitable  objectives. 

All  possible  means  are  employed  to  determine  the  effects  of 
the  bombardment  of  the  first  line;  the  reserves  of  the  different 
arms  pay  special  attention  to  it,  and  patrolling  parties  go  as 
far  as  possible  at  night  to  ascertain  the  results  secured.  Sham 
attacks  are  even  made,  in  order  to  make  certain  whether  any 
machine  guns  or  undiscovered  flanking  positions  remain  intact. 

The  engineers  contribute  to  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
position  by  the  use  of  mines  and  countermines;  they  aim  to 
blow  up  important  flanking  positions,  and  to  throw  disorder 
among  the  adversary's  troops. 

The  carrying  out  of  the  smashing  process  ought  to  give  to 
the  attacking  troops  entire  confidence  in  their  success.  The 
leaders  of  these  troops  have  the  right  and  the  duty  of  indicat- 

[102] 


PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK 

ing  to  the  commanding  officer  those  points  on  the  first  line 
where  they  judge  the  artillery  preparation  to  have  been  insuf- 
ficient; in  such  a  case,  observation  officers  of  the  artillery  in 
immediate  liaison  with  the  infantry  officers  concerned  devote 
themselves  to  obtaining  the  desired  results.  The  utilization 
of  this  method  of  procedure  relieves  the  troops  intended  for 
the  assault  of  any  apprehension  which  might  militate  against 
their  spirit  and  dash. 

The  physical,  professional,  and  moral  training  of  the 
troops  is  the  work  of  leaders  of  all  ranks. 

During  the  days  which  precede  the  attack  the  troops  take 
turns  in  resting  behind  the  front,  in  order  to  shake  off  the 
sluggishness  engendered  by  life  in  the  trenches.  At  this 
moment,  the  commanders  of  the  small  units  make  it  their 
business  to  continue  and  improve,  in  the  most  diverting 
possible  ways,  the  physical  training  previously  acquired. 

Instruction  is  the  surest  means  of  giving  the  troops  the  best 
chances  of  success;  it  should  be  the  constant  preoccupation  of 
the  commanders  during  periods  of  rest,  in  such  wise  that  it 
should  suffice  to  recall  to  the  men  certain  basic  principles  on 
the  eve  of  the  attack,  in  order  to  be  certain  that  they  will  give 
a  good  account  of  themselves.  And  instruction  is  not  only  the 
surest  road  to  victory,  but  also  the  surest  means  of  avoiding 
the  useless  sacrifice  of  countless  lives.  Troops  that  have  been 
well  taught  attain  success  with  a  minimum  of  losses. 

The  moral  preparation  is  a  work  of  long  duration,  and  con- 
sists in  cultivating  in  the  officer  and  in  the  soldier  military 
virtues  and  lofty  sentiments.  If  this  preparation  has  been 
carefully  made  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  it  bears  fruit 
during  a  whole  campaign.    It  remains  a  permanent  possession 

'  [103] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

of  certain  corps,  in  spite  of  the  new  men  who  come  in,  for  it  is 
passed  on  as  a  precious  heritage  to  the  recent  arrivals,  through 
the  almost  unconscious  intermediary  of  those  who  have  sur- 
vived. In  these  corps,  an  intimate  camaraderie,  which  does 
not  in  the  least  prevent  strict  discipline,  unites  all  the  com- 
batants from  the  commander  down  to  the  humblest  soldier. 

Such  are  the  feelings  which  must  be  stimulated  before 
combat.  On  all  sorts  of  different  occasions,  the  officers  and  N. 
C.  Os.  should  inflame  their  men  with  the  love  of  their  country 
and  the  resolve  to  uphold  the  honor  of  the  flag;  they  should 
affirm  the  certainty  of  victory,  so  as  to  inspire  their  troops 
with  the  necessary  confidence  and  to  endow  their  ranks  with 
irresistible  61an. 


[104] 


CHAPTER  III 

ATTACK 

Attack  is  the  essential  feature  of  combat.    It  may  last 
several  days,  or  even  several  weeks. 

The  choice  of  the  moment  of  attack  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
Command.  It  depends  on  the  results  of  the  artillery  prepa- 
ration, as  determined  by  all  the  means  of  observation,  includ- 
ing the  patrols;  on  the  state  of  the  weather,  since  rain  is  a 
great  hindrance;  on  the  clearness  of  the  air,  which  should  be 
such  as  to  permit  a  proper  adjustment  of  artillery  fire. 

The  object  of  the  attack  is  to  seize  the  enemy's  position  and 
hold  it  solidly,  in  order  to  permit  an  immediate  or  subsequent 
continuation  of  the  advance. 

This  role  is  assigned  to  the  infantry,  aided  by  the  fire  of  the 
artillery,  the  labors  of  the  engineers,  and  the  aerial  obser- 
vations. 

It  consists  in  seizing  the  first  line  of  trenches,  and  then  the 
succeeding  lines,  so  as  to  reach  the  line  of  the  enemy's  artillery 
as  soon  as  possible;  in  reducing  such  centres  or  works  as  may 
resist;  in  pushing  forward  to  the  limits  of  the  position,  and 
organizing  them  against  a  retour  offensif;  and  finally,  in 
taking  the  preliminary  steps  for  a  continuation  of  the  move- 
ment, never  losing  contact  with  the  enemy. 

Just  as  in  an  offensive  combat,  which  aims  to  capture  suc- 
cessive positions,  the  different  phases  should  follow  one  an- 
other rapidly,  so  in  an  attack  on  a  position,  the  assaults  on  the 
successive  objectives  should  take  place  without  delay,  in  order 

[105] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

that  the  enemy  may  have  no  time  to  re-form.  The  landmark 
assigned  to  each  unit  to  guide  its  march  should  be  chosen  be- 
yond the  final  objective  to  be  taken,  in  order  to  make  certain 
that  the  reconnaissance  of  the  next  position  will  be  carried  out. 

But  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Command  alone  to  provide  such 
measures  and  give  such  orders  as  are  necessary  for  the  attack 
on  the  succeeding  position. 

The  formations  adopted  for  the  attacking  units  are  of  great 
importance  for  the  proper  progress  of  these  units,  and,  conse- 
quently, for  the  success  of  the  operation. 

The  first  troops  advance  in  waves.  A  wave  is  formed  by  sev- 
eral lines  of  infantrymen  simultaneously  leaving  the  departure 
parallel.  The  various  units  in  lateral  contact  are  each  one 
echeloned  in  depth,  in  such  wise  that  a  battalion  can  have 
its  four  companies  divided  into  four  successive  waves,  or  that 
each  company  can  be  divided  into  two  successive  waves. 

This  formation  enables  the  leader  to  command  his  unit  more 
easily,  and  to  manoeuver  therewith,  if  necessary,  from  the  very 
start,  which  would  be  quite  impossible  if  it  were  drawn  up  in 
one  line;  it  thus  gives  to  the  wave  an  articulation  and  a  flexi- 
bility which  it  would  be  far  from  possessing,  did  it  consist  in  a 
single  deployed  unit. 

Since  the  various  waves  must  follow  one  another  rapidly,  it 
is  important  to  bring  them  as  near  as  possible  to  the  departure 
parallel.  This  arrangement  has  the  advantage  of  permitting 
them  to  escape  the  barrages  delivered  by  the  enemy  as  soon  as 
the  attack  is  started;  the  successive  waves  take  their  dis- 
tances at  the  time  of  departure  or  during  the  advance.  All 
such  concentrations  must  naturally  be  effected  with  caution, 
so  as  to  conceal  them  from  the  observation  and  fire  of  the 
enemy;  it  is  also  essential  to  avoid  piling  up  units  in  places 

[106] 


ATTACK 

where  they  have  no  shelter,  or  in  boyaux  which  should  remain 
unencumbered;  a  well-conducted  bombardment  might  cause 
considerable  losses  and  disorder  among  the  troops,  thus 
seriously  injuring  their  morale  for  the  assault.  Previous 
reconnaissance  by  the  officers,  perfect  liaison  between  front 
and  rear,  order,  silence,  and  rapidity  of  movement,  greatly 
facilitate  this  disposition  of  the  successive  units  for  the  start. 

Before  the  attack,  the  commander  contents  himself  with  re- 
calling to  all  his  subordinates  the  precise  task  of  the  unit,  and 
its  specific  objective.  Task  and  objective  are  the  same  for  all 
fractions  of  the  unit,  since  it  is  echeloned  in  depth;  and  this 
again  is  one  of  the  great  advantages  of  the  formation  adopted. 

The  artillery  observers  accompanying  the  infantry,  as  well 
as  the  details  of  engineers  assigned  to  the  attacking  units,  take 
their  places  with  the  troops  to  which  they  are  attached;  they 
never  start  with  the  first  wave,  even  though  they  may  have 
been  directed  to  join  it  subsequently. 

The  mechanism  of  march  and  of  combat  for  the  first  waves 
cannot  be  determined  by  any  fixed  rules,  for  it  depends  upon 
circumstances  and  upon  the  terrain.  Still,  there  are  certain 
principles  which  should  be  observed,  and  certain  methods 
which  should  be  adopted. 

The  word  waves,  which  calls  up  the  picture  of  billows  of  the 
sea  breaking  in  foam  upon  the  rocks,  might  give  rise  to  very 
false  ideas,  were  it  not  explained.  The  simile  is  good  at  the 
moment  of  departure;  it  still  holds  when  the  waves,  encoun- 
tering an  isolated  obstacle,  overrun  it  on  either  flank;  it 
ceases  to  hold  when  the  waves  break  successively  against  an 
insurmountable  barrier. 

A  wave  should  be  considered  as  an  echelon  suitable  for  the 
march;  it  is  not,  properly  speaking,  a  disposition  for  combat. 

[107] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

The  first  wave  alone  can  carry  on  the  fight  effectively.  The 
object  of  the  others  is  to  ensure  the  continuity  of  the  move- 
ment, by  completing  the  work  of  cleaning  up  the  terrain, 
by  reinforcing  or  relieving  the  first,  and  by  making  possible 
manoeuvers  intended  to  protect  a  menaced  element  or  to 
overcome  an  unforeseen  obstacle. 

The  succeeding  waves  should  never  be  hurled  against  ob- 
stacles which  the  first  wave  has  been  unable  to  overcome. 
Obstacles  of  this  sort  are  vanquished  with  materiel  and  not 
with  men. 

The  mechanism  of  march  and  of  combat,  resulting  from  the 
principles  which  we  have  laid  down,  must  now  be  explained 
in  detail. 

The  first  wave  leaves  the  departure  parallel  at  a  prearranged 
moment,  or  at  a  given  signal.  Every  platoon  has  its  different 
specialists  —  riflemen,  automatic  riflemen,  grenadiers,  etc.  — 
arranged  in  several  fines,  in  conformity  with  the  orders  given; 
but  these  fines,  though  they  are  sometimes  called  "waves,"  by 
an  extension  of  the  meaning  of  the  whole  to  the  different  parts 
that  compose  it,  tend  generally  to  merge  into  one  another  after 
a  short  time;  it  is  therefore  rather  the  sum  total  of  them  that 
constitutes  the  assaulting  wave  or  line  of  combat. 

The  first  wave  should  move  forth  without  hesitation  and 
without  a  moment's  delay;  for  at  this  very  instant  the  artil- 
lery, which  is  holding  the  enemy's  first  trench  under  its  fire, 
deepens  its  aim,  thus  enabling  the  defenders,  if  they  grasp 
the  situation  in  time,  to  come  out  from  their  shelters  and 
man  the  parapet.  It  advances  at  a  walk,  silently,  in  line,  and 
without  shooting,  straight  on  the  first  line  trench;  it  crosses 
this  trench  without  halting,  while  men,  designated  in  advance 

[108] 


ATTACK 

for  this  purpose,  take  possession  of  it,  exploring  the  shelters 
and  cleaning  it  up.    It  then  goes  on  to  the  second  trench. 

The  first  wave  or  fine  of  combat  advances  at  a  pace  which 
has  been  determined  beforehand  in  accordance  with  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  terrain  and  the  information  received  concerning 
the  enemy.  The  artillery  opens  a  barrage  fire  in  front  of  it, 
which  advances  at  the  same  pace  as  does  the  infantry.  In  this 
fashion  the  line  of  combat  is  protected  at  every  moment  by  a 
deluge  of  shells  which  opens  the  way. 

The  liaison  between  the  infantry  and  artillery  is  principally 
effected  by  a  prearranged  time  schedule.  If  an  unexpected 
halt  occurs  in  the  fine  of  combat,  and  the  artillery  has  not 
been  notified  of  it  by  some  method  of  liaison,  the  barrage  will 
continue  to  advance  and  leave  the  fine  of  combat  to  its  own 
resources.  These  resources  should  be  increased  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, as  for  example,  by  having  the  fine  of  combat  preceded  or 
accompanied  by  tanks. 

When  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  advance  without  incur- 
ring certain  losses,  the  fault  lies  in  the  insufficiency  of  the 
artillery  preparation.  In  such  cases  the  duty  of  the  commander 
is  to  avoid  useless  effusion  of  blood,  and  to  obtain  an  artillery 
preparation  that  is  more  complete. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  losses  are  caused  by  the  normal  inci- 
dents of  an  attack  against  a  tenacious  adversary,  the  fine  of 
combat  ought  to  go  ahead  on  its  own  resources.  It  cannot 
expect  the  artillery  to  clear  the  ground  of  all  the  enemy,  and 
it  should  be  willing  to  accept  the  sacrifices  which  are  inevi- 
table in  every  war.  In  case  it  has  been  compelled  by  the 
enemy's  fire  to  halt  before  the  first  trench,  its  rifles,  its  auto- 
matic machine  rifles,  and  its  rifle  grenades  are  used  to  gain 
ground;  then,  when  it  has  arrived  within  a  suitable  distance, 

[109] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

hand  grenades  are  thrown,  and  the  men  rush  to  the  assault 
with  the  bayonet. 

The  second  wave  should  follow  the  movement  of  the  first 
at  a  short  distance.  It  usually  starts  at  the  very  moment 
when  its  predecessor  has  reached  the  enemy's  line,  in  order  to 
avoid  congestion,  disorder,  or  loss,  in  case  of  a  hitch  at  the 
start.  Its  duty  is  to  aid,  support,  and  reinforce  the  fighting 
wave.  It  ascertains,  on  arrival  at  the  first  trench,  whether 
the  trench  cleaners  are  sufficient  for  their  task,  and  comes  to 
their  aid  if  need  be.  It  also  includes  men  entrusted  with 
cleaning  up  the  second  trench  and  the  boyaux. 

It  is  essential  to  make  sure  that  the  first  wave  be  not  fired 
into  from  behind,  as  that  would  oblige  the  men  to  turn  about 
and  deal  with  the  enemy  in  their  rear.  Likewise  is  it  essen- 
tial that  no  prisoners  be  left  near  the  fine  of  combat,  as  they 
might  resume  the  fight  at  the  first  opportunity. 

The  second  wave  is  accompanied  by  machine  guns  intended 
to  secure  the  retention  of  the  conquered  terrain  by  seizing 
favorable  positions  from  which  to  fire. 

The  succeeding  waves  are  set  in  motion  on  the  order  of  their 
commanders,  who  have  been  told  how  to  dispose  them  so  as  to 
accomplish  their  assigned  tasks.  They  are  echeloned  so  as  to 
provide  reinforcements  or  reliefs  when  needed,  and  to  ensure 
the  occupation  and  retention  of  specified  objectives. 

In  consequence  of  the  barrage  fire  usually  delivered  by  the 
enemy,  these  waves  march  in  lines  of  small  columns.  This 
formation  is  advantageous  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  avoid- 
ing losses,  but  also  for  that  of  controlling  the  troops,  and  for 
keeping  in  place  any  men  who  might  be  tempted  to  stop  in 
the  trenches  which  they  are  crossing. 

[130] 


ATTACK 

A  wave  is  not  a  tactical  unit.  Moreover,  it  is  of  very  vari- 
able size,  according  to  circumstances;  for  the  Command  may 
judge  it  wise  not  to  launch  the  attack  on  all  parts  of  the  front 
at  once.  It  has  not,  strictly  speaking,  an  objective;  a  trench, 
especially  a  trench  in  the  interior  of  a  position,  is  not  properly 
an  objective — first,  because  no  one  can  describe  it  exactly  nor 
even  see  it  in  advance;  second,  because  it  is  a  mere  line  of 
uncertain  direction  and  ill-defined  lateral  limits.  An  objec- 
tive is  a  tactical  point  towards  which  the  efforts  of  the  unit 
converge,  and  whose  occupation  is  a  step  towards  the  conquest 
of  the  position.  It  is  rather  the  units  constituting  the  ele- 
ments of  the  successive  waves  which  have  objectives;  these 
consist  sometimes  merely  in  intermediate  landmarks,  but  they 
always  lead  to  the  well-defined  objective,  which  has  been  fixed 
beforehand  by  the  Command. 

It  is  however  indispensable  that  each  wave  should  maintain 
its  own  lateral  cohesion,  for  fear  of  splitting  up  into  little 
individual  groups,  threatened  with  failure  and  destruction. 
This  cohesion  is  effected  by  perfect  lateral  liaison  between  the 
different  elements  of  the  contiguous  units.  Each  wave  must 
also  have  a  sufficient  number  of  officers  to  watch  it,  and  regu- 
late its  march.  If  all  the  contiguous  units  were  arranged  ac- 
cording to  the  same  plan,  all  the  majors,  for  example,  would  be 
in  one  wave,  all  the  captains  in  one,  and  so  on.  It  is  thus 
incumbent  on  the  Command  so  to  distribute  the  leaders  of 
units,  that  there  shall  be  with  each  wave  officers  capable  of 
making  a  decision,  of  giving  an  order,  of  assuming  responsi- 
bility, of  drawing  up  a  report  or  of  meeting  an  unexpected 
situation. 

When  it  happens  that  the  first  wave  in  its  advance  has 
sustained  too  great  losses  to  be  able  to  maintain  its  effort 

[in] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

without  help,  then  the  second  wave  must  reinforce  it  and  weld 
the  two  into  one. 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that,  in  the  course  of  the  attack,  the  first 
waves  cannot,  usually,  maintain  their  initial  rigidity;  at  some 
points  the  enemy  will  resist  more  stoutly,  owing  to  an  insuffi- 
cient destruction  of  his  works  by  the  artillery;  while  at  other 
points  the  waves  will  sweep  on,  almost  without  effort  and 
without  loss.  When  reinforced,  the  units  of  the  first  line 
which  have  suffered  least  can  extend  their  front,  by  means  of 
their  lateral  liaison,  and  avoid  offering  too  dense  a  formation 
to  the  enemy's  fire. 

The  reinforcement  of  the  fighting  wave  by  the  succeeding 
ones  is  effected,  when  it  is  needed,  by  means  of  the  liaison  from 
the  rear  to  the  front.  When  one  part  of  the  attacking  line  has 
sustained  loss,  the  reserves  of  the  corresponding  units  are  sent 
thither.  It  should  be  noticed  that  these  reserves  are  intended 
to  execute  some  manoeuver  which  shall  serve  to  make  the 
obstacle  fall,  not  to  renew  fruitless  and  bloody  assaults. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  commanders  to  see  to  it  that  this  re- 
inforcement takes  place  at  the  opportune  moment,  and  that 
the  succeeding  waves  are  not  mixed  in  automatically  with  the 
first  wave,  nor  piled  up  at  a  short  distance  behind  it;  these 
mistakes  would  expose  the  troops  to  needless  losses,  deprive 
them  of  the  use  of  reinforcements  at  the  critical  moment, 
and  create  between  the  attacking  line  and  its  reserves  a  gap 
prejudicial  to  the  favorable  development  of  the  combat. 

In  spite  of  all,  there  will  arise  various  modifications  in  the 
composition  of  the  waves,  regardless  of  the  officers.  In  the 
crisis  of  the  fight,  the  most  ardent  groups,  led  away  by  their 
enthusiasm,  will  be  found  in  the  midst  of  the  first  wave,  while 
others,  delayed  by  one  pretext  or  another,  will  mix  in  with  the 
following  ones. 

[112] 


ATTACK 

For  this  reason  it  is  well  to  have  in  each  company,  battalion, 
or  regiment  a  detail  of  police,  commanded  by  an  energetic 
leader  marching  with  the  last  wave  of  the  unit;  its  object  is  to 
pick  up  isolated  men  and  stragglers,  and  to  send  them  back  to 
their  places.  Indeed  this  is  one  of  the  important  advantages 
of  the  echelonment  in  depth;  the  men,  knowing  that  they  are 
followed  by  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  comrades 
of  their  unit,  are  restrained  from  lagging  behind,  both  by  self- 
respect  and  by  fear  of  reproach;  if  they  do  lag,  they  are  put 
back  where  they  belong. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  harm  in  giving  free  rein  to 
that  natural  selection  which  places  in  the  line  of  combat  the 
bravest  elements  of  the  first  waves;  provided,  of  course,  that 
this  can  occur  without  disorder,  by  the  natural  play  of  cir- 
cumstances, or,  so  to  speak,  automatically;  it  helps  to  put  dash 
into  the  first  wave,  and  to  pull  the  unit  along  by  the  example 
of  its  bravest.  All  the  elements  echeloned  in  depth  are  on 
fire  to  join  those  at  the  post  of  honor. 

The  struggle  inside  the  position  serves  to  break  up  the 
waves,  to  a  considerable  degree,  since  it  may  involve  the  most 
diverse  sorts  of  incidents. 

The  first  task  of  the  assailants  is  to  clean  up  the  conquered 
trenches.  In  each  wave  certain  details,  specially  organized  in 
advance,  are  charged  with  this;  the  chosen  men  are  armed 
with  grenades,  revolvers,  and  knives,  for  in  a  narrow  trench  it 
is  extremely  difficult  to  handle  a  bayonet.  It  is  often  simpler 
than  one  would  suppose  to  clean  up  a  trench ;  if  the  enemy  has 
been  able  to  man  the  debris  of  his  trench,  he  is  demoralized  by 
the  arrival  of  the  waves  and  the  storm  of  grenades,  and  resists 
but  feebly;  if  he  has  burrowed  into  his  shelters  under  the 
stunning  influence  of  terrific  artillery  fire,  he  is  even  more 

[113] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

likely  to  beg  for  quarter;  in  either  case  an  immediate  and 
energetic  suppression  of  any  hint  of  resistance  has  a  salutary 
effect  on  the  occupants.  Their  task  once  done,  the  cleaners 
do  not  stop  in  the  trench;  they  go  on  to  the  next  one  to  aid 
their  comrades,  progressing  thus,  step  by  step,  towards 
rejoining  their  unit. 

At  certain  points  where  the  enemy's  defensive  works  have 
been  spared  by  the  bombardment,  some  elements  of  the  waves 
will  meet  a  resistance  which  they  cannot  overcome.  The 
commanders  of  the  units  which  are  stopped  in  this  way  call 
into  play  the  rifle  grenade,  the  portable  cannon,  and  other 
accompanying  machines  such  as  tanks;  if  the  results  obtained 
with  these  are  insufficient,  they  wait  before  advancing,  either 
for  artillery  preparation,  or  for  the  adjacent  units  to  reach  the 
flanks  of  the  obstacle,  or  for  some  manoeuver  by  the  reserves. 
They  avoid  any  useless  sacrifice  of  their  men. 

An  incident  of  this  sort  must  never  be  allowed  to  retard  the 
advance  as  a  whole.  It  is  by  the  continuity  of  their  progress 
that  the  attacking  troops  prevent  the  enemy  from  rallying  on 
the  position. 

Machine  guns  accompany  the  first  waves;  they  sweep  the 
intervals  winch  the  accidents  of  the  advance,  or  the  separation 
of  the  objectives,  have  left  unoccupied;  in  this  way  they  pro- 
tect the  flanks  of  the  elements  of  the  waves;  they  halt  by  their 
fire  any  retour  offensif  or  counter-attack;  they  throw  the 
retreating  troops  into  disorder,  and  can  sometimes  inflict 
serious  losses  on  them. 

Behind  the  battalions  which  constitute  the  first  waves,  and 
which  feed  the  fine  of  attack,  march  those  other  battalions 
which  constitute  the  divisional  reserves.   These  are  intended 

[114] 


ATTACK 

eventually  to  reinforce  the  fighting  wave  by  sandwiching 
themselves  into  its  gaps,  by  manoeuvering  against  nuclei 
of  resistance,  by  holding  up  counter-attacks,  and  by  pro- 
viding total  or  partial  reliefs.  They  learn  what  is  expected 
of  them  from  the  commander  at  whose  disposal  they  have 
been  placed. 

Large  reserve  units,  such  as  brigades  and  divisions,  can 
relieve,  during  the  progress  of  the  fight,  those  units  which  have 
been  engaged  since  the  beginning  of  it,  in  case  the  latter  have 
been  too  sorely  tried  by  losses  or  by  weariness.  In  such  cases 
the  relieving  units  pass  on  beyond  those  relieved.  To  permit 
this,  the  first  units  engaged  halt  on  a  line  that  has  been  agreed 
upon,  give  the  new  units  all  possible  information  in  regard  to 
the  enemy  and  the  ground,  and  let  them  go  forward.  They 
then  get  a  chance  to  re-form  and  may  in  turn  become  reserves. 

In  the  course  of  this  fight  for  a  position,  the  artillery  never 
ceases  to  help  the  infantry  by  its  fire. 

Its  essential  task  is  to  counteract  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  when  the  latter  is  delivering  barrages  against  the 
waves,  either  to  prevent  egress  from  the  departure  parallel,  or 
to  hinder  the  further  advance.  Even  though  the  artillery  may 
doubt  its  ability  to  destroy  the  enemy's  batteries,  it  can  often 
silence  them  momentarily,  and  thereby  give  the  infantry  an 
enormous  advantage. 

The  barrage  which  precedes  the  infantry  continues  to 
advance  in  the  interior  of  the  position,  in  accordance  with  a 
prearranged  time-schedule.  This  time-schedule  should  be 
slow,  so  as  to  enable  the  infantry  to  follow  the  shells  without 
difficulty.  The  barrage  cannot,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  be  brought 
back,  on  account  of  the  dangers  involved;   and  it  should 

[115] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

not  advance  too  fast,  for  fear  of  leaving  the  infantry  without 
immediate  protection.  Its  aim  should  be  constantly  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy's  riflemen  and  machine  gunners  from  firing. 
In  order  that  there  may  be  complete  accord  between  the 
advance  of  the  barrage  and  that  of  the  infantry,  numerous 
preliminary  exercises  should  be  held,  in  order  to  enable  the  two 
arms  to  familiarize  themselves  with  one  another.  In  case  they 
get  out  of  touch  in  the  course  of  the  combat,  the  infantry 
should  be  able  to  make  signals  to  ask  for  (1)  an  advance  of  the 
barrage,  (2)  an  increase  of  its  intensity,  (3)  its  maintenance 
on  the  same  point  beyond  the  allotted  time. 

It  is  impossible  to  foresee  everything  that  may  occur  in  the 
interior  of  a  position.  The  troops  are  not  confronted  with 
clearly-marked  trenches,  such  as  furnish  comparatively  easy 
targets  for  the  artillery;  they  have  to  traverse  a  chaotic  region 
which  the  shell-holes  formed  by  the  artillery  preparation 
cause  to  resemble  a  bit  of  the  surface  of  the  moon.  The  enemy 
is  at  once  nowhere  and  everywhere :  a  single  machine  gun  in 
a  shell-hole  can  hold  up  one  or  two  battalions.  There  is  no 
clearly  defined  target  for  the  artillery. 

The  plan  of  action,  then,  can  do  no  more  than  provide  for  a 
halting  of  the  advance  of  the  barrage  on  known  lines  of  resist- 
ance. Every  such  halting  permits  the  infantry  to  re-form,  to 
be  reinforced,  or  if  necessary  to  be  relieved  by  another  unit 
advancing  beyond  it. 

Over  and  above  this  duty  of  directly  supporting  the  in- 
fantry, the  artillery  has  other  more  general  tasks.  It  delivers 
barrages  against  the  enemy's  reinforcements,  his  counter- 
attacks, and  his  reserves;  it  does  not  hesitate  to  take  under  its 
fire  any  concentrations  of  this  sort  which  are  pointed  out  to  it, 
in  order  to  disorganize  them  at  the  start.    It  fires  on  the  routes 

[116] 


ATTACK 

of  access  to  the  zone  that  is  being  attacked,  and  it  maintains  a 
protecting  barrage  on  its  flanks.  In  this  way  it  isolates  the 
various  adversaries  with  which  the  infantry  is  at  grips. 

In  these  operations  the  scouting,  observing,  and  fire-adjust- 
ing airplanes  render  great  services  to  the  batteries  engaged. 

The  artillery  may  also,  when  the  infantry  asks  for  it,  support 
the  latter's  attacks  against  nuclei  of  resistance.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  must  obtain  all  possible  information  and 
take  every  precaution  necessary  to  the  success  of  this  opera- 
tion which  is  sometimes  extremely  delicate.  The  infantry  is 
particularly  likely  to  be  demoralized  by  the  least  error  on  the 
part  of  its  artillery;  in  case  of  doubt,  it  is  better  to  let  the 
foot  soldiers  get  along  as  best  they  may  with  such  accompa- 
nying pieces  as  have  been  allotted  to  them. 

When,  on  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  resists  in  a  well- 
defined  section  of  the  line,  or  in  a  sharply  delimited  centre, 
the  batteries  may  effect  a  concentration  of  their  fire,  which 
constitutes,  from  the  tactical  point  of  view,  a  real  manoeuver; 
the  projectiles  of  the  artillery  will  often  afford  more  helpful 
aid  than  infantry  reserves. 

This  intervention  presupposes  that  the  distribution  of  the 
artillery  among  the  various  sectors,  which  was  adopted  during 
the  period  of  stationary  fighting  and  preparation,  has  been 
abandoned  at  the  beginning  of  the  combat,  in  order  to  leave 
the  various  artillery  units  in  the  hands  of  those  leaders  to 
whom  they  regularly  belong.  The  commander  of  a  first  line 
division  can  thus  concentrate  his  shells  more  easily  than  his 
foot  soldiers  on  that  part  of  the  battle  field  where  he  judges 
they  will  be  of  most  use;  to  this  effect  the  artillery  commander 
assembles  groups  of  batteries  of  heavy  or  field  artillery,  to 

[117] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

which  clearly  defined  tasks  are  assigned.  Some  of  these 
groups  are  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  brigade  or  regimental 
commanders,  to  enable  them  to  overcome  any  difficulties 
which  they  may  encounter. 

Artillery  reserves  are  constituted  by  artillery  units  which 
have  been  temporarily  taken  away  from  troops  who  are  not 
engaged,  or  else  are  located  in  the  quieter  sectors.  They  are 
placed  far  in  the  rear  and  intervene  at  the  order  of  the  Com- 
mand, either  as  a  manoeuvring  body  to  attain  a  particular  end, 
or  else  as  a  relief  to  replace  exhausted  units. 

Finally,  if  the  attacking  troops  push  forward,  the  batteries 
move  on,  in  order  to  continue  their  support.  This  movement, 
which  is  always  dangerous,  should  only  be  executed  when  it 
serves  a  purpose.  As  far  as  possible  it  should  take  place  during 
the  night.  It  is  carried  out  according  to  some  well  defined  plan 
by  echelons,  in  such  wise  as  not  to  break  the  continuity  of  the 
fire.  In  order  that  there  be  no  delay,  emplacements  for  the 
pieces  must  be  sought  out  beforehand ;  moreover,  the  materiel 
and  gangs  of  workmen  must  be  in  readiness  to  effect  the 
complete  installation  of  the  pieces. 

No  matter  what  care  has  been  given  to  planning  the  advance 
of  the  barrage,  no  matter  how  carefully  and  continuously  the 
supporting  artillery  performs  its  deplacements,  the  infantry 
will  often  inevitably  be  confronted  with  obstacles  which  it 
must  overcome  by  its  own  resources.  For  this  reason  it  must 
be  furnished  with  every  weapon  which  can  facilitate  its 
advance.  Success  in  the  interior  of  the  position  may  come 
from  the  use  of  cannon,  light  enough  to  accompany  the  in- 
fantry, yet  powerful  enough  to  overcome  obstacles.  In  any 
case  the  infantry  is  greatly  aided  by  skillful  utilization  of  the 
weapons  which  can  be  handled  by  the  foot  soldier;  the  rifle 

[118] 


ATTACK 

grenade,  hand  grenade,  automatic  machine  rifle,  and  machine 
gun. 

Night  fighting  is  the  natural  continuation  of  fighting  by  day; 
its  object  is  to  consolidate  and  complete  results  already 
obtained. 

Night  permits  the  organization  and  fortification  of  the  con- 
quered terrain,  the  reconstitution  or  relief  of  the  units  engaged, 
the  supply  both  of  munitions  and  provisions,  and  the  prepara- 
tion, by  local  progress  or  partial  actions,  for  the  resumption  of 
the  movement  at  daybreak. 

Troops  can  only  continue  their  general  advance  during 
the  night  if  they  already  know  the  terrain  on  which  they  are 
operating,  or  if  the  enemy  is  demoralized;  otherwise,  they  run 
the  risk  of  making  costly  mistakes,  or  of  f  ailing  into  murderous 
ambushes. 

The  liaisons  are  maintained  even  more  closely  than  during 
the  day.  Every  movement  of  one  unit  must  be  communicated 
to  the  neighboring  ones. 

Night  fighting  is  not  generally  speaking  adapted  to  an 
advance  on  a  wide  front  or  to  a  great  depth;  it  does,  however, 
permit  of  small  operations  called  raids,  which  can  be  of  con- 
siderable importance  for  the  continuation  of  that  advance. 

These  raids  are  executed  by  platoons,  companies  or  bat- 
talions, and  aim  at  such  objects  as  the  taking  of  a  trench,  the 
occupation  of  a  group  of  houses,  the  seizing  of  a  post,  or  the 
enveloping  of  a  nucleus  of  resistance.  An  important  element 
of  success  is  surprise,  which  is  harder  to  achieve  than  during 
stationary  periods;  still  it  is  during  the  night  that  the  enemy 
tries  to  reconstitute  his  forces,  to  carry  out  the  relief  of  his 
exhausted  troops,  to  fortify  the  positions  to  which  he  has  been 

[119] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

driven  back,  all  of  which  are  sources  of  momentary  weakness 
and  inattention. 

The  observers  and  patrols  observe  the  slightest  symptoms 
indicating  a  relaxation  of  the  enemy's  guard  or  watchfulness. 
At  a  signal  given  by  their  leader,  the  troops  attempting  the 
raid  steal  forward  in  perfect  order  and  absolute  silence;  on 
reaching  the  enemy's  entrenchments,  they  leap  in  with  gre- 
nade, revolver,  and  knife.  The  men  are,  for  the  most  part, 
unencumbered  with  knapsacks,  guns,  or  bayonets,  so  as 
to  increase  their  freedom  of  action  and  agility;  those  among 
them  who  are  ordered  to  retain  their  equipment  take  the 
greatest  pains  to  avoid  all  clicking  of  their  arms  during  the 
march.  The  conquered  entrenchment  is  at  once  reversed, 
organized,  and  connected  with  the  place  of  departure;  the 
arms  and  knapsacks  of  the  grenadiers  are  brought  up  by  a 
reinforcement. 

The  artillery  cannot  bear  effective  aid  in  night  operations; 
it  limits  itself,  before  the  arrival  of  darkness,  to  finding  the 
ranges  of  the  points  held  by  the  enemy,  or  of  dangerous  out- 
lets, so  as  to  be  able,  at  the  call  of  the  infantry,  to  let  loose  a 
barrage  to  prevent  a  retour  offensif  or  a  counter-attack.  The 
heavy  artillery  adjusts  its  fire  for  the  night  on  the  crossroads 
or  ways  of  approach  used  by  the  troops  and  the  supply 
columns,  in  order  to  cannonade  them. 

The  artillery  takes  advantage  of  night  time  to  alter  its  posi- 
tion with  some  measure  of  security,  to  move  to  those  emplace- 
ments which  have  been  located  during  the  day;  to  organize 
its  observing  stations,  and  its  telephone  lines.  The  airplanes 
and  the  dirigibles  have  the  task  of  bombarding  important 
railway  stations  and  lines,  cantonments  and  bivouacs  of  the 
[120] 


ATTACK 

reserves,  storehouses,  workshops  and  artillery  parks  behind 
the  first  line. 

The  attacking  troops  are  required,  even  if  they  do  not  judge 
it  wise  to  try  raids,  on  no  account  to  lose  contact  with  the 
enemy,  and  to  watch  his  every  movement.  This  surveillance 
will  sometimes  enable  them  to  occupy  without  loss  points 
which  for  the  moment  are  weakly  held;  it  reveals  the  enemy's 
retreat,  if  that  takes  place,  and  furnishes  useful  information 
for  the  resumption  of  the  advance. 

Orders  and  reports  are  of  extreme  importance  during  the 
combat. 

Orders,  which  are  the  decisions  of  the  commander,  should 
contain  everything  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  subordinate 
officer  to  know,  but  nothing  more. 

A  commander,  in  giving  his  orders,  should  not  leave  to  his 
subordinate  the  duty  of  prescribing  the  measures  for  which 
he  himself  should  be  responsible;  on  the  other  hand  he  ought 
not  to  limit  his  subordinate's  initiative  by  prescribing  to  him 
details  of  execution. 

All  orders  in  regard  to  operations  should  include: 

1.  Information  about  the  enemy. 

2.  The  intention  of  the  commander  who  gives  the  order  and 
the  ends  which  he  is  aiming  to  accomplish. 

3.  The  objectives  to  be  attained,  and  the  movements  to  be 
executed  by  the  unit  to  whose  leader  the  order  is  given. 

4.  The  place  where  the  commander  can  be  found. 

5.  The  movements  of  the  neighboring  units. 

An  order  should  be  perfectly  clear,  precise,  and  complete;  it 
should  contain  nothing  vague.    Indefinite  expressions  such  as 

[121] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

"  daybreak,"  "  night  time  "  should  never  be  used;  and  it  is 
better  if  possible  to  say  "north,  east,  south,  west,"  than 
"  to  the  front,  to  the  rear,  to  the  right,  to  the  left."  It  is 
often  very  important  to  state  what  particular  map  has  been 
utilized  for  drawing  up  the  order.  For  times  of  the  day  and 
night  the  hours  and  minutes  should  be  given.  The  French 
number  the  hours  from  1  to  24. 

Save  in  cases  of  special  urgency,  the  transmission  of  orders 
should  go  down  the  scale  of  authority  without  omitting  any 
intermediate  rank.  In  case  an  intermediate  officer  of  any 
grade  has  to  be  omitted,  the  commander  who  gives  the  order 
informs  him,  and  the  junior  officer  who  receives  the  order 
communicates  it  at  once  to  his  superior. 

Specially  important  orders  are  carried  by  officers.  Every 
man  who  carries  a  written  order  or  a  report  ought  to  be  pre- 
pared to  get  rid  of  it  safely  at  a  moment's  notice. 

Orders  relative  to  the  general  purpose  to  be  fulfilled,  the 
successive  objectives  to  be  reached,  and  the  principal  disposi- 
tions to  be  made,  are  communicated  before  the  action,  not 
merely  to  the  first  attacking  units,  and  their  brigade  and  divi- 
sional reserves,  but  also  to  all  troops  who  have  any  chance  of 
taking  part  in  the  combat. 

Secrecy,  so  indispensable  during  the  period  of  preparation, 
should  be  abandoned  on  the  eve  of  action,  for  at  the  last 
instant,  when  departure  is  unminent,  the  units  cannot  assimi- 
late the  idea  of  the  sort  of  effort  in  which  they  are  going  to 
participate.  Troops  who  have  arrived  after  hasty  transporta- 
tion or  marching,  frequently  at  night,  on  an  unf amiliar  terrain, 
face  to  face  with  obstacles  which  they  cannot  see,  and  without 
adequate  information  as  to  the  situation,  are  unquestionably 
placed  at  a  disadvantage  for  purposes  of  taking  part  in  com- 

[122] 


ATTACK 

bat.  On  the  contrary  they  are  well  prepared  for  their  work  if 
they  have  been  fully  instructed  before  the  beginning  of  the 
action,  kept  in  touch  with  the  march  of  events,  and  have 
clearly  faced  the  tasks  which  await  them. 

Orders  become  simpler  and  simpler  as  one  goes  down  the 
scale  of  authority.  Nevertheless,  they  should,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, be  given  in  writing,  even  in  the  case  of  a  small  unit  such 
as  a  battalion  or  company,  and  they  should  be  few  in  number, 
in  order  to  avoid  hesitation,  delay,  and  error. 

Reports  should  contain  precise  information  in  regard  to  the 
place,  date,  and  hour  at  which  the  events  set  forth  occurred. 

A  report  should  always  give  the  name  and  assigned  task  of 
the  sender,  and  those  of  the  person  to  whom  it  is  sent;  also 
the  day  and  hour  at  which  it  is  sent.  The  man  who  draws  it 
up  should  also  always  distinguish  between  what  he  has  seen 
himself,  and  what  has  been  reported  to  him  by  others,  by 
indicating  the  sources  of  his  information.  A  good  way  to 
remember  the  order  in  which  information  should  be  given  is 
by  the  formula,  "  Who,  When,  Where,  How,  What." 

Who     refers  to  the  effectives,  the  regimental  numbers, 

etc.,  of  the  enemy. 
When  indicates  the  exact  moment  when  the  observation 

reported  was  made. 
Where  indicates  the  place  occupied  by  the  enemy's  troops. 
How     refers  to  his  situation  and  movements. 
What    indicates  the  intentions  of  the  officer  sending  the 
report. 
It  must  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  report  should  reach 
the  commander  in  such  a  condition  that  it  can  be  read,  and  all 
the  necessary  precautions  must  be  taken  to  secure  this. 

[123] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

Reports  should  be  frequent  during  the  combat.  Too  much 
care  cannot  be  given  to  explaining  and  checking  up  the  infor- 
mation winch  they  contain,  for  they  constitute  important 
elements  for  a  decision  on  the  part  of  the  commander. 

Liaisons  during  the  attack  are  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance. 

Each  commander  of  a  unit,  when  he  executes  a  forward 
movement,  chooses  an  observation  post,  close  to  which  he 
places  his  command-post. 

Observing  stations  for  information  and  for  the  artillery 
should  be  established  in  suitable  places  during  the  course  of 
the  advance;  they  should  make  it  possible  to  follow  the 
march  of  the  combat  and  to  watch  the  signals  made  by  the 
attacking  line. 

Observations  from  airplanes  and  balloons  afford  a  particu- 
larly advantageous  means  of  establishing  good  liaisons,  and 
of  enabling  the  Command  to  obtain  exact  information. 
Photographs  make  it  possible  to  become  acquainted  with  the 
situation  in  any  particular  zone,  and  in  particular,  to  learn 
the  effects  which  have  been  produced  by  the  artillery. 

Airplanes  have  various  duties.  Some  accompany  the  in- 
fantry, never  losing  sight  of  the  attacking  line,  but  communi- 
cating with  it,  and  watching  the  enemy  opposite;  these  are 
the  accompanying  planes.  Others,  called  command  planes, 
observe  the  enemy  in  a  particular  sector  and  inform  the  Com- 
mand of  Ins  situation,  his  concentrations,  and  his  movements. 
A  third  category,  called  messenger  planes,  establishes  the  liai- 
son between  the  Command  and  the  corresponding  units  by 
transmitting  orders  and  information. 

Balloons  fulfill  functions  of  the  same  general  sort.  They  do 
not  confine  themselves  to   artillery   adjustment,   but  also 

[124] 


ATTACK 

observe  the  attacking  line  and  transmit  signals  (infantry  bal- 
loons). Others,  generally  one  for  each  army  corps,  follow  the 
progress  of  the  combat  for  the  information  of  the  Comma  1  id 
(command  balloons). 

The  liaisons  between  the  air  service  and  the  troops  are 
effected  in  the  following  manner: 

The  infantry  communicates  by  signals  with  the  accompany- 
ing planes.  In  front,  the  attacking  line  indicates  its  position  by 
Bengal  lights,  signalling  cloths,  called  panneaux  de  jalonne- 
ment  which  are  opened  out  on  the  ground,  projectors,  mirrors, 
and  all  sorts  of  means.  These  signals  are  made  along  lines 
determined  in  advance,  either  at  the  request  of  the  airplanes, 
or  on  the  initiative  of  the  company  commanders.  All  other 
troops,  save  those  of  the  attacking  line,  are  forbidden  to  make 
signals,  so  as  to  avoid  confusion.  Behind  the  attacking  line 
the  command-posts  for  battalions,  regiments,  or  larger  units, 
communicate  with  the  planes  or  balloons.  They  use  cloths 
bearing  special  marks  and  spread  out  on  the  ground  to  indi- 
cate their  location;  they  also  use  cloths  or  electric  flash  lights 
for  messages. 

Accompanying  planes  never  fly  at  a  greater  height  than  4000 
feet,  and  carry  distinctive  marks  which  should  be  familiar  to 
all  who  cooperate  with  them.  The  observer  communicates 
with  the  infantry  by  means  of  signal  cartridges,  after  he  has 
revealed  his  identity  by  an  audible  signal  or  identifying 
cartridge.  He  receives  signals  from  the  infantry  and  notes  its 
position.  He  transmits  urgent  information  by  wireless,  while 
other  less  pressing  matter  is  sent  by  weighted  messages;  these 
latter  convey  all  his  observations  relative  to  the  disposal  of 
the  line  of  attack  and  the  command-posts,  on  sketches 
prepared  in  advance. 

[125] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

The  infantry  balloons  (generally  one  to  each  division)  carry 
distinctive  marks.  They  receive  signals  from  the  attacking 
line  or  the  command-posts,  but  reply  only  by  very  simple 
signals,  such  as  "  Understood  "  or  "  Repeat,"  preceded  by 
the  indicative  of  the  receiver.  They  may  even  remain  in  the 
air  during  the  night.  They  communicate  with  the  ground 
by  telephone.  Thence  the  messages  are  forwarded  to  their 
destination  by  telephone,  or,  in  exceptional  cases  where  tele- 
phone lines  have  not  been  run,  by  wireless. 

During  the  course  of  the  advance,  the  rapid  establishment 
or  repairing  of  telephone  lines  is  of  great  importance.  These 
operations  are  much  easier  if  the  telephone  system  of  the 
departure  position  has  been  established  with  care,  and  if  the 
forward  movement  has  been  arranged  beforehand;  the  plan  of 
the  telephone  system  to  be  eventually  constructed  should  be 
studied,  the  work  thereon  pushed  as  far  as  possible,  and  the 
necessary  workmen  held  in  readiness.  All  the  supplementary 
means  of  liaison  must  also  be  planned  out. 

As  a  means  of  avoiding  all  errors,  the  use  of  other  signals  or 
other  means  of  communication  than  those  determined  on  by 
the  Commander-in-Chief  should  be  absolutely  prohibited; 
signals  must  be  exactly  the  same  along  the  whole  front. 

The  liaison  of  the  attacking  troops  with  the  artillery  is 

primarily  intended  to  show  the  latter  the  exact  location  of  the 
infantry  at  each  instant,  and,  whenever  possible,  its  tactical 
situation,  its  purpose,  and  its  needs.  In  this  way  it  doubles 
the  liaison  with  the  Command  and  avoids  delays,  for  the 
artillery  must  be  quickly  informed,  not  only  when  to  fire,  but 
also  when  not  to  fire,  or  to  lengthen  the  range. 

This  liaison  does  not  give  the  commanders  of  waves  or  small 
units  any  right  to  open  with  their  artillery  at  their  own  dis- 

[126] 


ATTACK 

cretion;  it  rather  gives  them  a  guarantee  against  errors  of 
range  or  misunderstandings,  and  a  means  of  pointing  out 
those  objectives  which  cannot  be  overcome  without  the  aid 
of  guns.  The  divisional  commander,  assisted  by  his  artillery 
officer,  is  responsible  for  using  the  batteries  for  the  greatest 
good  of  all;  he  distributes  them  in  tactical  groups  proportioned 
to  their  assigned  tasks;  he  may,  however,  put  a  certain  num- 
ber of  batteries  at  the  disposal  of  the  brigade  or  regimental 
commanders. 

The  means  of  liaison  are  the  usual  ones,  runners  and  tele- 
phones; at  the  same  time  it  is  more  practical  to  use  rockets  or 
visible  signals,  on  account  of  their  instantaneous  action,  when 
it  is  necessary  to  indicate  the  presence  of  friendly  troops  at  a 
certain  point,  to  ask  for  the  cessation  or  lengthening  of  the 
fire,  or  for  a  barrage  to  stop  a  counter-attack. 

It  is  precisely  under  special  circumstances  such  as  these  that 
the  commanders  of  artillery  battalions  or  of  batteries  may 
exercise  their  discretion,  provided  the  measures  adopted  are 
not  inconsistent  with  the  general  plan,  and  are  reported 
immediately  to  their  superior  officers. 

The  aircraft,  airplanes,  and  balloons  render  important  serv- 
ices to  this  liaison.  They  follow  the  troops  in  their  advance, 
always  remaining  in  the  zone  of  the  division  to  which  they  are 
attached.  Airplanes  communicate  with  one  of  the  centres  of 
information  by  electric  flash  lights  on  board,  by  rockets,  and 
weighted  messages;  this  centre  of  information  is  close  to  the 
divisional  command-post.  It  is  moved  forward  in  conformity 
with  the  advance  of  the  troops,  and  the  command-post  moves 
along  with  it.  It  communicates  by  all  the  means  at  its 
disposal  with  the  aviation  field  behind  the  original  point  of 
departure  for  the  attack.    But  a  landing  ground  should  always 

[127] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

be  sought  for  in  the  immediate  vicinity,  in  order  that  the 
airmen  may  come  and  be  told  precisely  what  their  tasks  and 
their  objectives  are,  and  learn  what  information  has  been 
obtained. 

The  forwarding  of  reserves,  munitions,  and  food  during  the 
attack  is  one  of  the  constant  cares  of  the  Command;  if  there  is 
to  be  continuity  in  the  forward  movement,  there  must  be  con- 
tinuity of  supply.  If  the  reserves  do  not  arrive  at  the  right 
moment,  if  the  ammunition  gives  out,  even  momentarily,  or  if 
the  food  is  lacking,  success  is  endangered. 

This  forwarding  involves  two  aspects,  a  tactical  one,  since 
it  is  ordered  by  the  Command;  and  a  practical  one,  since  it  is 
greatly  accelerated  by  special  material  preparations. 

In  order  that  the  Command  may  issue  its  orders,  it  is  essen- 
tial that  it  be  exactly  informed  as  to  the  situation  of  the  troops, 
their  progress,  the  results  which  have  been  accomplished,  and 
those  which  are  to  be  expected.  Thanks  to  precise  and  fre- 
quent reports,  the  commander  is  able  to  make  his  decision  in 
complete  knowledge  of  the  facts,  to  know  at  what  moment  to 
call  up  his  reserves  and  to  what  point  to  direct  them,  and  to 
see  whether  they  will  suffice  to  carry  out  the  purpose  he  has 
in  view. 

In  order  that  there  may  be  no  hitch  when  it  comes  to  the 
actual  execution  of  the  orders,  it  is  essential  that  the  atninage- 
ment  of  the  departure  position  should  be  carried  out  with 
diligence  and  foresight  during  the  period  of  preparation  for 
the  attack,  and  that  no  means  of  access  or  evacuation  be 
overlooked. 

The  most  rapid  and  certain  means  of  access  from  behind  the 
lines  are  railways;  the  Command  should  not  hesitate  to 
double  or  treble  them,  to  multiply  their  ramifications,  or  add 

[128] 


ATTACK 

to  them  branches  leading  towards  the  front.  As  for  the  roads 
whose  utilization  is  no  less  severe  on  account  of  the  circula- 
tion of  automobile  trains,  their  maintenance  is  constantly 
ensured  by  special  gangs  of  men.  Strict  orders  must  be  issued 
to  clear  these  roads  during  the  combat,  in  order  to  reserve 
them  for  supply  work  of  all  sorts.  Similarly,  near  the  front, 
the  narrow  temporary  roads  and  boyaux  are  strictly  super- 
vised so  as  to  avoid  all  loss  of  time  in  the  process  of  forwarding. 

Depots  for  munitions  and  food  are  utilized  as  turnouts  or 
halting  places.  They  permit  the  reserves  to  be  brought  near 
to  the  line  without  piling  them  up,  and  make  possible  the 
accumulation  of  ammunition  and  food  near  the  firing  line.  In 
the  places  d'armes  or  other  fixed  points,  the  reserves  should 
find  guides  sent  back  by  the  troops  whom  they  are  going  to 
support. 

Evacuation  routes  present  the  great  advantage  that  they 
make  it  possible  to  avoid  passing  and  congestion,  which  are 
fatal  to  free  circulation.  When  they  do  not  exist,  or  are  not 
sufficiently  numerous,  it  must  be  an  absolute  rule  that  supply 
takes  precedence  over  evacuation. 

The  organization  of  the  conquered  position  is,  in  principle, 
the  work  of  the  engineers,  who  follow  close  on  the  first  waves. 

When  the  enemy's  first  fine  trench  has  been  occupied,  it  is 
joined  to  the  departure  parallel  by  boyaux,  permitting  it  to  be 
approached  under  cover,  and  making  it  into  a  new  trench. 

Without  waiting  for  the  termination  of  this  work,  which  is, 
at  times,  fairly  protracted,  the  succeeding  trenches  are  cleared 
and  reversed  as  rapidly  as  they  are  occupied. 

The  object  of  all  this  is  primarily  to  facilitate  the  progress 
of  the  reinforcing  or  relieving  units  and  of  the  reserves,  by 

[129] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

improving  the  more  difficult  passages,  both  with  a  view  to 
their  security  and  to  rapidity  of  movement.  Another  object 
is  to  ensure  the  retention  of  the  conquered  terrain,  by  revers- 
ing the  trenches  against  the  enemy,  and  then  by  furnishing 
them  with  means  of  defense,  whenever  there  is  a  check  in  the 
forward  movement. 

When  the  attacking  troops  arrive  at  their  assigned  objective, 
the  conquest  of  the  position  is  generally  assured.  The  engi- 
neers, aided  by  workers  from  the  infantry,  organize  it  on  the 
same  principles  as  the  previous  position. 

The  general  limits  of  the  position  are  determined,  both  by 
topographical  considerations,  and  by  the  situation  of  the 
troops;  the  latter  must  be  speedily  provided  with  defenses  so 
as  to  prevent  a  retour  offensif,  or  counter-attacks.  To  this 
end,  the  commanders  of  the  attacking  units  fix  the  outline  of 
the  new  trench;  detachments  of  engineers  help  the  infantry- 
men in  fortifying  this  line,  making  as  much  use  as  possible  of 
the  enemy's  works,  the  inequalities  of  the  ground,  ditches,  and 
hedges.  Above  all,  speed  is  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  the 
retention  of  the  new  conquest,  and  to  save  the  victorious 
troops  from  needless  losses.  The  infantry  sappers,  who  have 
already  been  trained  in  these  different  jobs,  and  especially  in 
the  setting  up  of  accessory  defenses,  are  at  this  moment  of 
very  real  assistance. 

In  the  position  itself,  the  engineers  construct  artillery  ob- 
serving stations  and  create  or  refit  the  shelters  for  the  men 
and  their  officers,  while  the  telephone  men  speedily  carry  their 
wires  to  these  different  points.  Places  suitable  for  observing 
stations  are  pointed  out  by  the  infantry  officers  in  the  course 
of  their  advance,  and  accepted,  if  need  be,  by  artillery  officers 
specially  detailed  to  accompany  the  infantry;  no  sooner  is  the 

[130] 


ATTACK 

choice  made,  than  the  artillerymen  use  all  means  at  their 
disposal  to  establish  permanent  liaison  with  their  batteries. 

The  need  for  the  speedy  completion  of  these  works,  both 
along  the  front  and  in  the  interior  of  the  conquered  position, 
is  entirely  subordinate  to  their  tactical  importance.  Thus, 
while  some  details  of  engineers,  distributed  among  the  attack- 
ing units,  are  engaged  on  the  methodical  organization  of  the 
different  sectors,  those  elements  which  have  remained  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Command  are  grouped  in  detacliments  varying 
in  size  with  the  tasks  to  winch  they  are  assigned;  these  de- 
tachments fortify  solidly  points  of  tactical  importance  and 
parts  of  the  front  exposed  to  a  retour  offensif  or  menaced  by 
counter-attacks. 

A  judicious  distribution  of  machine  guns,  both  by  the  leaders 
of  the  attacking  units  and  by  the  generals,  and  their  timely 
use,  will  give  most  effective  aid  in  the  defense  of  the  position. 

The  guiding  principle,  both  in  ordering  the  construction  of 
works  and  in  the  adoption  of  measures,  is  perfectly  simple;  a 
position  once  conquered  must  never  be  lost. 

The  organization  of  the  position  is  the  immediate  and  logi- 
cal consequence  of  its  capture;  in  no  sense  does  it  imply  a 
halt  in  the  advance.  On  the  contrary,  the  organized  position 
furnishes  a  base  and  a  place  d'armes  for  those  fresh  troops 
whose  duty  it  is  to  pursue  the  enemy,  if  he  gives  up  resisting, 
or  to  attack  the  next  position,  if  he  has  prepared  one. 


[131] 


CHAPTER   IV 

PURSUIT 

The  capture  of  a  position  is  but  a  means  of  achieving  vic- 
tory; the  only  sure  sign  that  victory  has  been  won  is  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy's  forces. 

It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  pursue  troops  forced  out  of  a 
position  and  overtake  them  by  every  possible  means;  at  the 
same  time  troops  remaining  in  line  to  right  and  left  of  the  zone 
of  attack  must  be  taken  in  the  rear,  cut  off  from  their  com- 
munications and  reserves,  and  either  destroyed  or  surrounded. 
Thus  the  line  is  pierced,  not  only  because  the  material  barrier 
is  overthrown  at  a  given  point,  but  also  because  the  army 
which  was  sheltering  itself  behind  it  is  reduced  in  numbers 
and  broken  up,  and  because  its  fragments  are  easier  to  crush. 

The  crushing  of  the  fragments  of  the  enemy  is  the  indispen- 
sable complement  to  a  successful  attack  upon  a  position;  it 
must  be  immediately  undertaken,  so  as  to  prevent  them  from 
reassembling  and  from  forging  new  links  to  bind  themselves 
together. 

Speed  is  the  condition  essential  to  the  success  of  these  opera- 
tions, and  this  is  obtained  by  resolution  on  the  part  of  the 
Command,  by  the  rapid  despatch  of  sufficient  reserves,  and  by 
the  spirit,  the  audacity,  and  the  endurance  of  the  troops. 

The  maintenance  of  contact  with  the  enemy  is  effected  by 
the  attacking  troops  until  they  are  relieved  by  the  arrival  of 
new  elements. 

[132] 


PURSUIT 

The  limits  of  a  conquered  position  are  in  no  sense  absolute 
or  impassable.  While  establishing  themselves  in  it,  the  attack- 
ing troops  send  out  patrols  and  reconnoitring  parties  beyond 
it  to  observe  and  harass  the  enemy.  The  echeloning  one  be- 
hind the  other  of  the  units  of  attack  permits  them  to  re-form 
easily,  by  closing  up  on  the  foremost  elements;  in  this  way 
the  men  once  more  come  under  the  command  of  their  accus- 
tomed leaders,  which  would  be  impossible  if  other  formations 
were  used.  The  despatch  and  functioning  of  patrols  are  also 
better  secured  in  this  way. 

The  attacking  troops  suffer  less  in  direct  proportion  to  the 
rapidity  of  their  success;  but  even  if  they  are  not  obliged  to 
reorganize  they  do  not  leave  the  position  that  has  been  won 
and  go  themselves  in  pursuit,  except  upon  order  from  the 
Command. 

Continuity  of  movement  beyond  the  position  is  secured  by 
the  Command  which,  being  accurately  informed  by  frequent 
reports,  makes  the  necessary  arrangements,  directly  it  can  see 
the  possibility  of  success. 

Fresh  troops  of  infantry  brought  successively  up  to  the 
field  of  action  advance  beyond  the  conquered  position  and 
take  the  place  of  the  patrols  and  reconnoitring  parties  sent  out 
by  the  attacking  troops;  they  constitute  the  element  of  shock 
and  of  resistance  in  the  pursuit.  In  exceptional  cases  this 
task  may  be  entrusted  to  the  first  attacking  troops,  who  are 
then  replaced  in  the  occupied  position  by  others. 

Motor  cannon,  motor  machine  guns,  and  bicycle  groups  use 
the  roads  which  the  sappers  accompanying  the  attack  have 
taken  care  to  repair.  These  units  constitute  the  element  of 
speed  which  is  so  important  in  pursuit.    One  or  two  armored 

[133] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

motor  cars  go  ahead  to  clear  the  road  in  order  to  avoid  an 
accumulation  of  vehicles  in  front  of  an  unforeseen  obstacle; 
they  transport  some  sappers  for  the  purpose  of  making  quick 
repairs;  special  gangs  of  workmen  at  points  along  the  road 
have  the  task  of  inspecting  and  repairing  it. 

The  enemy,  moreover,  needs  these  roads  up  to  the  last 
moment  for  the  evacuation  of  his  artillery,  his  materiel,  and 
his  convoys,  so  that  he  is  prevented,  if  closely  pressed,  from 
injuring  them.  The  zone  in  which  the  roads  have  been  rendered 
useless  by  defensive  works  and  constructions,  and  the  effects 
of  the  bombardment,  is,  comparatively  speaking,  not  deep; 
it  lies  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy's  first  line 
trenches.  Beyond  it,  the  retiring  troops  often  lack  the  time  to 
effect  the  destruction  of  the  roads,  as  originally  planned, 
particularly  as  they  are  obliged  to  utilize  all  the  ways  of  com- 
munication up  to  the  very  last  moment. 

The  cavalry  is  brought  close  to  the  position  along  itineraries 
previously  reconnoitred,  and  does  not  take  part  in  the  cross- 
ing of  the  zone  of  trenches  until  after  new  reconnaissances 
have  been  made.  It  is  often  obliged,  in  order  to  avoid  encoun- 
tering insurmountable  difficulties,  to  make  use,  at  the  out- 
set, exclusively  of  roads.  In  every  case  it  assumes  formations 
calculated  to  avoid  the  effects  of  the  enemy's  artillery  fire. 
It  constitutes  an  element  both  of  acceleration  and  of  resist- 
ance; but  it  would  sacrifice  itself  uselessly  if  it  hurled  itself 
against  infantrymen  protected  by  trenches. 

The  artillery  goes  to  emplacements  previously  determined. 
It  maintains  its  liaisons  with  the  elements  entrusted  with  the 
pursuit,  so  as  to  facilitate  their  progress,  if  they  encounter 
obstacles,  and  to  bombard  hostile  concentrations  if  any  are 
seen.  The  artillery  officers  detailed  to  accompany  the  infantry 

[134] 


PURSUIT 

gather  information  regarding  emplacements  and  observing 
stations  to  be  occupied  on  the  occasion  of  fresh  advance. 

The  forward  deplacement  of  the  artillery  is  planned  as  com- 
pletely as  possible  in  advance. 

The  troops  entrusted  with  the  pursuit  may,  at  least  at  the 
start,  be  preceded  by  an  artillery  barrage,  similar  to  that 
which  precedes  the  attacking  troops.  Tliis  barrage  protects 
them  at  the  moment  of  their  leaving  the  conquered  position, 
and  is  continued  as  long  as  need  be;  it  is  effected  by  a  rapid 
deplacement  of  a  portion  of  the  artillery,  especially  that  por- 
tion winch  took  no  part  in  the  attack.  This  barrage  is  gen- 
erally kept  up  only  for  a  short  time,  in  order  to  give  perfect 
freedom  of  action  to  the  troops  in  pursuit. 

It  is  important,  on  the  other  hand,  to  give  these  troops  con- 
stant protection  against  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  To 
this  end  it  is  necessary  to  deplace  rapidly  a  certain  part  of  the 
long-range  mobile  artillery  and  of  the  field  artillery,  and  to 
arrange  groups  of  pieces  to  destroy,  or  at  least  to  neutralize, 
the  artillery  of  the  enemy.  These  groups  are  constituted, 
either  by  batteries  previously  located  near  the  line  of  depar- 
ture, but  inactive  during  the  attack,  or  by  batteries  reserved 
for  tins  purpose,  or,  finally,  by  batteries  whose  range  has  been 
exceeded  by  the  progress  of  the  advance. 

The  deplacement  of  the  artillery  is  effected  in  several 
echelons,  in  such  wise  that  the  same  battery  shall  be  deplaced 
as  few  times  as  possible  and  may  utilize  its  full  range  before 
being  moved  forward.  It  is  always  the  rearmost  echelon  which 
is  moved;  it  is  placed  in  front  of  the  foremost  one,  obtaining 
therefrom  all  available  information,  and  always  maintaining 
liaison  with  the  infantry  which  it  supports. 

[135] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

The  engineers  are  given  the  task  of  reestablishing  and  im- 
proving the  means  of  communication.  The  railways,  whose 
use  has  been  made  possible  by  the  advance  of  the  troops,  are 
repaired;  existing  lines  arc  prolonged  if  there  is  opportunity. 

The  aviators  follow  attentively  the  various  movements  of 
the  enemy's  troops;  they  furnish  the  Command  with  informa- 
tion as  to  the  direction  of  the  retreat,  the  intervention  of  re- 
inforcements, the  whereabouts  of  reserves,  and  the  occupation 
of  new  positions. 

If  the  defeated  troops  are  pursued  without  respite  or  delay, 
they  can  neither  reorganize  nor  oftentimes  even  occupy  posi- 
tions prepared  beforehand  in  the  rear;  they  hastily  abandon 
defenses  which  have  been  laboriously  constructed;  further- 
more, they  bring  disorder  among  the  reserves  designed  to 
reinforce  them,  and  involve  the  latter  in  their  own  disaster. 

Thus  a  position  organized  in  the  rear  of  the  first,  and 
capable  of  offering  a  like  resistance,  may  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  pursuing  troops,  if  they  fall  upon  it  by  a  bold,  rapid,  and 
decisive  stroke.  This  bold  stroke,  the  consequences  of  which 
may  be  considerable,  should  always  be  attempted;  its  success 
depends  primarily  upon  the  disorder  and  demoralization 
obtained  by  the  pursuit. 

The  disorder  and  demoralization  of  troops  in  retreat  and  of 
reserves  are  the  work  of  the  various  units  to  whom  is  en- 
trusted the  duty  of  ensuring  continuity  of  movement. 

The  motor  cannon  and  motor  machine  guns  are  moved 
boldly  forward,  as  are  also  the  bicycle  groups,  who  may,  as  cir- 
cumstances direct,  either  support  them  or  operate  independ- 
ently. In  every  case  these  units  maintain  connections  with 
each  other,  so  as  not  to  get  in  each  other's  way,  and  so  as  to 
concentrate  their  efforts. 

[136] 


PURSUIT 

Armored  motor-cars  have  as  their  special  task  the  destruc- 
tion of  hostile  machine  guns  which  have  remained  in  place  or 
have  been  set  up  quickly  in  position  to  fire;  being  provided,  on 
account  of  their  small  calibre,  with  a  supply  of  munitions 
sufficient  for  their  immediate  needs,  they  perform  a  part  which 
less  light  and  mobile  cannon  cannot  play.  They  become  use- 
less as  soon  as  their  ammunition  is  exhausted.  They  must 
therefore  avoid  all  waste,  and  provide  in  advance  the  means 
of  re-supplying  themselves. 

Motor  machine  guns  try  to  embarrass  the  retreat  of  the 
infantry,  winch  they  attack  on  the  flanks  and  in  the  rear,  and 
also  of  the  batteries  and  convoys,  whose  horses  and  drivers 
they  kill.  They  can  obtain  considerable  results  in  the  way  of 
disorganization  and  dispersion,  thus  preparing  the  task  for 
the  infantry. 

Furthermore,  infantrymen  can  be  transported  by  automo- 
biles, following  after  the  motor  artillery,  up  to  a  point  where 
prudence  compels  a  halt.  Movements  appearing  at  first 
unlikely  to  succeed  are  easily  carried  out  if  the  enemy's  artil- 
lery has  been  silenced,  if  it  runs  short  of  ammunition,  or  if  it  is 
engaged  in  beating  a  retreat. 

The  cavalry  resumes  a  greater  freedom  of  movement  after 
crossing  the  zones  of  trenches.  It  completes  the  work  of  the 
motor  vehicles  and  cyclists.  In  the  performance  of  this  task, 
it  leaves  the  roads  in  order  to  overtake  and  surround  the  re- 
treating troops,  who,  because  of  their  demoralization,  often 
surrender  without  fighting;  it  takes  batteries  and  convoys 
unawares;  it  occupies  certain  important  points  until  the 
arrival  of  the  infantry;  it  interrupts  telegraphic  and  tele- 
phonic communications;  it  cuts  railways  which  may  be  used 
by  the  enemy.     By  its  multiple  contact  with  the  adversary  it 

[137] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

gathers  in  valuable  information,  which  it  sends  with  all  speed 
to  the  Command. 

The  infantry  endeavors  to  gain  ground,  so  as  to  support  the 
efforts  of  the  more  rapid  arms  and  complete  their  action.  It 
should  be  careful,  as  soon  as  it  is  overtaken  by  them,  not  to 
fire  in  such  a  way  as  to  interfere  with  their  operations  or  to  hit 
them.  It  collects  the  prisoners  and  conducts  them  to  the  rear, 
surrounds  resisting  detachments  in  order  to  make  them  sur- 
render, and  seizes  such  batteries  or  convoys  as  it  is  able  to 
catch  up  with.  It  ensures  the  occupation  and  retention  of  the 
terrain,  and  forms  a  rampart  to  whose  shelter  the  other  arms 
can  fall  back,  in  case  there  is  a  retour  offensif  or  a  counter- 
attack. 

The  field  artillery,  by  dint  of  a  judicious  choice  of  observa- 
tion posts  and  constant  maintenance  of  its  liaison  with  the 
front  ranks  can  immediately  bring  hostile  concentrations  under 
its  fire,  cut  off  the  retreat  of  pursued  detachments,  and  de- 
stroy batteries  or  units  in  deplacement.  The  heavy  artillery 
directs  its  fire  upon  villages,  crossroads,  railway-stations,  and 
railways  still  in  the  enemy's  hands.  Artillerymen  cannot  take 
too  many  precautions  in  order  to  avoid  mistakes  which  might 
paralyze  the  pursuit. 

Aviators  contribute  effectively  to  the  destruction  and 
demoralization  of  the  retreating  troops;  some  by  directing  the 
fire  of  the  batteries  upon  objectives  which  have  escaped  the 
sight  of  observers  on  the  ground;  others  by  bombarding 
columns  on  the  march,  batteries  in  deplacement,  cantonments 
of  reserves,  workmen  organizing  a  new  position,  troops  in- 
tended for  the  defense,  railways  stations,  and  railways.  If  the 
enemy's  artillery  is  silenced  and  if  the  fighting  planes  protect 
them  well,  they  can  fly  low  and  accomplish  much. 

[138] 


PURSUIT 

Thus  by  means  of  the  action  of  the  different  arms  the  task 
of  the  infantry  is  facilitated;  but  the  infantry  alone  has  the 
means  of  reaping  the  benefit  of  the  disorganization  which 
has  been  attained.  After  long  waiting  it  has  its  innings;  after 
toilsome  and  bloody  days  it  wins  easy  successes  which  raise  its 
spirits  to  a  high  pitch  of  enthusiasm. 

Taking  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  lines  is  a  logical  conse- 
quence of  the  carrying  of  a  position  and  of  the  pursuit  of  its 
occupants.  It  is  the  attacking  of  new  positions  on  three  sides 
instead  of  on  one.  Its  aim  is  the  enlargement  of  the  breach, 
the  breaking-up  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  the  successive  crush- 
ing of  the  forces  which  defend  it.  It  is  carried  out  bit  by  bit 
and  its  execution  is  entrusted  to  fresh  troops. 

The  cavalry  plays  the  principal  part  in  this  expansion  of  the 
battle.  Seeking  for  free  ground  beyond  the  conquered  posi- 
tion, it  spreads  out  broadly  behind  the  enemy's  trenches,  so  as 
to  interrupt  communications,  prevent  the  arrival  of  fresh  sup- 
plies of  men,  food,  and  munitions,  and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the 
defenders. 

In  the  accomplishment  of  this  task,  the  cavalry  displays  a 
boldness  which  exposes  it  to  great  dangers,  but  which  is  fruitful 
in  important  results. 

Under  its  protection,  the  motor  cannon  and  the  motor 
machine  guns  are  enabled  to  advance  to  places  from  which 
they  fire  upon  isolated  points  of  resistance,  upon  troops  in 
deplacement,  upon  batteries  in  position,  upon  concentrations, 
and  upon  convoj'S.  They  have  some  chance  of  escaping  from 
the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  still  in  action  owing  to  the 
proximity  of  his  trenches  and  of  his  infantry;  nevertheless, 
their  task  is  as  dangerous  as  that  of  the  cavalry. 

[139] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

The  infantry  alone  is  able,  as  in  the  pursuit  of  troops  from  a 
position,  to  complete  the  results  obtained  and  to  occupy  the 
terrain.  Its  attack  on  the  rear  of  the  position  is  developed 
according  to  the  usual  rules,  but  with  differences  of  detail;  it 
has  to  execute  a  march  of  approach  during  which  it  must  itself 
ensure  the  protection  of  its  flank  and  rear;  it  does  not  require 
so  intense  an  artillery  preparation,  since  it  encounters  almost 
no  accessory  defenses. 

The  artillery,  placed  at  properly  chosen  points  in  the  occu- 
pied terrain,  supports  the  other  arms,  particularly  the  infan- 
try, when  it  attacks;  it  seizes  every  occasion  to  destroy  or  to 
disperse  the  enemy. 

The  maintenance  of  liaisons  of  every  kind  is  the  more  care- 
fully to  be  watched  in  proportion  as  it  becomes  more  difficult; 
the  slightest  remissness  may  entail  irreparable  errors,  particu- 
larly in  artillery  fire.  It  should  be  noted  that  there  are  in 
operation  not  only  heavy  pieces  and  also  some  of  the  field- 
pieces  originally  designed  to  batter  the  occupied  position,  but 
also  all  the  artillery  facing  the  trenches  taken  in  the  rear.  If 
precise  and  frequent  information  is  not  sent  to  the  Command, 
if  the  observing  stations  and  the  aviators  are  not  careful  to 
report  the  movements  of  troops,  the  projectiles  intended  for 
the  enemy  may  have  the  result  of  delaying  the  advance. 

The  role  of  the  Command,  limited  during  the  attack  to  that 
of  a  spectator  desirous  of  full  information,  becomes  more 
active  in  the  pursuit. 

The  duty  of  the  commander  of  an  army  corps  entrusted 
with  carrying  a  position  is  to  give  an  account  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  army,  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  of  the 
progress  of  events.  This  task  is  easy  because  of  the  relative 
certainty  of  the  telephonic  and  telegraphic  communications 

[140] 


PURSUIT 

established  between  the  large  units.  In  accordance  with  this 
information,  the  High  Command  gives  orders  relative  to  the 
pursuit  of  troops  driven  from  position,  and  later  to  the  taking 
in  the  rear  of  the  adjacent  troops. 

The  pursuit  of  troops  driven  from  the  position  may  be  en- 
trusted to  reserves  belonging  to  the  army  corps  which  has 
carried  out  the  attack.  But  the  taking  in  the  rear  of  adjacent 
troops  is  really  a  new  attack,  requiring  new  forces;  it  is  only 
developed  in  accordance  with  available  means. 

The  advance  of  the  victor,  in  depth  as  well  as  in  width, 
must  be  limited  by  well-defined  instructions  and  by  clearly 
determined  objectives.  While  necessarily  bold  and  rapid,  it 
must  be  methodical  and  certain.  For  that  purpose  com- 
manders of  the  units  involved  must  go  forward  at  the  same 
time  as  their  troops;  not  only  will  they  thus  be  more  fully  and 
quickly  informed,  but  they  themselves  will  understand  the 
situation  better,  and  be  able  to  make  use  of  all  those  qualities 
of  quick  observation,  decision,  and  character  by  which  they 
have  justified  their  right  to  command. 

It  is  by  trusting  to  the  value  of  their  information,  to  the 
acuteness  of  their  judgment,  and  to  the  ingenuity  of  their 
arrangements,  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  is  able  to  throw 
in  at  this  point  the  reserves  necessary  to  complete  the  local 
success  and  transform  it  into  a  brilliant  victory. 

These  reserves  are  distributed  in  proportion  to  the  difficulty 
and  importance  of  the  tasks  to  be  accomplished;  on  some 
occasions  they  all  come  in  together  under  the  command  of  a 
leader  assigned  to  them;  on  others  they  participate  in  the 
work  of  a  large  unit  already  in  fine,  as,  for  example,  by  taking 
in  the  rear  a  position  which  this  unit  is  attacking  from  the 
front. 

[141] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

All  the  troops  in  a  battle  thus  enlarged  are  placed  under 
the  orders  of  a  Commander-in-Chief;  he  knows  the  end  to  be 
attained  and  the  size  of  the  forces  on  which  he  can  count,  and 
he  determines  the  sphere  of  activity  of  each  of  his  subordi- 
nates. 

The  inrush  of  many  troops  upon  a  relatively  restricted  posi- 
tion and  their  passage  through  the  same  breach  before  it  is 
fully  opened  up  are  operations  all  the  more  delicate  because 
the  rapidity  of  their  execution  is  indispensable  to  success. 
The  Command  regulates  their  transportation  by  railway  and 
automobile,  their  crossing  over  into  the  zone  of  trenches,  and 
their  debouching  towards  the  indicated  objectives,  in  such  a 
way  that  the  flow  of  men  shall  correspond  with  the  urgency  of 
the  operations. 

The  order  and  speed  of  these  movements  depend  in  great 
measure  on  the  manner  in  which  the  attack  has  been  prepared 
and  carried  out.  Every  measure  intended  to  facilitate  the 
sending  forward  of  troops  commanded  to  take  the  position  is  a 
help  to  those  who  follow  them.  The  knowledge  of  the  terrain 
acquired  by  the  units  of  attack  must,  moreover,  be  utilized. 
Finally,  trustworthy  guides  in  sufficient  numbers,  provided  by 
these  units,  are  more  valuable  than  any  topographical  de- 
scription or  any  sign  post,  to  ensure  the  rapid  bringing  up  of 
the  reserves. 

The  supply  of  food  and  munitions  is  provided  for  and  over- 
seen by  the  Command ;  it  is  facilitated  by  measures  previously 
adopted.  The  arrival  of  ammunition  when  required,  particu- 
larly for  the  artillery,  takes  precedence  of  every  other  need. 
Victory  goes  to  that  one  of  the  adversaries  whose  projectiles 
are  exhausted  last. 

[142] 


CHAPTER  V 


MARCH  OF  APPROACH 


The  object  of  the  march  of  approach  is  to  bring  troops  within 
assaulting  distance  of  a  position,  without  incurring  losses. 

When  an  attack  starts  from  the  first  line  trenches,  there  is 
of  course  no  march  of  approach  for  the  first  waves;  for  the 
later  waves  and  for  the  reserves,  it  is  reduced  to  the  operation 
which  is  called  "  advancing  through  the  boyaux." 

But  when  the  attack  is  the  immediate  sequel  to  other 
operations,  the  march  of  approach  assumes  a  different  aspect. 

After  taking  the  position,  the  troops  sent  forward  in  pur- 
suit may  encounter,  either  at  the  beginning  of  their  progress 
or  after  they  have  advanced  some  miles,  a  second  position, 
previously  organized. 

If,  by  a  bold  surprise  attack,  they  succeed  in  taking  it,  its 
occupation  is  accomplished  with  all  possible  speed,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  usual  rules. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  encounter  a  vigorous  and  obsti- 
nate resistance,  their  only  means  of  overcoming  it  is  a  new 
attack,  whose  importance  may  equal  or  surpass  that  of  the 
previous  one,  and  whose  execution  requires  a  new  prepara- 
tion. The  Command  is  the  sole  judge  when  the  moment  is 
ripe  for  this  attack.  As  soon  as  it  is  decided  upon,  it  necessi- 
tates a  march  of  approach  between  the  position  already  cap- 
tured, and  the  one  that  still  remains  to  be  taken. 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

The  preparation  of  the  approach  is  designed  to  ensure,  during 
the  march  of  the  troops,  relative  security,  a  constant  direction, 
and  perfect  order. 

It  constitutes  the  initial  act  of  an  eventual  attack  and  has, 
for  just  that  reason,  a  considerable  bearing  upon  its  success. 
Troops  badly  started  find  difficulties  to  overcome;  whereas, 
once  well  launched,  they  go  straight  on  to  victory. 

The  fresh  troops  who  have  been  sent  forward  in  pursuit  are 
generally  entrusted  with  the  new  attack.  For  reserves,  they 
have  the  troops  who  have  carried  out  the  previous  attack  and 
who  have  been  re-formed  in  the  conquered  position,  until  the 
arrival  of  other  units  to  whom  the  Command  may  assign  this 
task.  The  principles  and  the  procedure  according  to  which 
they  execute  their  march  of  approach  are  applicable  to  all 
other  troops. 

The  question  of  speed,  essential  in  pursuit,  is  important 
in  the  approach;  but  it  is  subordinated  to  two  other  con- 
ditions —  the  safety  of  the  troops,  and  the  determination  of 
the  directions  in  which  they  are  to  go.  Whereas  in  the  pur- 
suit, the  troops  expose  themselves  boldly  in  order  to  overtake 
the  enemy,  and  capture  with  a  rush  such  objectives  as  they 
may  chance  to  discover  in  their  advance,  in  the  march  of 
approach  they  must  take  every  precaution  to  arrive  intact  at 
assaulting  distance,  and  from  the  outset  make  for  definitely 
determined  objectives. 

Previous  study  of  the  position  is  the  surest  way  of  obviating 
unnecessary  losses;  it  permits  a  choice  of  suitable  itineraries, 
and  an  avoidance  of  dangerous  changes  of  direction.  It  is 
made  by  means  of  every  kind  of  information  gathered  by  the 
Command.  Photographs  by  the  aviators  furnish  the  most 
precise  data.    The  advanced  elements  of  the  pursuit  check  up 

[144] 


MARCH  OF  APPROACH 

these  data;  in  the  exceptional  case  of  war  of  movement,  this 
task  is  performed  by  scouting  parties  of  cavalry,  and  the  fore- 
most elements  of  the  covering  troops.  These  last,  by  their  bold 
dashes,  manage  to  determine  the  contours  of  the  position,  the 
best  routes  of  access,  the  weakest  points,  and  the  morale  of 
the  defenders.  All  this  information,  coordinated  with  that  sup- 
plied by  the  maps  of  the  country,  by  observations  taken  on 
the  ground,  and  by  prisoners  and  deserters,  gives  a  general  idea 
of  the  forces  and  means  necessary  to  approach  and  to  carry 
the  position. 

The  Command  can  then  assign  to  each  unit  its  task,  deter- 
mine its  itinerary,  and  indicate  its  objective.  Before  starting 
out  on  the  march,  each  unit  has  its  route  reconnoitred  and 
places  itself  squarely  opposite  its  objective  in  order  to  avoid 
irresolution  and  delays,  as  well  as  changes  of  direction  under 
fire. 

These  dispositions  do  not  give  sufficient  security  to  the 
infantry  if  they  are  not  supplemented  by  the  installation  of 
batteries.  The  infantry  cannot  defend  itself  by  its  fire  either 
against  rifles  and  machine  guns,  or  against  cannon;  it  looks 
solely  to  its  own  artillery  for  protection,  which  must  therefore 
be  ready  to  extend  in  front  of  it  the  curtain  of  fire  under  cover 
of  which  it  advances. 

The  execution  of  the  approach,  facilitated  by  a  careful  prep- 
aration, may  be  rapid,  and  may  be  the  prelude  to  a  victorious 
assault. 

Each  division  of  infantry  advances  in  its  assigned  zone. 

When  the  distance  which  separates  the  conquered  position 
from  that  still  to  be  taken  is  considerable,  the  infantry  should 
march  with  cavalry  protection,  in  route  columns,  extended  as 

[145] 


ATTACK   ON  A  POSITION 

much  as  possible.  In  the  first  line  divisions  the  artillery  does 
not  march  in  the  lead,  but  only  sends  forward  its  reconnais- 
sance personnel,  with  the  telegraphic  and  telephonic  equipment. 
In  the  second  line  divisions,  on  the  contrary,  the  artillery  itself 
should  take  the  lead,  so  that  it  may  be  immediately  drawn  up 
in  line.  The  information  centres  which  communicate  with  the 
airplanes  are  moved  forward  by  sudden  rushes. 

When  the  distance  between  the  two  positions  is  not  great  or 
when  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  is  dangerous,  the  infantry 
deploys  and  advances  from  cover  to  cover;  it  does  its  utmost 
to  effect  the  rapid  seizure  and  immediate  organization  of 
points  which  might  be  used  for  observing  stations. 

The  infantry  is  formed,  as  for  an  attack,  in  successive  waves, 
the  contiguous  units  of  which  are  echeloned  in  depth.  But 
the  first  waves,  instead  of  being  lines  of  skirmishers,  are  lines 
of  small  columns;  such  a  formation  is  less  vulnerable,  permits 
changes  of  direction  to  be  effected  with  less  risk  in  case  of 
mistakes  in  defining  the  objectives,  gives  greater  facilities  for 
manoeuvering  if  occasion  arises,  and  frees  the  troops  from 
the  temptation  of  useless  firing. 

The  advanced  elements  of  the  pursuit,  who  have  held  their 
ground  in  order  to  continue  their  observations,  permit  them- 
selves to  be  passed  by  the  infantry,  and  transmit  to  it  all  the 
information  acquired;  they  then  fall  back  under  its  protection. 

The  infantry  gains  ground  little  by  little;  it  stops  only  to 
rest,  since  its  fire  is  ineffective.  It  is  constantly  protected  by 
the  artillery,  which  watches  its  progress  and  maintains  liaison 
with  it.  It  is  accompanied  by  machine  guns  and  by  all  the 
movable  trench  artillery;  the  advance  of  this  artillery  and  of 
the  various  accompanying  pieces  is  regulated  in  accordance 

[146] 


MARCH  OF  APPROACH 

with  the  amount  of  ammunition  which  can  follow  without  diffi- 
culty, for  they  should  not  be  impeded  by  those  pieces  which  it  is 
impossible  to  keep  supplied. 

If  a  part  of  the  field  artillery  has  remained  in  its  original 
position,  it  moves  forward.  As  to  the  heavy  artillery,  which  is 
difficult  to  move,  it  does  not  make  its  arrangements  to  advance 
until  the  attack  has  progressed  beyond  the  point  where  it  is 
able  to  support  it.  When  the  amount  of  material  available 
permits,  the  Command  keeps  heavy  pieces  upon  motor  tractors 
and  railways  in  readiness  to  accompany  the  forward  move- 
ment, as  soon  as  the  state  of  the  pursuit  makes  it  probable 
that  it  can  be  continued. 

Advances  of  artillery  are  generally  effected  by  echelons, 
according  to  the  same  rules  as  are  followed  in  a  pursuit.  They 
are  effected  at  night  by  reconnoitred  and  prepared  itineraries; 
but  they  can  often  be  carried  out  in  the  daytime,  before  the 
enemy  has  had  time  to  get  himself  in  hand  again. 

Indeed,  the  attack  on  a  position  ought  to  be  hurried,  so  as  to 
have  better  chances  of  success.  Furthermore,  while  the  infan- 
try advances,  an  intense  artillery  fire  is  delivered  with  the  two- 
fold purpose  of  protecting  its  march  and  preparing  its  assault. 

The  adjusting  planes  cooperate  with  the  batteries,  while 
the  scouting  planes  continue  to  gather  information  concerning 
the  disposition  of  the  enemy. 

The  engineers  work  hard  at  the  improvement  and  security 
of  the  roads  intended  for  the  reserves,  the  heavy  artillery,  and 
ammunition. 

As  soon  as  the  first  waves  are  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  and  machine  guns,  they  deploy  as  skir- 
mishers in  order  to  continue  their  march.    As  the  distance 

[147] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

grows  shorter,  their  progress  becomes  more  difficult  and  is 
accomplished  by  the  quick  rushes  of  elements  of  different 
sizes,  advancing  from  cover  to  cover;  the  N.  C.  Os.  see  to 
it  that  a  relative  alignment  is  maintained,  so  that  the  waves 
remain  solidly  constituted.  The  artillery  pieces  assigned  to 
the  infantry  battalions  and  the  machine  guns  accompany  the 
first  wave,  so  as  to  facilitate  its  march  and  to  prepare  for  its 
assault. 

When  it  has  arrived  at  assaulting  distance,  the  first  wave 
re-forms  and  takes  cover  behind  natural  obstacles  and  in 
hastily-dug  individual  entrenchments.  The  artillery  opens 
fire  energetically  against  the  position,  as  do  also  the  infantry 
cannon,  the  machine  guns,  and  other  accompanying  pieces, 
so  as  to  destroy  the  supplementary  defenses,  demolish  the 
parapets,  and  either  kill  or  terrorize  the  occupants.  The 
scouts  and  the  observers  carefully  watch  the  effects  produced 
by  this  preparation  upon  the  various  points  of  the  line.  As 
soon  as  it  is  considered  sufficient,  notice  is  given  the  artillery 
to  increase  its  range  at  a  given  signal  or  at  a  given  moment. 
This  signal  or  moment  is  that  of  the  assault. 

If  the  assault  fails  and  cannot  be  quickly  renewed  with 
chances  of  success,  there  begins  a  period  of  stationary  fighting; 
trenches  must  then  be  organized. 

The  role  of  the  High  Command,  when  the  combat  is  thus 
enlarged,  increases  progressively  in  importance.  The  generals 
in  command  of  army  groups  and  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
who  have  already  issued  general  directions  in  regard  to  the 
pursuit,  must  now  make  more  definite  decisions,  and  issue 
orders  for  attack. 

While  the  troops  told  off  to  capture  the  second  position 
perform  their  march  of  approach,  others  proceed  to  take  in 

[148] 


MARCH  OF  APPROACH 

the  rear  the  positions  adjacent  to  the  first  one.  A  battle  of 
large  extent  begins.  If  the  second  position  is  carried,  a  deci- 
sive victory  is  in  sight.  The  chance  must  not  be  allowed  to 
escape;  the  fruit  of  patient,  prolonged,  and  bloody  efforts  must 
not  be  lost  at  the  last  moment.  To  this  end,  the  High  Com- 
mand sees  to  it  that  the  battle  front  is  well  supplied  with  men 
and  ammunition,  while  at  the  same  time  it  limits  the  efforts 
made  at  other  points  in  the  line  and  even  confines  them 
strictly  to  the  defensive. 

The  responsibility  assumed  is  crushing,  but  the  task  to  be 
accomplished  is  magnificent.  Every  organism  in  the  army 
comes  into  play  and  works  without  respite.  The  railways  and 
motor  trucks  convey  the  reserves,  the  heavy  artillery,  muni- 
tions, and  food,  whose  immediate  forwarding  or  temporary 
maintenance  are  carefully  regulated.  Every  service  is  engaged 
in  this  task,  according  to  the  instructions  of  the  Command. 

In  the  general  advance,  the  forwarding  of  heavy  artillery 
often  presents  great  difficulties;  it  must,  however,  be  accom- 
plished whatever  the  cost,  so  as  not  to  expose  victorious  troops 
to  the  risk  of  being  definitively  held  up.  At  this  stirring  mo- 
ment more  than  at  any  other,  a  close  liaison  must  be  main- 
tained between  the  different  arms,  so  as  to  ensure  continuity 
of  movement  and  to  make  the  most  of  the  success  obtained. 

The  infantry  is  powerless  to  extend  the  radius  of  its  action 
and  to  maintain  its  advance,  unless  it  be  faithfully  followed  up 
not  only  by  the  field  artillery,  but  also  by  the  heavy  artillery. 
It  may  be  victorious  over  a  fleeing  or  demoralized  adversary, 
when  supported  only  by  field  artillery;  but  it  is  doomed  to 
failure  when,  without  heavy  artillery  at  its  disposal,  it  hurls 
itself  against  strongly  organized  positions.  Even  if  it  carries 
these  positions,  at  the  price  of  costly  efforts,  it  will  neverthe- 

[149] 


ATTACK  ON  A  POSITION 

less  be  obliged  to  evacuate  them  and  fall  back  again  under  the 
sheltering  wing  of  this  indispensable  ally. 

The  rapidity  of  marches  of  approach  and  of  assaults  may 
hamper  the  enemy's  artillery  in  its  fire  for  a  short  time,  owing 
to  its  uncertainty  regarding  the  respective  positions  of  the  two 
adversaries;  but  this  period  of  uncertainty  cannot  continue 
indefinitely,  particularly  if  the  enemy's  artillery,  in  order  to 
save  a  dangerous  situation,  does  not  scruple  to  fire  on  its  own 
men. 

The  rapidity  of  the  assailant's  success  or  the  skill  of  his 
manoeuvers  may  place  the  enemy's  heavy  artillery  in  danger 
and  may  even  result  in  its  capture.  In  that  case  the  field 
artillery  once  more  plays  the  principal  part. 

The  successive  positions,  moreover,  are  naturally  in  less  and 
less  close  lateral  connection,  which  permits  of  manoeuvering; 
they  are  also  less  and  less  organized,  which  facilitates  attack. 
In  fact  the  war  of  movement  begins  again. 

The  army  which  has  been  able  to  bring  this  about  has 
already  won  the  victory.  It  devotes  itself  wholly  to  following 
up  its  success  with  those  means  which  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  thenceforth  distributes  with  lavish  hand. 


[150] 


PART  IV 
DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 


CHAPTER  I 

GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS  ON  DEFENSIVE 
FIGHTING 

The  defense  of  a  position  aims  to  oppose  the  progress  of  the 
enemy,  until  such  time  as  it  be  possible  to  change  over  to  the 
offensive. 

It  is  rendered  necessary  either  by  the  need  of  awaiting  favor- 
able circumstances  and  sufficient  material  means  for  attack, 
or  by  the  decision  to  hold  certain  parts  of  the  front  with  a 
minimum  of  troops,  so  as  to  be  able  to  make  a  more  con- 
siderable effort  elsewhere. 

When  the  defensive  goes  on  with  no  other  symptoms  than 
rifle  fire,  bombardment,  reconnaissances,  patrols,  mining,  and 
raids,  it  becomes  a  mere  process  of  stationary  fighting  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  enemy;  it  is  simply  "  trench  warfare  "  over 
again.  When  it  is  opposed  to  a  methodical  and  stubborn 
attack,  delivered  by  the  enemy  with  every  resource  at  his 
command,  it  is  "  defensive  combat." 

Defensive  combat  extends  over  that  part  of  the  front 
which  is  attacked  by  the  enemy,  that  is  to  say,  over  one  or 
more  contiguous  positions. 

The  study  of  its  development  in  any  one  of  these  enables  us 
to  grasp  it  in  its  entirety.  This  development  includes,  as 
successive  phases: 

[153] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

The  organization  of  the  defense; 

The  defense  of  the  position; 

The  retreat,  when  the  enemy  is  victorious; 

The  retour  offensif,  designed  to  retake  the  lost  terrain. 

The  immediate  aim  of  defensive  combat  is  the  holding  of 
the  position  in  spite  of  every  attack;  but  it  is  intimately 
bound  up  with  the  general  aim  which  dominates  every  act  of 
war  —  namely,  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  army.  The 
commander  in  charge  of  the  defense,  while  always  energetically 
maintaining  Ins  hold  on  the  terrain  entrusted  to  his  protection, 
seeks  to  inflict  the  heaviest  possible  losses  upon  the  attacking 
troops,  and  to  diminish  the  general  capacity  of  the  adver- 
sary for  future  fighting;  he  thus  prepares  the  way  for  the 
victorious  offensive  of  the  morrow. 


[154] 


CHAPTER  II 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DEFENSE 

Defensive  combat  takes  place  in  the  position  on  which  the 
troops  have  been  established,  sometimes  for  many  months. 

It  is  the  sudden  realization  of  an  event  constantly  antici- 
pated. It  should  not,  therefore,  involve  any  special  prepara- 
tion; in  the  first  place,  because  such  preparation  is  being 
made  every  day  during  the  time  of  stationary  fighting;  and 
also  because  the  enemy's  attack  is  generally  in  the  nature  of  a 
surprise. 

An  attack,  nevertheless,  does  not  take  place  until  significant 
symptoms  have  indicated  its  imminence  to  attentive  observers. 

The  accumulation  of  batteries  of  artillery,  the  labor  neces- 
sary to  install  them,  the  activity  of  the  air  service,  the  great 
number  of  trains  bringing  troops  and  supplies  of  all  kinds,  the 
massing  of  reserves  in  the  cantonments  and  bivouacs  close  to 
the  front — no  one  of  these  symptoms  should  escape  the  watch- 
ful eyes  of  the  aviators. 

The  preparatory  work  carried  on  by  the  enemy's  first  line — 
saps,  mines,  departure  parallels,  openings  in  the  accessory 
defenses  —  are  discovered  by  the  sappers  and  engineers,  by 
the  artillery  observers,  and  by  the  watchers  and  the  patrols, 
whose  vigilance  must  never  relax. 

Prisoners  and  deserters,  who  have  seen  the  preparations 
and  who  often  have  on  their  persons  instructions  from  their 

[155] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

commanders,  furnish  valuable  information  and  a  means  of 
verifying  what  has  already  been  learned. 

Finally,  an  intense  artillery  preparation,  often  lasting 
several  days,  precedes  the  assault  on  the  position. 

As  soon  as  there  is  prospect  of  an  attack,  the  troops  occupy- 
ing the  position  are  notified.  They  redouble  their  watch- 
fulness and  their  precautions.  Their  commanders  of  every 
rank  take  all  the  necessary  measures  to  enable  them  to  fulfill 
their  tasks. 

The  troops  maintain  their  organization  and  perform  their 
regular  duties  in  accordance  with  the  usual  rules,  but  are 
specially  forewarned  against  the  effects  of  a  surprise.  There 
are  also  certain  measures  which  will  render  them  even  better 
prepared  for  the  ensuing  struggle;  these  have  to  do  with  the 
detailed  study  of  the  two  opposing  positions,  with  the  material 
aminagement  of  the  position,  and  with  the  physical  and  moral 
preparedness  of  the  troops.  Lastly,  the  Command  must  not 
forget  any  of  the  duties  which  fall  to  its  lot. 

The  detailed  study  of  the  two  opposing  positions  is  carried 
out  in  advance  by  all  the  troops  which  may  be  called  upon  to 
fight  on  this  terrain.  It  is  as  advantageous  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  defense  as  for  that  of  the  attack. 

As  regards  the  position  to  be  defended,  this  study  helps  in 
attaining  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  various  routes;  in 
consequence,  it  facilitates  rapid  execution  of  reliefs,  avoidance 
of  dangerous  passages,  the  bringing  of  immediate  assistance  to 
contiguous  units,  the  reinforcement  of  menaced  points  with- 
out hesitation  or  delay,  withdrawals  with  avoidance  of  losses, 
and  successful  execution  of  counter-attacks  or  retour  offensifs, 
even  at  night. 

[156] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DEFENSE 

As  regards  the  opposing  position,  it  facilitates  the  discovery 
of  the  enemy's  arrangements,  and  his  eventual  means  of 
attack;  it  makes  possible  the  anticipation  of  his  probable 
routes  of  access,  and  the  adjustment  of  the  barrage  fire  in 
advance,  the  determination  of  the  most  vulnerable  points  in 
his  line  and  the  preparation  of  counter-attacks,  the  location 
of  the  openings  made  in  his  accessory  defenses,  with  a  view  to 
bringing  them  under  machine-gun  fire. 

Furthermore,  the  study  of  the  two  positions  should  be  made 
as  for  an  attack,  not  only  by  consulting  the  maps  of  the  topog- 
raphers and  the  aviators,  but  also  by  personal  inspection  and 
traversing  of  the  trenches  themselves  in  every  direction,  and 
by  always  keeping  some  one  in  the  observing  stations. 

The  material  amenagement  of  the  position  consists  simply 
in  the  inspection  and  improvement  of  its  organization  during 
the  period  of  stationary  fighting.  These  are  effected  in  accord- 
ance with  the  latest  information  received  concerning  the 
enemy. 

In  the  advanced  part  of  the  position,  the  orders  to  be  given 
are  as  follows:  Inspect  daily  the  condition  of  the  accessory 
defenses,  restoring  as  soon  as  possible  those  which  have  been 
destroyed  or  impaired.  Rectify  any  parts  of  the  outline  of  the 
trench  which  cannot  be  held  without  exposing  their  defenders 
to  losses  disproportionate  to  the  advantages  gained,  or  which 
may  endanger  the  security  of  the  line.  Reinforce  the  guard 
and  observation  service.  Ascertain  whether  the  machine 
guns  can  take  under  flanking  and  enfilading  fire  those  zones 
which  the  enemy  must  cross.  Make  certain  by  actual  trial 
that  the  transference  of  the  machine  guns  from  their  shelters 
to  their  fire  emplacements  is  as  near  as  possible  instantaneous, 
and  that  their  mechanism  works  perfectly.    Dig  false  trenches, 

[157] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

and  cover  the  real  ones  with  camouflage  as  thoroughly  as  pos- 
sible so  as  to  dissipate  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  Main- 
tain a  complete  supply  of  munitions  of  all  sorts,  and  of  food. 
Strengthen  the  liaisons,  both  lateral  and  in  depth. 

The  liaisons  must  be  watched  with  particular  care  at  the 
points  of  junction  of  the  different  corps.  The  enemy  knows 
that  these  points  are  vulnerable,  in  consequence  of  the  divided 
command,  and  is  watching  them  carefully,  with  a  view  to 
attacking  there. 

In  the  interior  of  the  position,  the  following  measures  must 
be  taken:  Look  after  the  condition  of  the  observation  posts, 
shelters,  communicating  and  support  trenches,  and  make  others 
in  different  places,  if  need  be.  Make  sure  that  the  obligatory 
points  of  passage,  and  the  points  of  tactical  importance  can 
be  taken  under  the  fire  of  machine  guns  whose  shelters  are  in 
good  condition,  whose  firing  emplacements  have  been  recon- 
noitred, and  whose  crews  know  their  job.  Arrange  for  the 
supply  of  the  depots  for  munitions,  water,  and  food.  Construct 
new  access  and  evacuation  boyaux  in  view  of  the  possibility 
that  the  intensity  of  the  fight  may  render  them  necessary. 
Increase  the  number  of  sign  boards,  police  posts,  liaison  agents, 
and  guides;  this  will  ensure  good  order  and  rapidity  of  move- 
ment. Increase  also  the  number  of  places  d'armes  where 
reinforcing  and  relieving  troops  may  be  kept  near  the  line  of 
combat,  without  being  congested  or  exposed.  Prepare  all 
sorts  of  obstacles  and  means  of  resistance,  such  as  barricades 
for  the  boyaux,  stations  for  grenadiers,  etc.,  in  case  the  enemy 
should  break  into  the  trenches. 

As  regards  obstacles,  one  of  the  most  effective  consists  in 
wire  entanglements  on  the  reverse  slope;  these  cannot  be 
destroyed  by  artillery,  since  they  are  in  a  dead  angle;  more- 

[158] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DEFENSE 

over,  they  stop  the  progress  of  the  attackers,  who  are  either 
demoralized  at  encountering  them,  or  decimated  in  trying  to 
cross  them.  If  there  be  no  natural  reverse  slope,  it  is  a  good 
plan  to  prepare  an  artificial  one,  at  least  several  yards  wide. 

For  the  rear  of  the  position,  the  orders  to  be  gives  ar< 
follows:  Every  line  of  communication  used  in  forwarding 
troops,  ammunition,  and  food  must  be  kept  in  the  best  of 
condition.  Special  gangs  of  workmen  must  be  in  readiness 
to  keep  these  ways  in  repair;  they  will  be  subjected  to  ex- 
ceptionally heavy  strain,  owing  to  the  violence  of  the  bom- 
bardment, and  the  great  amount  of  traffic.  With  regard  to 
railways,  these  should  be  double-tracked  and  extended  when 
necessary,  and  those  sections  which  are  specially  exposed  to 
the  enemy's  fire  should  be  shifted  so  as  to  prevent  their  being 
cut.  Constant  watch  should  be  kept  on  the  general  circula- 
tion, remembering  that  the  necessities  of  the  defense  take  pre- 
cedence of  everything  else. 

In  general,  a  close  cooperation  of  the  different  arms,  each 
fulfilling  its  proper  function,  tends  to  create  an  organism  which 
leaves  nothing  to  chance;  the  administrative  departments, 
especially  the  sanitary  service,  whose  activities  may  saye  so 
many  lives,  should  make  every  effort  to  prevent  being  inter- 
rupted in  their  work. 

The  physical  and  moral  preparation  of  the  troops  takes  a 
long  time,  and  grows  more  and  more  arduous  with  the  approach 
of  defensive  combat. 

The  troops  assigned  for  relief,  and  more  especially  those 
detailed  for  counter-attacks,  will  recover  their  agility,  their 
spirits,  and  their  vigor  in  the  cantonments  or  bivouacs  to  the 
rear  of  the  position;  they  in  their  turn  take  the  places  of  those 

[159] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

who  have  been  in  the  trenches,  while  the  latter  seek  repose 
after  their  fatigues  and  losses. 

The  commanders  of  every  rank  try  to  raise  the  morale  of 
their  men  to  a  high  pitch,  and  quicken  their  patriotism;  they 
instill  into  them  the  idea  that  they  must  hold  the  position  en- 
trusted to  their  charge,  come  what  may,  and  let  themselves  be 
killed  on  the  spot  rather  than  allow  it  to  fall  into  the  enemy's 
hands. 

The  role  of  the  Command  consists  in  foreseeing  the  events 
which  may  arise,  and  in  taking  the  proper  steps  to  avoid  or  at 
least  to  limit  the  scope  of  a  reverse. 

The  commander  who  is  given  the  task  of  defending  a  posi- 
tion draws  up  a  plan  of  defense:  he  studies  the  situation  of 
the  enemy,  decides  upon  the  distribution  of  his  own  troops,  both 
laterally  and  in  depth,  assigns  their  duties  to  the  different  arms, 
and  estimates  what  reinforcements  may  become  necessary. 
He  should  not  only  prepare  to  resist  to  the  last,  but  must  also 
keep  in  mind  the  possibility  of  an  evacuation.  If  he  should  be 
forced  to  retreat  he  will  have  to  direct  his  troops  and  his 
materiel  to  a  position  in  the  rear,  so  as  to  be  able  to  make  a 
resistance  there,  with  the  support  of  fresh  troops.  This 
second  position  should  be  situated  four  or  five  miles  behind 
the  first,  so  as  not  to  be  in  range  of  the  same  artillery  fire,  and 
so  as  to  escape  the  possible  effects  of  asphyxiating  gas.  In 
case  such  a  position  has  not  been  previously  chosen,  and  in 
case  its  selection  and  organization  have  not  been  entrusted 
to  the  commander  of  the  first  one,  the  latter  should  ask  for 
orders  in  regard  to  it  from  the  responsible  commander  as  soon 
as  possible. 

The  commanders,  up  to  the  very  highest  rank,  should  deter- 
mine the  measures  to  be  taken  on  the  actual  ground  and  in 

[160] 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DEFENSE 

person;  their  presence,  their  advice,  and  their  observations 
infuse  into  everyone  a  desire  for  work,  and  a  dash  which  no 
written  word  or  telephone  message  can  hope  to  equal. 

Conscious  of  the  responsibility  weighing  upon  him,  the 
commander  never  takes  his  mind  off  the  task  with  which  he  is 
entrusted;  not  only  does  he  look  ahead  and  give  orders,  he 
sees  to  it  also  that  his  orders  are  carried  out.  He  should  bear 
in  mind  that  if  there  is  anything  lacking  in  the  organization  of 
a  position  in  winch  troops  have  been  stationed  for  a  long  time, 
it  is  because  their  commander  has  given  proof  of  incapacity, 
and  has  failed  in  the  performance  of  his  duty. 


[161] 


CHAPTER  III 

DEFENSE 

The  object  of  the  defense  is  to  drive  back  the  enemy  when 
he  attacks  the  position,  and  at  the  same  time  to  inflict  upon 
him  the  heaviest  possible  losses.  Not  only  does  it  thus  en- 
sure the  inviolability  of  the  front;  it  also  lowers  the 
adversary's  morale,  exhausts  his  strength  for  future  struggles, 
and  favors  the  offensive  either  at  the  place  defended  or  at 
some  other  point. 

The  maintenance  of  the  troops  under  bombardment  is 
the  first  phase  of  the  defense. 

This  phase  is  almost  wholly  passive,  at  least  for  the  in- 
fantry. It  consists  in  remaining  in  place,  in  spite  of  the 
shells  of  every  calibre  which  demolish  the  trenches,  break 
down  the  parapets,  destroy  the  accessory  defenses,  smash  in 
shelters,  blow  to  pieces  or  bury  their  occupants,  and  cut  com- 
munications with  the  rear.  The  morale  of  the  troops  prevents 
their  weakening  in  these  critical  circumstances,  and  enables 
them  uncomplainingly  to  occupy  ground  where  death  is 
everywhere;  the  ascendency  and  example  of  the  leaders  help 
greatly  in  maintaining  this  morale. 

During  the  lulls,  particularly  at  night,  the  infantry,  helped 
by  the  engineers,  hastens  to  repair  the  accessory  defenses,  to 
rebuild  the  parapets,  to  free  the  trenches,  and  to  reconstruct 
the  shelters  and  observation  posts;  it  sees  to  the  burial  of  the 
dead  and  to  the  evacuation  of  the  wounded. 

Artillery  alone  is  able  to  diminish  the  intensity  of  the  bom- 
bardment by  attempting  to  destroy  or  to  silence  the  enemy's 

[162] 


DEFENSE 

batteries.  Aided  by  the  observation-balloons  and  by  the 
fire-adjusting  planes,  the  heavy  and  field  artillery  make  every 
effort  to  accomplish  this  result. 

These  groups  ought  to  avoid  "zone  fire"  which  does  not 
serve  to  destroy  the  enemy's  pieces;  they  should  devote  their 
attentions  to  definitely  determined  "  nests  "  of  hostile  guns. 
They  may  use  special  toxic  or  lachrymatory  shells  for 
purpose  to  good  advantage,  in  order  to  neutralize  the  enemy's 
fire;  for  the  enemy's  artillerymen,  since  they  are  obliged  to 
seek  shelter  or  to  put  on  their  gas  masks,  are  thus  rendered 
incapable  of  serving  their  pieces  effectively. 

When  the  attack  seems  imminent,  as  is  indicated  by  move- 
ments taking  place  in  the  enemy's  lines,  the  artillery  carries 
out  a  counter-preparation,  which  may  be  very  effective  both 
upon  the  concentrations  which  have  been  pointed  out  and 
upon  the  trenches  in  which  the  assailants  are  massed. 

Since  the  enemy  frequently  uses  asphyxiating  gases  in  the 
periods  preparatory  to  his  attacks  —  the  defenders  of  the 
position  should  be  thoroughly  trained  in  the  means  of  pro- 
tecting themselves.  Strict  orders  oblige  officers  and  men  to 
have  their  masks  with  them  on  all  occasions,  ready  to  be  put 
on  —  even  when  they  are  several  miles  behind  the  fines;  for 
not  only  can  gas  waves  be  blown  a  considerable  distance  by 
the  wind,  but  also  asphyxiating  shells  can  carry  the  terrible 
poison  a  long  way.  Only  by  rigorous  discipline,  and  con- 
stantly reproving  the  natural  carelessness  of  the  men,  is  it 
possible  to  defend  their  lives  against  this  barbarous  practice, 
specifically  forbidden  in  treaties.1 

1  The  use  of  these  methods  was  forbidden,  as  contrary  to  the  laws  of 
humanity,  by  (1)  the  Declaration  of  Petrograd  (11  Dec,  1S68)  and  (2)  the 
Declaration  of  the  Hague  (29  July,  1899),  signed  and  ratified  by  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey. 

[163] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

The  defense  of  the  first  line  is  ensured  by  close  coopera- 
tion between  infantry,  machine  guns,  and  artillery. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy's  real  attack  (not  merely  a  trial 
wave)  leaves  its  trench,  it  is  greeted  with  a  barrage  fire  from 
those  batteries  which  have  been  given  the  task  of  stopping  it. 
Other  batteries  fire  upon  reinforcements  as  they  move  forward 
and  upon  reserves  at  their  stations.  Isolated  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, or  even  advanced  batteries,  which  until  then  have  kept 
silent  so  as  not  to  run  the  risk  of  premature  destruction,  un- 
mask themselves  at  the  opportune  moment,  and  open  fire 
upon  the  advancing  masses;  pieces  which  move  on  rails  are 
specially  valuable  for  this  purpose,  since  they  can  be  taken  to 
desired  points  in  a  few  minutes,  and  then  be  put  in  shelter  as 
soon  as  their  task  is  fulfilled. 

The  defenders  of  the  first  line,  sheltered  as  completely  as 
possible  during  the  bombardment,  are  notified  by  their  watchers 
as  soon  as  the  enemy  begins  his  advance.  Then  instantly 
rifles  and  machine  guns  are  mounted  in  the  remaining  ele- 
ments of  the  trenches,  the  shell-holes,  and  mounds  of  earth 
which  constitute  the  line.  The  infantrymen,  who  have  been 
careful  always  to  keep  their  arms  in  good  condition,  and  to 
prepare  sheltered  positions  from  which  to  fire  upon  their 
assailants,  breathe  more  freely  because  the  enemy's  artillery 
is  obliged  to  lengthen  its-  range.  The  machine-gun  crews 
immediately  come  into  action,  and  try  to  take  the  enemy 
in  flank  or  in  enfilade,  adjusting  their  fire  calmly;  the  riflemen 
take  deliberate  aim,  at  a  distance  and  under  conditions  in 
which  every  bullet  should  tell. 

If  the  enemy's  troops,  despite  their  losses,  reach  the  acces- 
sory defenses,  they  encounter  an  obstacle  which,  notwith- 
standing its  partial  destruction,  is  generally  not  to  be  despised ; 

[164] 


DEFENSE 

it  causes  delays  in  their  march  and  disorder  in  their  ranks, 
and  diverts  their  attention  from  their  real  objective.  The 
machine-gun  crews  and  the  infantrymen  seize  this  moment 
to  finish  their  work  of  destruction;  the  grenadiers  render 
them  great  assistance  by  throwing  their  hand  grenades  among 
the  assailants,  who  are  in  difficulties  with  the  deoris  of  the 
wire-entanglements.  When  the  survivors  of  the  wav< 
assaulting  columns  reach  the  immediate  vicinity  of  t  he  t  renches 
they  are  bayoneted;  but  they  are  often  so  few  in  number, 
so  demoralized,  or  so  worn  out,  that  they  surrender;  in  this 
event,  they  are  immediately  sent  to  the  rear  and  questioned. 

Directly  any  element  of  the  trenches  falls  into  the  enemy's 
hands,  the  adjacent  elements  strive  to  inflict  losses  on  its 
occupants  and  to  surround  them.  A  retour  offensif  is 
attempted  as  quickly  as  possible,  before  the  enemy  has  had 
time  to  reorganize. 

Unity  of  purpose  constitutes  the  true  liaison  between  the 
troops.  Whereas  on  the  offensive  it  is  obtained  by  the  con- 
verging of  efforts  upon  the  objective,  it  is  realized  on  the  de- 
fensive by  the  common  will  to  resist  at  any  price,  and  to  retain 
the  terrain  held. 

The  artillery,  in  addition  to  executing  barrage  fire  in  pre- 
determined directions,  may  also  take  the  attacking  lines  or 
columns  at  an  angle  or  in  enfilade;  it  must  not  let  such  a 
chance  escape.  Furthermore,  the  Command,  in  case  the  dis- 
tribution of  batteries  is  that  which  was  adopted  during  the 
period  of  stationary  fighting,  should  be  on  the  watch  to 
change  it  as  soon  as  the  enemy  attack  occurs.  New  groups 
are  constituted  with  reference  to  the  needs  of  the  defensive  as 
it  develops;  sometimes  they  can  be  provided  beforehand  in 
the  plan  of  defense. 

[16S] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

Fighting  in  the  interior  of  the  position  presents  cer- 
tain analogies  to  the  defense  of  the  first  line,  since  the  enemy 
attacks  successive  lines  defended  by  the  same  methods;  but  it 
differs  from  it  in  the  fact  that  the  lines  are  much  less  sharply 
marked,  and  that  the  enemy  is  scattered  about  in  a  number 
of  shelters  such  as  shell-holes  and  sections  of  boyaux. 

The  assailant  has  a  moral  advantage,  owing  to  his  first 
success;  but  he  is  under  the  disadvantage  of  fighting  on  un- 
known ground  full  of  traps,  where  the  defender  can  find  his 
way  about  without  any  hesitation,  even  at  night.  Fighting 
in  the  boyaux  is  full  of  dangers  and  surprises  for  anyone  who 
is  not  conversant  with  their  windings.  The  elements  of 
trenches  connecting  shell-holes  cannot  be  clearly  discerned  by 
the  aviators,  nor  taken  as  targets  by  the  artillery;  they  may 
even  be  hidden  from  the  infantry,  and,  especially  when  on  a 
reverse  slope,  they  may  constitute  formidable  obstacles. 

The  machine  guns  which  have  been  previously  installed  in 
the  communicating  and  support  trenches,  as  well  as  at  all 
important  points,  so  as  to  command  the  points  of  obligatory 
passages  at  an  angle  or  in  enfilade,  come  suddenly  into  action 
at  the  moment  when  the  target  they  are  awaiting  can  be  most 
advantageously  fired  upon;  they  inflict  upon  the  enemy  in  a 
short  space  of  time  enormous  losses,  whose  effect  is  as  great 
on  the  moral  as  on  the  material  side.  A  single  machine  gun, 
which  has  remained  unharmed  in  a  casemated  shelter,  can 
often  perform  the  greatest  services  if  it  is  served  by  a  brave 
and  active  crew;  it  can  stop  important  forces  in  their  ad- 
vance, until  the  moment  when  the  infantry  is  able  once  more 
to  resume  the  struggle. 

The  defending  troops  try  to  impede  the  advance  of  the 
assailants  by  means  of  counter-attacks.      These    counter- 

[166] 


DEFENSE 

attacks  are  delivered  by  fresh  troops.  They  are  thrown  for- 
ward at  the  moment  when  the  enemy  is  exhausted  by  his 
effort  and  tries  to  recover  his  breath  or  hesitates  in  hie  ad- 
vance. They  can  be  delivered  advantageously  at  night  In 
case  the  troops  employed  are  well  acquainted  with  the  i 
tion.  The  choice  of  the  moment,  which  is  of  great  importance 
for  the  success  of  these  counter-attacks,  is  left  to  the  judg- 
ment of  the  leader  who  orders  them  to  be  delivered. 

Counter-attacks,  instead  of  being  local,  may  be  launched 
from  a  neighboring  position  which  is  stronger  or  less  seven  ly 
attacked,  and  may  free  the  position  menaced  by  demoralizing 
the  enemy. 

In  any  case,  one  of  the  important  factors  of  success  is  the 
mutual  support  which  all  the  troops  in  line  give  one  another. 
This  support  is  easiest  to  effect  when  information  as  to  the 
situation  is  most  expeditiously  transmitted  and  when  all  the 
different  liaisons  are  best  maintained. 


[167] 


CHAPTER  IV 

RETREAT 

The  retreat  consists  in  abandoning,  by  order  of  the  Com- 
mand, either  a  part  of  the  position,  or  the  whole  of  it.  It 
includes  the  evacuation  both  of  men  and  of  the  materiel. 

It  is  usually  rendered  necessary  by  a  reverse  suffered  in  the 
position  itself  or  in  a  neighboring  position,  and  is  performed 
with  the  intention  of  retaking  the  evacuated  terrain  as  soon 
as  possible. 

Re-alignment  of  the  front  is  the  operation  of  retreat  per- 
formed voluntarily  over  a  certain  part  of  the  line,  in  order  to 
preserve  the  liaison  with  troops  which  have  suffered  a  check,  or 
to  improve  a  dangerous  tactical  situation.  It  constitutes  the 
means  either  of  reestablishing  an  enfeebled  resistance,  or  of 
avoiding  a  probable  reverse. 

When  the  line  has  been  driven  back  over  a  large  zone,  the 
army  which  has  been  thus  broken  permits  the  enemy  to  have 
complete  freedom  of  movement,  if  it  does  not  succeed  in  re- 
organizing itself  in  the  rear.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  the 
troops  occupying  the  zones  adjacent  to  that  which  has  given 
way  should  try  to  re-align  themselves  with  it.  These  troops 
fall  back  upon  positions  previously  organized,  which  form 
the  outline  of  the  new  barrier  opposed  to  the  enemy's  efforts. 
Similarly,  when,  for  whatever  reason,  certain  elements  of 
the  line  have  been  obliged  to  fall  back,  the  neighboring  ele- 
ments become  salients  dangerously  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
attack.    If  the  Command  considers  that  the  defense  of  these 

[168] 


RETREAT 

salients   involves   useless   sacrifices,   it   orders   them    to   be 
evacuated. 

There-alignment  of  the  front  which  has  been  thus  neces- 
sitated by  a  general  or  a  local  situation  should  be  effected 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy.  Prepared  quickly  bul 
carefully,  it  is  performed  at  night,  and  every  precaution  is 
taken  to  see  that  no  feature  of  it  arouses  suspicion  in  the 
opposite  trench.  It  becomes  a  very  much  more  delicate  affair 
if  hampered  by  a  sudden  attack,  or  by  an  intense  bomba  n  1- 
ment. 

The  difficulties  of  this  operation  consist  especially  in  the 
evacuation  of  the  artillery.  If  the  artillery  is  removed  gradu- 
ally, the  enemy,  noticing  the  progressive  diminution  in  the 
activity  of  the  fire,  may  decide  on  a  sudden  attack,  and  find 
the  infantry,  so  to  speak,  without  means  of  defense;  in  such 
cases  the  infantry  is  crushed.  If  the  artillery  is  not  removed 
till  the  last  moment,  there  results  a  congestion  along  the 
roads,  and  there  follows  a  critical  moment  during  which  a 
sudden  attack  by  a  watchful  enemy  may  cause  disaster;  the 
artillery  in  deplacement  is  captured,  and  the  infantry  is 
forced  to  seek  safety  in  hasty  flight. 

When  the  re-alignment  of  the  front  can  be  performed  un- 
observed, it  permits  of  traps  being  laid  for  the  enemy.  The 
commonest  of  these  consists  in  leaving  in  the  evacuated 
position  a  thin  advance-line  of  lightly  equipped  riflemen  and 
alert  engineers,  whose  task  is  to  divert  the  enemy's  attention. 
As  soon  as  a  hostile  attack  on  it  seems  about  to  begin,  the 
riflemen  rapidly  evacuate  the  position,  so  as  to  leave  the  coast 
clear  for  a  carefully-prepared  artillery-fire.  The  engineers 
increase  the  losses  caused  by  the  artillerymen  by  exploding,  at 
the  proper  moment,  previously  prepared  mines  and  fougades. 

[169] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

The  enemy  thus  pays  very  high  for  his  advance,  without 
causing  the  defenders  any  injury. 

Retreat  under  hostile  pressure  is  the  operation  per- 
formed as  the  result  of  a  direct  reverse,  in  order  to  continue 
in  a  new  position  a  resistance  which  for  the  time  being  has 
become  impossible. 

The  Command  is  the  sole  judge  of  the  circumstances  and 
of  the  moment  when  a  retreat  is  necessary.  No  leader  of  a 
unit  should  abandon  on  his  own  initiative  the  terrain  which 
he  is  given  to  hold;  he  defends  it  to  the  last,  informs  his 
superior  officers  of  his  difficulties,  and  lets  himself  be  killed  on 
the  spot  with  all  his  men  if  he  does  not  receive  the  order  to 
retire.  Such  a  sacrifice  is  at  times  indispensable  to  the  safety 
of  larger  units;  for  the  premature  retreat  of  one  element  of 
the  line  may  seriously  endanger  the  security  of  the  others. 

When  the  Command  considers  a  retreat  necessary,  it  sees 
to  it  that  its  orders  reach  all  the  units  in  proper  time.  In  the 
midst  of  violent  fighting  communications  become  very  diffi- 
cult; telephone  wires  are  cut,  liaison  agents  are  killed  or 
wounded  during  their  journeys,  signalling  is  impossible. 
Taking  all  these  contingencies  into  consideration,  the  Com- 
mand determines  the  time  and  the  conditions  of  the  retreat  in 
such  a  way  that  the  most  advanced  elements  can  be  notified; 
it  makes  sure  that  these  elements  are  thoroughly  prepared  to 
fall  back,  and  that  no  one  is  forgotten,  by  verifying  the 
acknowledgments  of  orders  received.  Order  and  method  are 
worth  more  than  haste  and  impulsiveness  in  critical  situations 
of  this  sort. 

The  retreat  is  performed  whenever  possible  by  night,  so  as 
to  avoid  the  murderous  fire  which  in  daytime  is  opened  upon 
troops  in  movement. 

[170] 


RETREAT 

In  every  case  it  is  indispensable  for  the  units  to  have  per- 
fectly definite  directions  in  which  to  march,  and  well-deter- 
mined tasks  to  perform.  "  Beating  a  retreat  "  is  not  an  aim; 
it  is  a  means  of  escaping  from  the  enemy  in  order  to  resist  him 
successfully  in  another  position.  The  itineraries  are  ch 
so  as  to  avoid  crossing,  crowding,  and  delays;  the  roa< 
reserved,  in  principle  at  least,  for  the  artillery  and  the  matenel. 

The  evacuation  of  the  artillery  is  a  delicate  operation. 
The  artillery  is  very  useful  up  to  the  last  moment  to  pr< 
the  retreat  of  the  troops;  but  it  runs  the  risk  of  capture  if  it 
delays  too  long  in  the  position.  The  heavy  pieces  whose 
removal  is  difficult  leave  first  and  are  followed  by  the  field- 
pieces.  The  orders  relative  to  their  departure  are  issued  by 
the  Command,  which,  however,  should  be  careful  to  leave  a 
certain  latitude  to  the  commanders  of  the  artillery  units,  since 
they  are  the  only  persons  capable  of  estimating  the  situation 
as  it  actually  is.  Rapidity  of  comprehension,  coolness,  and 
method  on  the  part  of  these  commanders  of  units  play  a  large 
part  in  the  proper  carrying  out  of  the  evacuation.  If  the 
pieces  are  irretrievably  lost,  they  are  disabled  at  the  last 
moment. 

The  retreat  of  the  various  troops,  including  the  first-line 
artillery,  is  carried  out  under  the  protection  of  the  batteries 
remaining  in  position,  whose  barrage  fire  is  directed  upon  the 
points  by  which  the  enemy  must  necessarily  pass.  It  is  also 
protected  by  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles,  whose  skillful 
use  can  be  of  the  greatest  service. 

The  units  of  the  rear  guard  have  a  difficult  and  dangerous 
task;  since  they  are  entrusted  with  holding  certain  points  for 
a  definite  length  of  time,  they  are  sometimes  obliged  to  sac- 
rifice themselves  entirely  in  the  performance  of  their  duly. 

[17!] 


DEFENSE  OF  A  POSITION 

Mutual  support  of  the  troops  in  line  or  in  echelons,  as  well 
as  maintenance  of  liaisons  both  lateral  or  in  depth,  are  of 
great  help  in  preserving  order  and  security. 

Mines  and  fougades  prepared  by  the  engineers,  obstacles 
piled  up  at  points  where  the  enemy  has  to  pass,  retard  the 
march  of  the  hostile  forces.  The  communication  routes  are 
destroyed  as  completely  as  possible,  so  as  to  impede  the  move- 
ments of  the  hostile  artillery,  the  arrival  of  munitions  and 
supplies,  and  to  hamper  liaisons  on  the  ground.  But  counter- 
attacks, ordered  at  the  precise  moment  when  the  spirit  of 
the  assailants  begins  to  weaken,  are  the  best  of  all  methods 
of  stopping  the  pursuit. 

A  resistance  maintained  step  by  step,  contesting  every  inch 
of  ground  with  the  enemy,  is  not  always  the  best  method  of 
attaining  the  desired  result.  It  is  often  a  better  plan  to  escape 
from  the  enemy's  clutches  by  a  sudden  rapid  retreat,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  hold  him  back  by  artillery  fire,  and  at  night 
by  a  curtain  of  troops;  and  then  finally  to  reorganize  in  a 
position  against  which  he  will  hurl  himself  in  vain,  suffering 
losses  which  will  be  the  greater  in  proportion  as  he  fancies 
himself  certain  to  succeed. 


[172] 


CHAPTER  V 

RETOUR  OFFENSIF 
The  retour  offensif  aims  at  retaking  the  lost  position. 

It  is  carried  out  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  retreat,  so  as 
not  to  give  the  adversary  time  to  consolidate  his  conquest. 
As  soon  as  the  enemy's  troops,  overjoyed  by  their  initial 
success,  encounter  the  next  position  defended,  they  often 
attack  it  in  a  haste  and  fury,  inconsistent  with  proper  prep- 
aration and  suitable  security;  they  suffer  heavy  losses  and 
renew  their  attacks  until  they  are  exhausted.  This  is  often 
the  most  favorable  moment  to  attempt  a  retour  offensif. 

Fresh  troops,  who  either  know  the  abandoned  position  or 
who  are  supplied  with  numerous  guides,  are  thrown  against 
the  decimated,  disorganized,  and  discouraged  assailants.  They 
execute  their  attack  in  the  same  way  as  an  ordinary  attack 
on  a  position,  but  they  also  have  several  advantages:  the 
defenses  are  neither  as  numerous  nor  as  strong;  the  defenders 
have  used  up  their  troops,  their  reserves,  and  their  munitions; 
they  have  not  always  got  the  range  for  their  heavy  artillery; 
and,  lastly,  they  are  demoralized  by  the  attack  of  an  enemy 
whom  they  imagined  to  be  defeated. 

The  retour  offensif  may  be  aided  by  local  counter-attacks  de- 
livered by  adjacent  troops,  or  by  strategic  counter-attacks  car- 
ried out  on  other  parts  of  the  front,  in  order  to  draw  thither 
the  enemy's  reserves  or  to  keep  in  place  such  as  are  there. 

Its  success,  since  it  increases  the  attrition  and  the  dis- 
organization of  the  enemy,  may  be  the  prelude  to  a  victorious 
offensive. 

[173] 


CONCLUSION 

The  principles  laid  down  in  this  study  have  been  deduced 
from  the  actual  events  of  the  war.  From  the  outset,  a  certain 
number  of  them  have  forced  themselves  upon  the  minds  of 
many  officers. 

The  synthesis  which  we  have  made  is  founded  upon  the 
personal  observation  of  daily  occurrences,  from  which  the 
logical  conclusions  have  been  drawn.1 

The  exposition  does,  however,  draw  upon  the  imagination, 
since  it  describes  phases  of  the  present  war  which  have  not  yet 
occurred. 

But  this  imagination  does  not  contemplate  a  "  war  of 
movement "  wherein  the  enemy  will  have  kindly  removed 
from  the  territory  in  his  rear  all  wire  entanglements,  all 
trenches,  and  all  organized  positions,  so  as  to  let  the  cavalry 
go  prancing  gaily  through!  It  seeks  merely  to  see  the  fighting 
as  it  must  logically  develop,  in  the  present  state  of  arma- 
ments. 

The  events  of  Verdun  and  on  the  Somme  are  a  striking 
exemplification  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  chapters  on 
the  defense  of  a  position,  and  on  the  preparation  and  execu- 
tion of  an  attack.  It  is  to  be  hoped,  for  the  glory  of  the 
Allied  arms,  that  some  future  day  will  witness  the  actual  real- 
ization of  such  phases  as  "the  pursuit"  and  "the  march  of 

1  The  writer's  first  draft  of  the  present  work,  La  Guerre  actuelle,  Riflexions  et 
Souvenirs,  of  which  copies  were  deposited  in  the  Archives  of  the  Ministry  of 
War  at  Paris,  and  at  the  Biblioth&que  Nationale,  March  2, 1916,  is  based  on  his 
personal  experiences. 
[174] 


CONCLUSION 

approach,"  and  that  the  enemy  will  be  forced  to  "  re-align 
his  front  "  and  to  "  retreat." 

It  is  impossible  to  summarize  in  a  few  pages  a  study  which 
enters  into  the  details  of  fighting,  and  which  defines  the  parts 
played  at  each  moment  by  the  various  arms.  But  it  is 
missible  to  emphasize  a  few  underlying  principles,  whose  very 
simplicity  often  causes  them  to  be  overlooked  even  by  the 
best-informed  minds. 

Modern  warfare  is  dominated  by  two  factors :  the  offensive 
power  of  artillery,  and  the  defensive  power  of  field  works. 

These  two  factors  determine  its  characteristics;  it  is  "a  war 
of  positions."1  Movement  is  in  nowise  excluded;  but  it  is 
limited  for  a  twofold  reason:  the  encountering  of  organized 
positions  and  the  difficulty  of  transporting  and  emplacing 
heavy  artillery. 

An  attack  which  is  well  prepared  and  then  carried  out  with 
the  help  of  a  large  quantity  of  heavy  artillery,  abundantly 
provided  with  ammunition,  has  the  best  chances  of  suc- 
cess. In  fact  it  should  always  result  in  the  capture  of  the  first 
trenches  without  great  difficulty.  The  better  the  preparation, 
the  less  the  assailant  suffers.  The  result  of  the  attack  is  a 
forward  movement.  The  rapidity  and  width  of  this  movement 
are  proportional  to  the  ease  with  which  the  heavy  artillery 
can  be  deplaced. 

Heavy  artillery,  indeed,  has  at  its  mercy  those  positions 
which  it  first  subjects  to  a  bombardment  and  then  delivers 

1  Certain  military  critics,  who  have  heard  this  expression  without  under- 
standing it,  speak  of  a  war  of  position  (in  the  singular),  conceiving  it  as  a  war 
of  stationary  forces,  as  "  trench  warfare  "  (in  the  sense  of  warfare  in  holes  in  the 
ground),  and  contrast  it  with  an  imaginary  war  of  movement! 

[175] 


CONCLUSION 

over  to  the  assaults  of  an  energetic  infantry.  The  second 
position  is  often  stronger  than  the  first;  it  is  selected  to  suit 
the  needs  of  the  defender,  whereas  the  first  position  has  been 
forced  upon  him  by  circumstances.  But  the  positions  behind, 
whatever  may  be  their  tactical  advantages,  cannot  be  or- 
ganized as  completely  as  the  two  first,  owing  to  lack  of  means, 
of  time,  and  of  men. 

The  methodical  advance  of  the  attacking  troops  causes  them 
thus  to  encounter  positions  which  become  progressively  less 
organized  and  more  widely  separated.  The  advance,  for  that 
reason  alone,  becomes  more  extended.  But  it  would  be  folly  to 
expect,  on  the  part  of  an  intelligent  adversary,  a  sudden 
absence  of  organized  positions.  Any  body  of  troops,  when  it 
has  to  fight,  digs  itself  in  and  thus  creates  a  position. 

The  enemy's  defense  also  diminishes  progressively  in 
intensity,  owing  to  attrition  in  men,  which  leads  either  to  a 
shortening  or  to  a  withdrawal  of  the  fronts;  in  materiel, 
which  results  in  a  weakened  resistance  in  the  fighting  zones; 
in  morale,  which  causes  enemy  troops  to  run  away  or  to 
surrender. 

Attrition  of  the  adversary  is  the  more  intense  when  ob- 
tained by  a  more  abundant  and  powerful  materiel.  Modern 
war,  which  is  a  war  of  positions,  is,  therefore,  also  a  war  of 
attrition  and  a  war  of  materiel. 

The  object  which  should  be  aimed  at  is  not  only  to  have 
more  and  better  troops  than  the  enemy's,  but  also  to  have 
cannon  and  munitions  in  line  when  he  is  deprived  of  them. 

Even  should  the  adversary  possess  unlimited  reserves  in 
men,  he  is  beaten  if  he  has  not  sufficient  artillery  to  protect 
them.    Men  are  not  a  defense  against  cannon. 

[176] 


CONCLUSION 

This  principle  is  as  true  in  the  offensive  as  in  the  defensive. 
An  obstacle  is  not  overcome  by  repeated  infantry  attacks,  but 
by  successive  blows  dealt  by  the  artillery. 

The  battle  thus  joined  between  cannon  and  field  works  baa 
caused  the  artillery  to  become  more  and  more  powerful,  and 
the  trenches  to  become  deeper  and  deeper.  The  logical  out- 
come must  be:  on  the  one  hand  the  construction  of  pieces 
discharging  very  heavy  and  highly  explosive  projectiles;  on 
the  other  hand  the  digging  of  trenches  and  shelters,  ever 
deeper,  more  casemated,  and  better  protected. 

The  respective  development  of  these  two  opposing  factors 
may  give  to  modern  warfare  varying  aspects,  according  to  the 
engines  of  destruction  devised  and  the  means  of  protection 
employed.  It  does  not  modify  the  general  principles.  But 
at  any  instant  the  cannon  must  be  prepared  for  a  strengthen- 
ing of  the  opposing  entrenchments,  and  the  entrenchments 
must  in  turn  be  ready  for  an  increased  weight  of  enemy's 
cannon,  if  either  side  would  avoid  finding  itself  at  a  serious 
disadvantage. 

There  are,  however,  certain  limits  to  this  double  develop- 
ment. Heavy  artillery  loses  in  mobility  what  it  gains  in 
power;  it  becomes  too  difficult  to  move,  and,  above  all,  to 
keep  supplied.  Deep  entrenchments  are  dangerous  because 
men  or  munitions  may  be  buried  in  them;  their  construction, 
moreover,  takes  too  much  time  and  effort  to  be  effected  over 
large  spaces  of  territory. 

Because  of  the  considerable  man-power  and  the  immense 
material  means  required  in  modern  warfare,  it  is  difficult  to 
join  battle  along  an  entire  front.  Attacks  are  executed  in 
certain  zones,  which  may  be  very  large,  but  are  limited  in 
number. 

[177] 


CONCLUSION 

It  is  the  choice,  first  of  all,  of  these  different  zones,  and 
next  of  that  particular  one  where  the  fighting  must  be  forced, 
regardless  of  cost,  which  constitutes  the  strategic  art  of  to-day. 
Success  will  follow  of  itself. 

The  same  law  controls  tactical  and  strategic  efforts.  In 
an  attack  upon  a  position,  a  centre  of  resistance  falls  if  its 
flanks  are  overrun;  in  an  attack  on  a  zone,  the  position  is 
doomed  if  its  communications  are  exposed  by  the  capture  of 
the  adjacent  zones.  Likewise,  in  an  attack  upon  a  front,  an 
advance  in  one  or  more  zones  may  lead  to  the  evacuation  of 
all  the  others. 

If  an  army  could  dispose  of  sufficient  munitions  to  begin  and 
to  continue  an  artillery  action  over  the  entire  front,  it  would 
bring  about  ideal  conditions  for  obtaining  a  decisive  victory. 
The  enemy's  army,  kept  on  the  alert  at  all  points,  decimated, 
and  demoralized,  would  be  forced  back  in  the  zone  where  the 
attack  was  most  successfully  developed.  The  breach  thus 
made  would  be  deepened  and  widened,  forcing  the  enemy  to 
retreat  in  the  adjoining  zones. 

The  opening  of  the  breach  is  but  the  prelude  of  success,  for 
it  requires  cruel  sacrifices  of  men  and  an  enormous  expenditure 
of  materiel.  It  is  the  drawing  in  of  the  other  parts  of  the 
enemy's  front  which  completes  the  victory;  this  takes  place 
over  a  considerable  extent  of  terrain  and  permits  an  assailant 
who  is  watchful  and  active  to  capture  thousands  of  men  and 
of  engines  of  war,  almost  without  striking  a  blow. 

Attention  and  activity  must  be  the  watchword  everywhere. 
No  troops,  even  in  the  calmest  sector,  should  allow  them- 
selves to  become  slack  or  idle.  If  they  do,  they  may  well 
permit  the  enemy  to  escape  unperceived,  and  thus  lose  all 
the  advantages  of  a  success  which  has  been  within  their  grasp. 

[178] 


CONCLUSION 

Upon  every  point  of  the  front  the  soldiers  should  labor 
unremittingly  to  prepare  for  the  glorious  morrow.  It  is  the 
duty  of  every  commander  to  organize  his  position  or  his 
trench  for  the  offensive  as  well  as  for  the  defensive;  he  must 
not  spare  himself  trouble  nor  quiet  himself  with  the  false 
excuse  that  he  occupies  a  merely  provisional  position.  Un- 
ceasing labor  always  bears  fruit. 

Will-power,  method,  discipline,  and  perseverance  are  the 
means  by  which  Victory  is  won. 


[179] 


GLOSSARY 


GLOSSARY 

Accessory  Defenses  (Ddfenses  accessories):  Material  obstacles 
such  as  barbed-wire  entanglements,  chevaux  de  frise,  pitfalls, 
etc.,  for  the  purpose  of  obstructing  the  approach  to  temporary 
or  permanent  fortification.  The  word  "obstacles"  lias  been 
frequently  employed  in  English  for  this  purpose,  but  should 
be  avoided,  since  obstacle  in  military  French  has  a  totally 
different  meaning. 

Amlnagement  (Amenagement) :  Preparation  of  a  terrain  or  of  a 
position  for  the  purpose  of  a  military  operation.  It  includes 
the  construction  of  all  sorts  of  works,  the  bringing  up  and 
installation  of  materiel,  the  organization  of  communications, 
etc. 

Artillery: 

(a)  Field  Artillery  (Artillerie  de  Campagne —  A.C.):  In  this 
book  this  term  is  used  in  its  French  sense.  In  France  field 
artillery  includes  only  the  smaller  calibres  such  as  the  75 
(3-inch),  the  80  (3.2-inch)  and  the  90  (3.6-inch),  which 
correspond  to  what  is  called  "  light  artillery  "  in  the  United 
States.  The  larger  calibres,  including  the  95  (3.8-inch) 
and  upwards,  are  classed  in  France  with  the  heavy  artil- 
lery; but  in  the  United  States  some  of  these  larger  calibres 
are  included,  together  with  the  light  artillery,  in  the  term 
"  field  artillery." 

(6)  Heavy  Artillery  (Artillerie  lourde  —  A.  L.):  In  this  book 
this  term  has  also  been  used  in  its  French  sense.  In 
France  heavy  artillery  includes  the  95  (3.8-inch)  and  up- 
wards; it  is  subdivided  into  heavy  artillery  of  medium 
calibre  (up  to  the  155  (6-inch)),  and  heavy  artillery  of 
larger  calibre  (from  the  155  upwards). 

[188] 


GLOSSARY 

(c)  Light  Artillery  (in  the  U.  S.)  (Artillerie  Ugere) :  This  term 
no  longer  exists  in  France,  and  it  is  not  used  in  this  book. 
The  American  light  artillery  is  the  same  as  the  French 
field  artillery.    (See  under  "  Field  Artillery.") 

(d)  Trench  Artillery  (Artillerie  de  Tranchee — A.  T.):  Includes 
all  ballistic  weapons,  bomb-throwers  and  mortars  of  all 
calibres  and  of  all  models  which  are  set  up  in  trenches  and 
served  by  artillerists  called  trench  mortar-men. 

Attrition  ( Usure) :    Indicating  wastage  of  men  and  of  materiel, 
and  deterioration  of  morale. 

Automatic  Machine  Rifle  (Fusil  mitrailleur) :  An  automatic  rifle 
which  works  by  a  long  recoil  of  the  barrel,  and  is  loaded  with 
semi-circular  clips  containing  twenty  cartridges  each.  It 
weighs  about  eighteen  pounds  and  is  served  by  a  marksman 
and  two  loaders.  The  term  "  French  automatic  rifle,"  formerly 
used  to  designate  the  fusil  mitrailleur,  is  no  longer  employed 
in  this  sense,  because  a  regular  automatic  rifle  has  been  in- 
vented and  is  now  in  use  in  France.  The  term  "  automatic 
rifle  "  is  henceforth  reserved  for  this  weapon.  On  the  other 
hand,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  confuse  the  automatic  machine 
rifle  with  the  machine  gun. 
Barrage  (Barrage):  A  wide  curtain  of  fire,  formed  usually  by 
shells,  but  also  sometimes  by  projectiles  shot  by  infantry 
weapons,  for  the  purpose  of  creating  an  impassable  zone  in 
front  of  friendly  troops. 

A  barrage  may  be  either  defensive  or  offensive. 

A  defensive  artillery  barrage  is  delivered  at  a  moment's 
notice,  in  order  to  stop  an  attack,  a  counter-attack,  or  a  retour 
offensif  by  enemy  troops.  An  offensive  artillery  barrage  is  a 
moving  barrage,  which  precedes  by  the  shortest  possible  dis- 
tance the  attacking  infantry  of  the  same  side  that  delivers  it, 
and  advances  at  the  same  rate  with  that  infantry. 

Boyau  (Boyau)  :  A  ditch  used  for  circulation  between  the 
trenches  and  the  rear  in  the  dangerous  zone.  The  boyaux 
run  in  a  direction  generally  perpendicular  to  the  front,  and 
are  used   solely  for  circulation,  while  trenches  are  used  for 

[184] 


GLOSSARY 

combat  and  run  in  a  direction  generally  parallel  to  the  front. 
The  English  call  these  boyaux  "  communication  trench. 
which  is  likely  to  cause  confusion.  The  word  boyau  is  in 
accord  with  the  French  usage.  To  avoid  errors  which  might 
result  from  the  adoption  of  the  English  terminology,  the  term 
"  communication  trenches"  has  been  kept  out  of  this  book. 
For  the  same  reason  the  term  "communicating  trenches, " 
which  has  been  sometimes  employed  to  designate  "  dowUing 
trenches  "  (not  boyaux)  should  also  be  avoided. 

Camouflage  {Camouflage) :  Any  means  of  concealment  of  works, 
batteries,  materiel,  roads,  trenches,  troops,  or  any  other  imple- 
ment of  warfare. 

Command  (Commandement) :  Designates  in  a  general  way  leaders 
of  high  rank  whose  duty  it  is  to  make  decisions  and  to  give 
orders;   it  also  includes  their  staffs. 

High  Command  (Haiti  Commandement):  Designates  leaders  of 
the  highest  rank  such  as  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Generals 
of  army  groups  and  of  armies. 

Command-Post  (Poste  de  Commandement) :  Place  where  a  com- 
mander places  himself,  either  in  the  trenches  (organized  shelter) 
or  during  the  course  of  the  combat  (improvised  shelter).  In 
current  usage  the  word  "  station  "  is  sometimes  employed, 
together  with  the  rank  of  the  commander  occupying  it:  e.  g., 
"  Colonel's  station." 

Counter-Attack  {Contre-attaque) :  Partial  attack  directed  against 
an  attacking  body  of  hostile  troops  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing its  advance. 

Depot  (Depot):  Place  where  provisions,  water,  ammunition  or 
materiel  can  be  set  down.  In  zones  exposed  to  artillery  fire 
it  is  a  shelter  or  a  wide  space  where  munitions  are  spread  out 
so  as  to  escape  the  danger  of  destruction  by  enemy  airplanes. 
In  the  French  military  vocabulary  the  word  has  another 
meaning,  namely,  the  unit  comprising  available  troops  who 
are  awaiting  their. departure  for  the  front,  as,  e.  g.,  depdts  des 
regiments  (in  the  cities  far  behind  the  lines)  or  depdt  divisionnaire 
(near  the  front). 

[185] 


GLOSSARY 

Echelon,  verb  0 chelonner) :  To  arrange  a  body  of  troops  in 
echelons,  that  is  to  say,  to  divide  it  into  two  or  more  portions 
placed  one  behind  the  other. 

Echelon,  noun  (Echelon) : 

1.  A  portion  of  a  body  of  troops  arranged  in  echelons.  In  the 
case  of  artillery,  "  to  move  by  echelons  "  means  to  move 
the  echeloned  portions  one  after  another  in  such  a  way 
that  the  rearmost  passes  in  front  of  the  foremost. 

2.  In  a  special  sense  a  portion  stationed  behind  and  to  the  right 
(or  left)  of  another  portion  of  the  same  body  of  troops. 
This  is  in  fact  the  usual  significance  of  the  word  in  English. 
"  To  retreat  by  echelons  "  means,  in  the  case  of  infantry,  to 
move  back  the  different  portions  one  after  another  in  such 
a  way  that  one  of  them  is  placed  behind  and  to  the  right  (or 
left)  of  the  one  adjacent  to  it  and  under  its  protection. 

3.  In  French  the  word  echelon  has  also  several  other  meanings : 

(a)  Echelon  de  Combat  (artillery)  signifies  combat  train; 

(b)  Echelon,  in  the  case  of  a  machine-gun  company,  desig- 
nates a  portion  of  that  company  consisting  of  the  means 
of  transport  for  those  guns  and  their  ammunition  which 
are  to  go  directly  to  the  firing  line. 

Echelonment  (Echelonnement):  Arrangement  by  which  a  body 
of  troops  is  divided  into  echelons. 

Effectives  (Effectif):  Number  of  men  (officers,  N.  C.  Os.,  and 
soldiers)  in  a  body  of  troops. 

Emplacement  (Emplacement):  Point  or  portion  of  the  ground 
which  is  or  can  be  utilized  to  install  a  weapon,  an  implement, 
an  organ  of  command,  materiel,  or  a  body  of  troops.  The 
"  location  "  is  the  topographical  determination  of  the  emplace- 
ment. 

Enfilading  Fire  (Tir  d' enfilade):  A  fire  which  catches  a  linear 
objective  longitudinally,  whether  from  the  side  or  from  the 
front;  end-on  fire. 

Fascines  (Fascines) :   Faggots  about  eight  feet  long  used  in  field 
fortifications. 
[186] 


GLOSSARY 

Field  Works  (Ouvrages  de  campagne):  In  contrast  to  permanent 
fortifications. 

Flanking  Fire  ( Tir  d'tcharpe) :  Oblique  or  slanting  Grc. 

Fougade  (Fougasse):  Buried  charges  of  powder  or  melinite  BOme- 
times  covered  over  with  stones  and  exploded  by  an  electric 
current  or  by  a  detonating  fuse. 

French  Automatic  Rifle:  Term  at  first  used  to  indicate  the  auto- 
matic machine  rifle,  q.  v.,  in  contrast  to  the  regular  automatic 
rifle.  It  has  now  been  definitively  supplanted  by  the  term 
"  automatic  machine  rifle." 

Gabion  {Gabion) :  Cylindrical  basket  without  a  bottom,  composed 
of  branches  tied  around  stakes  and  filled  with  earth,  sand,  or 
gravel;  utilized  in  field  fortifications. 

Group  (Groupement,  —  d'artillerie) :  The  word  groupe  in  French 
designates  the  regular  artillery  unit  corresponding  to  the  Ameri- 
can artillery  battalion.  The  group  (groupement)  on  the  other 
hand  is  a  temporary  conjunction  of  different  units  —  usually 
of  different  calibres  —  as,  for  example,  a  battalion  of  field 
artillery  and  a  battery  of  heavy  artillery. 

Guide-plan  (Plan  directeur)  :  Detailed  maps,  on  the  French 
scales  of  -j-oxfthJ)  TTTBTJTy  ana*  ^T)V(y>  giving  the  fullest  and  most 
minute  information  obtainable  in  regard  to  the  enemy's  trenches 
and  organization.  These  plans  may  show  only  the  enemy's 
trenches,  or  they  may  show  those  of  both  sides;  in  this  latter 
case,  they  are  not  given  to  commanders  of  lower  rank  than 
majors,  and  must  never  be  taken  up  into  the  first  line. 

Formerly  these  guide-plans  were  called  "firing  maps"  (plans 
directeurs  du  tir),  and  were  made  for  the  use  of  the  artillery. 
But  now  that  the  necessity  of  having  detailed  plans  for  all 
arms  of  the  service,  for  the  staffs,  and  for  officers  of  all  ranks 
has  become  generally  recognized,  these  guide-plans  have  de- 
veloped rapidly,  and  their  use  has  been  greatly  extended. 

American  officers  of  all  ranks  should  familiarize  themselves 
with  these  French  guide-plans,  and  with  the  French  scales. 

[187] 


GLOSSARY 

Indicative  (Indicatif,  —  aviation) :  Prearranged  signal  by  means 
of  which  an  airplane  or  balloon  can  either  call  the  station  on  the 
ground  with  which  it  wishes  to  communicate  (by  wireless  or 
by  an  electric  flash  light  on  board)  or  can  make  itself  known  by 
an  identifying  cartridge  with  one  or  several  flashes. 

Listening  Post  (Poste  d'ecoute):  Post  situated  in  front  of  the  first 
line  trench  for  observing  and  listening  to  the  movements  of  the 
enemy. 

Observation  Post  (Poste  d' observation) :  Position  selected  to 
enable  commanders  of  every  rank  to  observe  the  enemy  or  the 
terrain.  It  should  be  close  to  the  command-post  and  conse- 
quently determines  the  choice  of  the  latter  in  the  case  of  an 
advance;  it  is  organized  as  completely  as  possible,  but  lacks 
the  extensive  equipment  of  an  observing  station. 

Observing  Station  (Observatoire) :  A  construction  specially  or- 
ganized for  purposes  of  observation  in  a  place  selected  because 
of  its  topographical  location  and  the  views  it  commands.  Ob- 
serving stations  are  provided  with  a  special  personnel  and  a 
special  outfit;  they  are  carefully  concealed  from  the  sight  of 
the  enemy  and  protected  against  bombardments.  There  are 
observing  stations  for  the  Command  and  observing  stations  for 
the  artillery. 

The  French  word  observatoire  is  also  applied  to  airplanes 
and  balloons.  One  speaks  of  aerial  observatoires  in  contrast  to 
those  on  the  ground. 

Retour  Offensif  (Retour  Offensif):  An  attack  whose  object  is  to 
retake  a  trench,  a  work,  a  terrain  or  a  position  which  the  enemy 
has  seized. 

Rifle  Grenade  (Grenade  a  fusil,  e.  g.,  obus  V.  B.,  q.  v.) :  A  grenade 
of  cylindrical  shape  fired  by  means  of  a  sort  of  cannon  (called 
in  French  tromblon)  which  can  be  fitted  to  an  ordinary  rifle. 
The  shell  is  propelled  by  the  powder  in  the  rifle  cartridge;  it 
explodes  from  five  to  seven  seconds  later,  through  the  action 
of  a  firing  powder  which  is  lighted  by  a  trigger  set  off  by  the 
bullet  of  the  rifle. 
[188] 


GLOSSARY 

Sap  (Sape):  An  excavation  which  may  be  subterraneous  <>r  not 
dug  by  men  who  advance  foot  by  foot ;  in  contrasl  to  a  trench 
or  a  boyau  which  is  made  by  men  all  digging  at  the  same  time. 

Sapper  (Sapeur):  Soldier  of  the  engineers;   in  a  special  sent)  one 

who  digs  a  sap. 

Stationary  Fighting  (Stationnement):  A  period  of  the  *ra?  of  po- 
sitions during  which  the  troops  remain  in  the  same  trenches 

and  are  unable  to  advance. 

Traverse  (Traverse):  A  piece  of  natural  soil  around  which  the 
trench  turns,  and  so  placed  as  to  protect  adjacent  portions  of  it. 

V.  B.  (Viven-Bessieres) :  Names  of  the  inventors  of  the  V.  B. 
rifle  grenade  used  in  the  French  army.  (See  under  "  Rifle 
Grenade.") 

Trench  (Tranchee):  A  ditch  dug  to  protect  troops  from  the  enemy, 
and  to  permit  them  at  the  same  time  to  remain  face  to  face  with 
him. 

Trenches  have  an  offensive  object;  in  that  they  enable  the 
men  to  remain  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy,  to  cause  him 
losses,  and  in  that  they  furnish  a  place  from  which  t«>  launch 
attacks. 

They  have  a  defensive  object;  in  that  they  make  it  possible 
to  resist  the  enemy's  attacks,  and  to  confront  him  with  a  num- 
ber of  successive  lines,  difficult  to  take. 

They  differ,  in  interior  shape,  in  tactical  purpose,  and  in  the 
general  direction  in  which  they  run,  from  boyaux,  which  are 
used  for  circulation  between  the  trenches  and  the  rear.  Boyaux 
should  therefore  never  be  designated  by  the  name  "  communi- 
cating trenches,"  as  is  so  often  done. 

On  the  different  kinds  of  trenches,  —  first  line,  doubling, 
transversal,  support,  see  pp.  41-48.  All  these  trendies  may 
become  "  firing  trenches,"  in  case  the  enemy  attacks  and  ad- 
vances into  the  interior  of  the  position. 

The  use  of  other  adjectives  to  describe  or  define  the  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  trenches  can  only  lend  to  dangerous  confusions 
and  mistakes. 

[189] 


GLOSSARY 

Wave  (Vague):  A  wave  is  a  formation  for  combat.  It  is  com- 
posed of  units  (platoons,  companies,  etc.)  placed  side  by  side, 
and  belonging  to  other  larger  units  disposed  in  depth.  (See 
pages  107  ff .) 

The  attacking  wave  or  first  wave  includes  two  lines,  which 
are  sometimes  incorrectly  called  "  waves  "  in  common  parlance; 
these  lines  are  placed  about  fifteen  paces  from  one  another;  a 
third  line,  composed  of  trench-cleaners,  and  often  improperly 
called  "  the  third  wave,"  marches  about  twenty  paces  behind 
the  second.  The  whole  of  this  formation  goes  forward  en  bloc 
like  a  wave;  but  also  like  a  wave,  it  tends,  if  it  encounters  an 
obstacle,  to  resolve  itself  into  a  single  line,  through  the  piling 
up  of  the  rearward  elements  on  the  foremost. 

The  following  waves  (second,  third,  etc.),  which  are  intended 
to  serve  as  reinforcing  and  manoeuvring  troops,  start  at  various 
distances  behind  the  first:  these  distances  are  secured  by  the 
command,  either  by  means  of  a  prearranged  time-schedule, 
by  spacings  on  the  ground  or  by  signals. 

The  frequent  and  incorrect  use  of  the  word  waves  to  desig- 
nate the  different  lines  of  one  and  the  same  wave  has  created 
numerous  confusions  and  ambiguities  which  it  is  important  to 
terminate. 

Zone  (Z6ne):    Space  of  terrain  of  variable  size. 

(a)  A  zone  of  the  front  might  be  as  much  as  fifty  miles  long  and 
twenty  deep.  Such  a  zone  may  be  defined  by  limits  existing 
in  either  of  the  adversaries'  fines. 

(b)  A  zone  of  attack,  of  march,  or  of  stationary  fighting  is  the 
portion  of  territory,  of  limited  extent,  which  is  assigned  to 
a  large  or  small  body  of  troops,  in  any  phase  of  the  com- 
bat (attack,  pursuit,  march  of  approach,  or  stationary 
fighting). 

(c)  Zone  fire  is  an  artillery  fire  directed  on  a  limited  space 
which  constitutes  the  target,  without  designation  of  any 
more  special  objective  inside  it. 


[196] 


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